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Abstract
This dissertation draws on gang organization research and organizational theory to assess
the underlying dimensions of organization in terrorist groups. Using the Leadership for
the Extreme and Dangerous for Innovative Results (LEADIR) dataset, findings suggest
that organization is a multidimensional construct in terrorist groups, including the
structuring of activities dimension and the concentration of authority dimension. In
relation to violence, terrorist groups high on the structuring of activities dimension were
significantly more lethal in general and more lethal when attacking hard targets, whereas
terrorist groups high on the concentration of authority dimension attacked hard targets at
a significantly higher rate. These findings demonstrate that both dimensions of
organization were related to an increased capacity for violence yet in different ways. In
light of these findings, a theoretical model is outlined, and practical implications are
discussed with a focus on how both organizational dimensions highlight the role of
criminal capital and bureaucratic control mechanisms in terrorist groups.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, a number of terrorism studies have examined the structural form
of terrorist groups (e.g., Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001; Ligon et al., 2013; Shapiro, 2005;
Volder, 2016) as well as the relationship between terrorist group characteristics and
violent outcomes such as lethality or soft target selection (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008;
Heger et al., 2012). Despite advances, few scholars have utilized a criminological
approach to understand the organizational features of terrorist groups. While terrorism
studies are relatively new, there is a large body of literature on the structure of street
gangs and its influence on violence (Bouchard & Spindler, 2010; Decker, 2001; Decker
& Curry, 2000; Decker & Van Winkle, 1995; Sanchez-Jankowski, 1991; Spindler &
Bouchard, 2011; Thrasher, 1927; Yablonsky, 1959). Drawing from a group process
perspective, this literature focuses on how street gangs and criminal groups have specific
properties that influence the behavior of its members (Short & Strodtbeck, 1965; also see
Klein & Crawford, 1967). Broadly speaking, insights from street gang research are
applicable to the study of terrorist groups for two reasons. First, street gangs and terrorist
groups are difficult to reach populations consisting of mostly young males that engage in
public violence (Curry, 2011; Decker & Pyrooz, 2011, 2015a, 2015b). Second, research
has shown that both street gangs and terrorist groups share similar group characteristic
and vary in degrees of organization (Valasik & Phillips, 2017).
In this dissertation, I examine the dimensions of organization in terrorist groups
and their influence on violence. In doing so, this study is of the first to quantitatively
assess how the dimensions of organization manifest in terrorist groups. To understand
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terrorist group organization, I rely on gang organization research and the group processes
perspective in criminology.1 Organization refers specifically to the “work environment”
and ways in which gangs bring order, planning, or coordination to their criminal activities
(Bouchard & Spindler, 2010, p. 922). Organization is also related to the extent to which
criminal groups are complex such as a division of labor and specialization, coordinated
and governed by formal rules, and purposeful with a shared objective (Best & Luckenbill,
1980; Cressey, 1972). Gang organization research is beneficial for this study for two
reasons. First, gang organization research is methodologically robust and provides
measureable indicators of organization that can also be used to examine terrorist group
organization. Second, gang organization research have demonstrated that more organized
gangs have higher levels of criminal offending and other deviant activities across
multiple levels of analysis (Bjerregaard, 2002; Bouchard & Spindler, 2010; Decker,
2001; Decker, Bynum, & Weisel, 1998; Decker, Katz & Webb, 2008; Decker & Pyrooz,
2015a; Hagedorn, 1994; Leverso & Matsueda, 2019; Moule Jr, Pyrooz, & Decker, 2013;
Pyrooz, Fox, Katz, & Decker, 2012; Sheley, Zhang, Brody, & Wright 1995). Thus, gang
organization research provides a foundation for the expected relationship between
organization and violence in terrorist groups.
Statement of the Problem
There are two primary limitation with the current literature on terrorist group
organization. First, the majority of research on terrorist group organization is theoretical
in nature or relies on case studies (e.g., Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001; Jackson, 2006; Ligon
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According to Papachristos, Hureau, and Braga (2013) group processes focus on “a range of interactional
mechanisms and normative processes fostered by the coming together of members and the formation of
collective identity” (p. 420).
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et al., 2013; Shapiro, 2005; Volders, 2016; Zelinsky & Shubik, 2009). Subsequently, few
studies focus on measurement or offer ways to quantitative examine terrorist group
organization. While terrorism scholars put forth common organizational dimensions
underlying terrorist groups such as centralization or interconnectedness, little is known
regarding how to quantify these dimensions. This is problematic for the study of
terrorism since there is no systematic approach to understand organization across a large
number of terrorist groups. This is also problematic for law enforcement and those in the
field since there is no empirical basis on what terrorist groups to prioritize based on a
tangible set of organizational characteristics.
The second broad limitation is that the majority of terrorism research has
examined individual or environmental predictors of terroristic violence. In contrast, few
studies have examined predictors of terrorism at the group level (for exception Abrahms
& Potter, 2015; Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008; Heger et al., 2012). Moreover, studies that
have examined the link between terrorist group organization and violence typically
classify groups into broad categorize (i.e., hierarchical or non-hierarchical). By doing so,
organization is viewed as a definer as opposed to a descriptor in terrorist groups. Such an
approach to classifying terrorist groups neglects important variation in organization that
exists between categorizes.
To address the limitations in the existing literature, I draw upon existing research
on gang organization to identify what indicators of organization are frequently used. If
gangs and terrorist groups are similar (Curry, 2011; Decker & Pyrooz, 2011, 2015a,
2015b; Valasik & Phillips, 2017; Vishnevetsky, 2009) then many of the indicators of
organization used to examine gangs should be applicable to terrorist groups. Next, I
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assess how those indicators of gang organization map onto specific organizational
dimensions (e.g., centralization, complexity, formalization) discussed in organizational
theory. Organizational theory focuses on how organizational features influence
performance (e.g., Lammers, 1978; Mintzberg, 1979; Rogers, 2003). In a recent study,
Moule Jr and colleagues (2014) proposed a similar strategy and argued that five
organizational dimensions typically found in theories of organizational behavior are
applicable to gangs including centrality, formalization, complexity, interconnectedness,
and organizational slack. While Moule Jr and colleagues (2014) used a top-down strategy
and selected the indicators of organization based on theory, I use a bottom-up approach
where I identified common indicators in the gang literature, then explore the
organizational theory literature to contextualize the representation of these indicators.
Finally, I examine how the indicators found in gang research and their underlying
dimension manifest in terrorist group and influence violent outcomes of terrorist groups.
Research Questions and Agenda
The overarching goal of this dissertation is to better understand the organization
of terrorist groups drawing from existing gang organization research and organizational
theory. This dissertation addresses two central research questions. The first research
question addressed: Which indicators of gang organization can be applied to terrorist
groups to develop a classification schema of terrorist group structure? Classification
schemas have a long history in the field of criminology (e.g., Moffitt, 1993) and offer an
approach to organizing complex information into coherent taxonomies. In terrorism
research, a large body of literature focuses on typologies of terrorist organizations based
on their structural characteristics (e.g., Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001; Kilberg, 2012). The
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drawback is the majority of this research is either theoretical or based solely on case
studies. Thus, the goal of the first research question is to identify which indicators of
organization -- drawn from the gang organization literature and supported by
organizational theory – are applicable to and vary between terrorist groups.
The second research question addressed: Do terrorist groups that are more highly
organized engage in more group level violence than less organized terrorist groups?
With regard to violence, I examined two main types: lethality and hard target selection.
The first type of violence, lethality, is related to the total number of victims killed by a
terrorist group. Prior research has shown that terrorist groups who are centralized and
share a strategic vision are more lethal than groups who do not meet those criteria (Heger
et al., 2012). Studies on gang organization also suggest that members of more organized
gangs are more violent and criminally active than members of less organized gangs
(Decker et al., 2008). This, the working hypothesis is that terrorist groups with higher
levels of organization are more lethal than those with lower levels of organization.
The second violent outcome, hard target section, examines the degree to which
terrorist groups attack targets that are heavily protected such as members of the
government, or those charged with protecting against violent attacks such as police or
military members. Relative to soft targets, which typically have few protections in place
and require little skill to attacks, hard targets demand a considerable amount of
coordination and expertise to attack given their capacity to deter and combat terrorist
attacks. While target selection is an essential facet of terrorist organization decisionmaking (Abrahms & Potter 2015; Asal, Rethemeyer, Anderson, Stein, Rizzo, & Rozea,
2009; Drake 1998; de la Calle & Sanchez-Cuenca 2006), few studies have focused on
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attacks on hard targets (for exception see, Asal, Gill, Rethemeyer, & Horgan, 2015;
Berman & Latin, 2008; Piazza, 2020). I expect that terrorist groups with greater levels of
organization are more likely to attack hard targets relative to those with lower levels of
organization. This is in line with Best and Luckenbill’s (1980) notion that criminal
collectives with higher levels of organizational sophistication have a greater capability for
complex deviant operations.
Key Terms: Terrorism and Terrorist Groups
There is no universally accepted definition of terrorism. In some cases, the term
“terrorism” is used subjectively to label someone or some group to delegitimize their
actions. In other cases, the term is used in reference to a tactic used by an organization or
an individual (e.g., Hoffman, 2006). For this dissertation, the definition of terrorism is as
follows:
the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to
attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or
intimidation (START, 2020).2
In a study of more than fifty scholarly articles, Schmid and Jongman (1988) found that
the basic definition is that terrorism is a violent tactic used to intimate or coerce an
audience towards a political or social goal. In a more recent analysis of seventy-three
definitions from the four leading academic journals on the study of terrorism, Weinberg,
Pedahzur, and Hirsch-Hoefler (2014) came up with the consensus definition: “Terrorism
is a politically motivated tactic involving the threat or use of force or violence in which

2

This definition does not include acts of state terrorism and the term terrorism is interchangeable with the
term violent extremism.”
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the pursuit of publicity plays a significant role" (p. 786). The definition of terrorism used
in this dissertation satisfies these tenants.3
Similar to the concept of terrorism, prior research has defined terrorist groups in a
number of ways (e.g., Asal & Rethemyer, 2008; Crenshaw, 1991; Cronin, 2009; Della
Porta, 1995; de la Calle & Sánchez-Cuenca 2011, Enders & Sandler, 2012; Findley &
Young, 2012; Shapiro & Siegel, 2012). For this dissertation, the definition of terrorist
groups is as follows:
Subnational political organizations that use terrorism (Phillips, 2015, p.231)
This definition is suitable for two reasons. First, it meets three criteria commonly found
in prior research including subnational, political organization, and the use of terrorism
(see Phillips, 2015 for review). The focus on subnationality and political goals excludes
state terrorism and criminal groups who use violence for instrumental purposes. Second,
this definition is inclusive and treats a group as a terrorist group regardless of whether it
meets other exclusive criteria (e.g., holding territory or not).
Criminological Study of Terrorism
Sutherland and Cressey (1960) defined crime as “behavior in violation of the
criminal law” (p. 4). By this definition, terrorism and other acts of political violence are
crimes and fall within the domain of criminology (Maier-Katkin, Mears, & Benard, 2009;
Pickett, Baker, Metcalfe, et al., 2014). Some scholars argue that acts of political violence

3

Section 802 of the USA Patriot Act defines terrorism as an act dangerous to human life that is a violation
of the criminal laws of a state or the United States, if the act appears to be intended to: (i) intimidate or
coerce a civilian population; (ii) influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to
affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination or kidnapping. While the USA
Patriot Act focuses on acts against US citizens in their definition, the definition of terrorism used in this
dissertation does not.
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such as terrorism and genocide are relevant to what some consider “core criminology,”
given their association with increased levels of street crime and delinquency (Gartner,
1990; Pickett et al., 2014). However, this view of terrorism has not always been the case.
Early research on the link between crime and terrorism rested on the assumption that the
terrorist is altruistic and believes he or she is serving a “good” cause whereas the criminal
serves no cause outside of his or her personal aggrandizement and material satisfaction
(Hoffman, 2006). Prominent criminologists, such as Hirschi and Gottfredson (2001), also
supported the view that crime and terrorism are distinct concepts and that criminological
theory is poorly suited to explain terrorism since it ‘‘reflect[s] commitment to a political
cause’’ (p. 94).
Over time, the treatment of crime and terrorism as distinct concepts has
diminished as researchers have increasing pointed out similarities, both in motives and
tactics, between terrorist groups and criminal organizations. For instance, researchers
have shown that criminal organizations such as Mexican drug cartels employ terrorist
tactics to advance their interests (Phillips, 2018), while terrorist organizations such as the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) engage in extortion, kidnapping, and
drug trafficking to support their political goals (Treverton, 2009). Other scholars have
pointed out that, despite differing goals, terrorists and criminals appropriate each other’s
activity and seek expertise from one another (Shelley & Picarelli, 2005; Windle,
Morrison, Winter, & Silke, 2018). Today, a wide range of criminological theories have
been used to help understand the motivations, tactics, risk factors, and protective factors
related to violent extremism including life course theory (Simi, Sporer & Bubolz, 2016),
techniques of neutralization (Liddick, 2013; Sporer, Logan, Ligon, & Derrick, 2019),
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social disorganization (Fahey & LaFree, 2015; Freilich, Adamczyk, Chermak, Boyd, &
Parkin, 2015), routine activities (Parkin & Freilich, 2015), displace and diffusion (Hsu &
Apel, 2015), rational choice (Gill, Marchment, Corner, & Bouhana, 2020; Mandala &
Freilich, 2017; Perry & Hasisi, 2015), deterrence (Argomaniz & Vidai-Diez, 2015), and
general strain theory (Agnew, 2010; Nivette, Eisner, & Ribeaud, 2017). Taken together,
terrorism is a growing research area in the field of criminology and criminological
theories are well suited to better understand the complexities of terrorism.
Crime-terror continuum
Initially conceptualized by Makarenko (2004), the crime-terror continuum
describes an underlying nexus between ideologically motivated terrorism and profitoriented organized crime. The crime-terror continuum supports the idea that crime and
terrorism are not distinct concepts, and the relationships, goals, and tactics of organized
crime groups and terrorists are not fixed. Instead, the organized crime-terrorism
relationship is transformational and based on a hybrid of economic and ideological
motives in a rapidly evolving global market (Makarenko, 2004; Perri & Brody, 2011;
Phillips & Kamen, 2014). At one end of the continuum are organized crime groups who
seek to maximize profits while avoiding scrutiny. At the other end of the continuum are
terrorist organizations that pursue ideological goals through violent or threatening means.
In the middle of the continuum are theoretical possibilities where one organization,
organized crime or terrorist, adopts the methods of the other to accomplish its goal
(Valasik & Phillips, 2017). For example, terrorist groups such as the Islamic State
embrace traditional organized crimes such as extortion, kidnapping, and drug trafficking
to raise funds (Bastug & Guler, 2018). Likewise, Flanigan (2012) highlights how drug
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cartels have increasingly used “ghastly” acts of violence, typically reserved for terrorist
groups, to intimidate public officials and create a sense of fear among the Mexican
population. In one potent example, Flanigan (2012) describes how members of La
Familia Michoaca ́n first gained notoriety by dumping five severed heads onto the dance
floor of a nightclub.
Gang-terror continuum
Much of the conceptualization of the crime-terror continuum has focused on
terrorism as it relates to traditional organized crime and vice-versa. More recently,
however, several scholars have highlighted ways in which the street gang literature can
inform terrorism studies (Curry, 2011; Decker & Pyrooz, 2011, 2015a, 2015b; Valasik &
Phillips, 2017; Vishnevetsky, 2009). Curry (2011) notes that comparing street gangs and
terrorist organizations is more promising than initially thought. This is likely because
despite the relative newness of terrorism studies the study of street gangs date back
“nearly 100 years, with thousands of empirical studies” (Valasik & Phillips, 2017, p.
194). Furthermore, terrorist groups, like street gangs, are a difficult to reach population
consisting of mostly young males that engage in public violence (Decker & Pyrooz,
2011).
Another illustration of the gang-terror continuum centers on the organization of
street gangs compared to terrorist groups. For example, both street gangs and terrorist
groups widely vary in their level of organization (Valasik & Phillips, 2017). In gang
research, this is best exemplified by Decker and Van Winkle’s (1995) description of the
instrumental-rational compared to informal-diffused perspectives of gang organization.
The instrumental-rational perspective holds that street gangs are well organized with a
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hierarchical structure and shared goals among its members (Decker & Curry, 2000). In
contrast, the informal-diffused perspective views street gangs as disorganized and
comprised of self-interested aggregates of individuals (Decker & Curry, 2000). Research
on the organization of terrorist groups follows a similar pattern. Some terrorist groups are
structured like traditional organizations characterized by a hierarchical command-andcontrol structure, organizational boundaries, and rules (Ligon et al., 2013; Hoffman,
2008; Shapiro, 2013). Other terrorist groups follow a decentralized “leaderless
resistance” model, which emphasizes the ability of individuals or autonomous cells to
execute terror attacks (Carson et al., 2012; Loadenthal, 2017). Despite the conceptual
overlap, few studies have examined if, and how, gang organization research can inform
terrorism studies. To overcome this limitation, I examine the organization of terrorist
groups through the theoretical lens typically applied to street gangs.
Level of Analysis
In this dissertation, I am interested in examining the variation in levels of
organization between terrorist groups at the group level of analysis. My focus on the
group level of analysis does not discount other existing explanations and any holistic
perspective on violent extremism accounting for individual level or contextual level
variation. For example, important individual level differences include the role of adverse
life experiences such as war-related trauma (e.g., Bhui, Warfa & Jones, 2014),
discrimination (e.g., De Waele & Pauwels, 2014; Pauwels & Schils, 2016), perception of
state-level injustice (Hafez & Mullins, 2015; Piazza, 2011), childhood trauma (Simi et al.
2016; Speckhard & Akhmedova, 2005) and violent extremism. Contextual level factors
such as country of origin’s rate of deprivation, economic inequality, or social
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disorganization, each of which have been consistently linked to terrorism (Coggins, 2015;
Fahey & LaFree, 2015; Gurr, 1970; Lia, 2007; Piazza, 2006, 2007, 2008; Sandler, 2014).
Despite the importance of these individual and contextual factors, exploring their relative
contribution to violence is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
Group level factors and terrorism
The group level of analysis, also referred to as the unit or organizational level of
analysis, examines the effect of variation in group dynamics and processes on acts of
terrorism. Put another way, research operating at this level argue, “much of what
terrorists do on the outside can only be understood by looking inside the group itself. A
terrorist organization is not a black box but a living system, subject to a range of
influences that may be only tangentially related to its stated strategic objectives”
(McCormick, 2003, p. 486). At the group level, theoretical frameworks have examined
the role of ideology (Drake, 1998), leadership (Abrahms & Potter, 2015; Hermann &
Sakiev, 2011), competition (Bloom, 2005), organizational capabilities and resources
(Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008; Horowitz, 2010), and terrorist group behavior. For example,
ideology provides the moral boundaries of the organization and a basis for expectations
on the appropriateness of targets (Drake, 1998; Crenshaw, 1988; Hoffman, 2006).
Terrorist groups motivated by religion are deadlier because their violence is
unconstrained. For these groups, violence serves a supernatural purpose and is justified
by scripture (Asal & Rethemeyer 2008; Gressang IV, 2001). Likewise, terrorist
organizations motivated by ethnonationalist concerns are more lethal since they excel at
creating a dividing line between members and the “other” (Juergensmeyer, 2003; Pape,
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2005; Tilly, 2003). By creating this boundary, there is little reason to discriminate when
killing since nearly all out-group members are legitimate targets.
Terrorist leaders influence organizational decisions (for a comprehensive review,
see Hofmann, 2017). For instance, Abrahms and Potter’s (2015) suggest that when
terrorist organizations undergo periods of weak leadership or “leadership deficiencies,”
they are more likely to attack soft targets (e.g., private civilians). During period of weak
leadership, tactical decisions are relinquished to lower level members who are
incentivized to attack soft targets given their lack of combat experience, resources, and
stake in the organization (Abrahms, Beauchamp, & Mroszczyk, 2017; Abrahms, Ward, &
Kennedy, 2018). In contrast, strong terrorist leaders with high levels of charisma, or
charismatic authority, have a profound influence on their organization and have shown a
superior ability to recruit and radicalize follower (Hofmann & Dawson, 2014; Ingram,
2013; Ligon, Logan, & Derrick, 2020; Nesser, 2011; Post, 2006). Terrorist decapitation
also impacts the tactics of terrorist groups (Carson, 2017; Cronin, 2009; Freeman, 2014;
Johnston, 2012; Jordan, 2009; Langdon, Sarapu, & Wells, 2003; Price, 2012). The
evidence on the effectiveness of leadership decapitation is largely mixed with some
studies showing that leadership decapitation accelerates the mortality rate of terrorist
groups in some cases (Price, 2012), while others argue that it is counterproductive and
results in escalating rates of retaliatory violence (Jordan, 2009). Despite mixed
conclusions, this literature demonstrates that leaders play a pivotal role in the behavior of
terrorist groups.
Next, researchers have also shown that competition influences organizational
decision-making. This includes competition between terrorist organizations as well as
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between terrorist organizations and law enforcement. Most notably, Bloom’s (2005)
outbidding hypothesis argues that internal competition for influence incentivizes
oppressed groups to seize the marketplace by “outbidding” one another by demonstrating
higher levels of commitment to the cause. This explains why some extremist groups
adopted suicide bombings – the ultimate signal of an intense commitment to ones’ cause
– while others do not. Cropley, Kaufman, and Cropley (2008) posit that competition is
one of the main drivers of malevolent creativity in terrorist organizations (also see Gill,
Horgan, Hunter, & Cushenbery, 2013). To ensure their survival, terrorist organizations
must develop creative methods to overcome one another, the same as businesses attempt
to gain a competitive advantage over rivals (Cropley & Cropley, 2011; Logan, Ligon, &
Derrick, 2019).
Finally, terrorism scholars have emphasized the link between the capabilities and
resources of terrorist groups and their behaviors. For example, Asal and Rethemeyer
(2008) found that large terrorist organizations are more lethal than smaller ones.4
Terrorist organizations with robust membership have greater resources including
members who are skilled with a high degree of tactical expertise, capable of raising
funds, and who have access to restricted information, places, and material (Asal et al.,
2015; Bloom, 2017; Hunter, Shortland, Crayne, & Ligon, 2017; Windisch, Logan, &
Ligon, 2018). Horowitz’s (2010) adaptation capacity theory also empathizes the
necessity of organizational capital and financial intensity of terrorist groups seeking to
innovate. Without the proper tangible (e.g., revenue) and intangible (e.g., expertise)
capital, terrorist groups are at risk of failing irrespective of their ideological beliefs.

4

While organizational size is also considered an indicator or element of organizational structure, it is most
often portrayed as a resource or capacity in existing terrorism studies.

15
As illustrated above, several factors influence terrorist groups’ behavior and
decision-making. In this dissertation, I am interested in the degree of terrorist group
organization and its influence on violent outcomes. To understand this relationship, the
next section focuses on why, and how, terrorist groups organize.
The Terrorist Dilemma and the Role of Organization
Terrorist groups face an inherent dilemma while trying to reach their collective
objectives. On the one hand, terrorist groups must organize, coordinate, and control the
behavior of their members in order to achieve their strategic and operational goals
(Shapiro, 2013). In other words, terrorist groups must also overcome fundamental
organizational issues such as resource pooling and allocation, limiting member discretion,
and recruitment and retention (Volders, 2016). On the other hand, terrorist groups operate
in secrecy to avoid infiltration from law enforcement or competitors (De la Calle et al.,
2006; Jackson, 2006; Shapiro, 2013). The need for both efficiency and secrecy in
operations created a paradox in terrorist groups known as the “terrorist dilemma”
(Shapiro, 2013; see also, Berman, 2009). The terrorist dilemma stresses the critical
tradeoff between two organizational goals: (1) the need to maintain operational
effectiveness and control in order to achieve ideological goals, and (2) the need to operate
in secrecy to secure the organization’s survival.
The issue for terrorist groups is that the organizational mechanisms used to
coordinate, and control members’ behaviors creates operational vulnerabilities. Put
another way, as operational efficiency increases, levels of security decrease and viceversa. For example, communication between leaders and foot soldiers helps ensure that
any actions are consistent with the strategic goals of the group. However, communication
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between leaders and foot soldiers also highlights internal linkages in the movement that
law enforcement can exploit – placing the organization’s survival at risk. In contrast,
terrorist groups with lower degrees of organization are more secure and less likely to be
infiltrated since there are fewer communication and coordination mechanisms. The
drawback of prioritizing security over effectiveness is that control over members
diminishes. Thus, members have increased autonomy and are at risk of engaging in
tactics that are counterproductive to the organization’s long-term strategic goals.
Terrorist groups’ balance of the need for efficiency and security has implications
for decision-making and organizational behavior. For example, Volders (2016) argues
that the nature and impact of the terrorist dilemma is a key factor in the organizational
design of terrorist groups. Terrorist groups such as the Animal Liberation Front or Earth
Liberation Front prioritize secrecy over efficiency and are characterized by having “no
discernible leadership, are not centrally controlled, and have no functional
differentiation” (Kilberg, 2012, p. 814; see also Shapiro, 2005). These less organized
terrorist groups are structured in a manner that is difficult to infiltrate, but their lack of
coordination also makes it difficult to achieve strategic goals (Shapiro, 2013). In contrast,
terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah and the Lord’s Resistance Army prioritize
efficiency and are characterized by having leadership, central command-and-control, and
specialization. These more organized, hierarchal terrorist groups are more lethal, more
likely to sustain violence over time, and more likely to attack hard targets compared to
non-hierarchal groups (Heger et al. 2012; Kilberg, 2012). While these groups are
structured in a way that facilitates intra-group coordination and resource allocation, they
are also at increased risk of infiltration from law enforcement.
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As first discussed in the limitations, the primary issue with the existing research
on terrorist group organization is that it is theoretical (e.g., Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001;
Volder, 2016) or relies on case studies (Ligon et al., 2013; Shapiro, 2005). In addition,
the few quantitative studies that have examined the relationship between the organization
of terrorist groups and violence rely on broad classification schemas (e.g., hierarchal/nonhierarchal; Heger et al. 2012; Kilberg, 2013). This study is of the first to provide a datadriven approach to classify terrorist groups based on indicators of organization derived
from gang research and supported by organizational theory.
Conclusions
In a short research note, Decker and Pyrooz (2015b) laid out twelve “lessons
learned” from gang research that can provide insight in terrorism studies. The third lesson
highlighted by the authors reads as follow:
“The study of gangs has taught us time and again that the group is more powerful
than the individual. Because groups motivate individuals to act in ways they would
not otherwise do, it therefore is critical to understand the collective features of the
group and how it relates to crime and deviance. Group structure differs from gang
to gang and is not monolithic, which is why it is equally important to understand
the role of group process within the group. Focusing on group process naturally
leads to asking questions about the catalysts for actions of various sorts. Identifying
the steps in engaging in violence, whether in the gang or terror context is important.
Both individual and group motivations are important. Understanding the role of
group process and organizational structure in recruitment, adopting group norms
and engaging in violence are key issues in understanding both gang and terror
groups... It is important not to squabble over generalizing whether extremist groups
are hierarchical, decentralized, or leaderless, but instead to determine how each of
the organizational structures relate to different group processes and accordingly
different collective and per capita rates of crime and deviance.
In line with Decker and Pyrooz (2015b), this dissertation uses a criminological lens
typically found in research on street gang organization to understand levels of
organization in terrorist groups and their effects on group level violence. While there is
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no shortage of group level explanations of violent extremism, few studies have drawn on
the over 100 years of gang research.
The remainder of this dissertation is divided into five main sections. Chapter 2
examines the prior research on gang organization. This chapter also integrates insights
from organizational theory and prior research on terrorist group structures. Chapter 3
highlights the methodology and analytical techniques used in this research. Chapter 4
presents the results in three sections. I examine how the underlying structure of terrorist
group organization using factor analysis. Then, I examine the relationship between
degrees of organization and violence (i.e., lethality and hard target selection) in terrorist
groups. Third, I use cluster analysis to provide a data-driven approach to classifying
structural typologies of terrorist groups. In the final chapter, Chapter 5, I offer theoretical
and practical conclusions, discuss limitations, and suggest potential avenues for future
research.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Pioneered by the work of Thrasher (1927), research on gang organization focuses
on the degree to which a gang effectively and efficiently coordinates and carries out
activities (see Pyrooz et al., 2012, p. 86).5 After over 100-years of research, the degree to
which gang organization varies is best characterized by two competing views. First,
research from scholars such as Mieczkowski (1986), Padilla (1992), Skolnick, Correl,
Navarro, and Rabb (1988), Skolnick (1990), Sanchez-Jankowski (1991), Taylor (1990),
Venkatesh (1997), and Venkatesh and Levitt (2000) suggest that gangs exhibit similar
features of formal organizations with a leadership structure, diversity of roles, rules, and
control over members. This view of gang organization is termed the instrumentalrational perspective (Decker & Van Winkle, 1995). More specially, Decker and Curry
(2000, p. 474) describe the instrumental-rational perspective as one where gangs “have a
vertical structure, enforce discipline among their members, and are quite successful in
defining and achieving group values” (also see Decker et al., 1998).
In contrast to the instrumental-rational perspective, research from scholars such as
Esbensen and Huizinga (1993), Decker and Curry (2000), Decker and colleagues (2008),
Decker and Van Winkle (1995), Hagedorn (1994), Klein, Maxson, and Cunningham
(1991), McGloin (2005), and Waldorf (1993) suggest that gangs are loosely confederated
groups with little organization or cohesion. This view of gang organization is termed the
informal-diffused perspective (Decker & Van Winkle, 1995). More specially, Decker and

5

This is very similar to term organizational structure, which refers to the formal configuration between
individuals and groups regarding the allocation of tasks, responsibilities, and authority within the
organization (Greenberg, 2011).
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Curry (2000) describe the informal-diffused perspective as one where gangs “are
diffused” and compromised of “self-interested and self-motivated aggregates of
individuals” (also see Decker et al., 1998). The following sections describe previous
studies in the instrumental-rational and informal-diffused perspectives in more detail.
Instrumental-Rational Perspective
Drawing from interviews with 39 inmates and 43 criminal justice officials,
Skolnick and colleagues (1988) and Skolnick (1990) highlight the instrumental-rational
view by concluding that gang involvement in drug distribution was well organized and
offered rational advantages to youth interested in selling drugs. Furthermore, many
members of entrepreneurial gangs perceive themselves as “organized criminals.”
Mieczkowski’s (1986) study of 15 members of the Young Boys Incorporated -- a black
street gang in Detroit – found gang members operated in a bureaucratic structure
coordinated by a leader who enforced the rules of the gang and differential roles for
members in drug distribution operations. Padilla (1992) reached a similar conclusion and
found that members of Puerto Rican street gangs in Chicago had different criminal roles
in the gang, with street dealing considered the most prestigious.
Fagan (1989) developed four gang typologies based on members’ patterns of drug
involvement and other criminal activities including social, party, serious delinquent and
organized gangs. The latter two types, serious delinquent and organized gangs, reported
higher levels of organization sophistication such as having a leader, specific rules and
codes, division of labor, and a hierarchy based on age. Taylor (1990) identified a
corporate gang structure among gangs located in Detroit. Corporate gangs functioned like
a business and had evolved from a relative disorganized group into an organized structure
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with effective leadership and shared goals. After 10-years of fieldwork involving 37
different gangs across three cities, Sanchez-Jankowski (1991) described gangs as highly
structured organizations with a leadership structure, diversity of roles, and rules.
Organized gangs were more likely to be involved in acts of organized violence as
opposed to individual violence given their ability to control and coordinate the activities
of its members. More recently, Densley (2012) examined gang organization in a crossnational content. Utilizing interviews with gang members and associates from 12
different gangs across London, Densley concluded that each of the 12 gangs were well
organized with a hierarchical structure with multiple levels of power, an “elder”
leadership group, rules of conduct, and punishments. Many gang members also reported
the presence of age-graded roles and an incentive system in the gang.
Informal-Diffused Perspective
Hagedorn (1994) examined the organizational characteristics of gangs in
Milwaukee and found that drug sales were consistent with the informal-diffused model.
More specifically, many gang members were more of individual entrepreneurs as
opposed to part of a well-organized group. Utilizing arrest records from five Los Angeles
police departments, Klein, Maxson, and Cunningham (1991) explored differences in
crack sales between gang members and nongang members. The authors found that gangs
were not well organized, lacked permanent membership or roles, and did not have shared
goals. Esbensen and Huizinga (1993) examined involvement in criminal activities for the
gang and nongang members over time using the Denver Youth Survey. The authors
described the gangs in their sample as informal organizations lacking structure, and for
many gang members, their membership in the gang was relatively short, lasting

22
approximately a year. Waldorf (1993) found that few gangs in Southern California did
not have the organization nor skills to establish new drug markets. Taken together, these
studies suggest that gangs who focus on drug sales generally have lower degrees of
organization.
Using data collected as part of a three-year field study in St. Louis, Decker, and
Van Winkle (1995) explored the role of gangs and gang members in drug sales. To
determine how gangs organized drug sales, the authors examined several interrelated
questions about the presence of organizational roles and leadership in the gang. Of the 99
active gang members interviewed, the authors found that the majority of gang members
(58 percent) could not identify any roles related to drug sales in the gang. Decker and
Van Winkle (1995) conclude that their results “unequivocally support the conclusion that
the involvement of gangs in drug sales does not affect recruitment, lacks organization,
and fails to produce a commitment to a central goal” (p. 601). Decker, Bynum, and
Weisel (1998) examined the extent to which gangs were transitioning into organized
crime groups using a sample of gang members in San Diego, an emerging gang city and
Chicago, an established gang city. The authors found that each gang with the exception of
the Gangster Disciples in Chicago showed low levels of organization. Decker and Curry
(2000) interviewed 96 current, associate, and former gang members about their perceived
levels of gang organization. The authors concluded that there was no substantial evidence
that the gangs described in their study were well organized nor controlled or influenced
the behavior of individual members. This supports Decker and Curry’s (2002) research
which found that gang organization was linked to intragang as opposed to intergang
violence due to the loose structure and lack of control of gang members.
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Drawing from social network analysis, McGloin (2005) found that street gangs in
Newark were disconnected subgroups of associations. Furthermore, she concluded that
the overall street gangs were organized in a “very loose fashion” despite the presence of
more cohesive cliques or subgroups within the street gangs. Decker and colleagues
(2008) found that levels of gang organization were rather low for both current and former
gang members. Using a seven-item gang organization index, the authors found that while
levels of organization were higher among gangs associated with former gang members as
opposed to current members, the organizational sophistication of gangs as a whole, was
rather low. Finally, Spindler and Bouchard (2011) examined how gang typologies emerge
across a sample of 44 self-identified gang members and 171 delinquent group members.
Results from a cluster analysis using measures of organization suggest that produced four
gang typologies: low organization, honor-based, location-based, and highly organized.
The low organization type, characterized by few organizational features, was the largest
group, while the highly organized type characterized by the most organizational features,
was the smallest group.

Informal Diffused

Instrumental
-Rational

Figure 1. Gang Organization Continuum
In sum, there are two important conclusions from the existing research on gang
organization. First, as initially pointed out by Thrasher (1927), “no two gangs are alike,”
and levels of gang organization vary from gang to gang (Cohen, 1977; Coughlin &
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Venkatesh, 2003; Klein & Maxson, 2006). Second, gang organization is primarily a
descriptor rather than a definer of groups (Densley, 2012; Fagan, 1989; Klein & Maxson,
2006). While prior research has shown that support for the informal-diffused perspective
of gangs outweighs that of the instrumental-rational view, the key point is that gangs vary
across the continuum. From this perspective, gang organization is best conceptualized on
a continuum with informal-diffused on one end and instrument-rational on the other end
(see Figure 1; Decker & Pyrooz, 2015a). In the next section, I review prior research on
the relationship between gang organization and criminological outcomes.
Gang Organization and Criminological Outcomes
To date, a number of studies have directly or indirectly examined the relationship
between gang organization and delinquent or criminal behaviors (Bjerregaard, 2002;
Bouchard & Spindler, 2010; Decker et al., 2008; Esbensen et al., 2001; Pyrooz et al.,
2012; Scott & Maxson, 2016; Sheley et al. 1995). For example, using a sample of 373
male juveniles incarcerated in a maximum-security facility, Sheley and colleagues (1995)
found that members of structured gangs were significantly more likely to engage in drug
sales, burglary, robbery, and gun-carrying than members of unstructured gangs. Esbensen
and colleagues (2001) and Bjerregaard (2002) both indirectly examined gang
organization in their research on self-nomination techniques of gang membership.
Drawing on a sample of 5,935 eighth-grade public school students representing 42
schools across 11 cities, Esbensen and colleagues (2001) found that members of
organized gangs were more likely to engage in state offenses, minor offenses, property
offenses, personal offenses, drug sales, and drug use compared to all other gang members
whose gang did not meet the definition of organized gangs. Next, Bjerregaard (2002)
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found that organized gangs were significantly more likely to have committed a robbery,
participated in a break-in, stolen a car, committed an assault, and fought rival gangs
compared to the other groups. A similar pattern existed with regard to the individual gang
member’s delinquent behavior.
Decker and colleagues (2008) examined the relationship between levels of gang
organization and gang members’ involvement in violent crime, drug sales, and violent
victimization using a sample of approximately 250 self-nominated juvenile gang
members. The authors found that their seven-item gang organization index was
significantly correlated with indices of violent victimization, drug sales, and violent
offending for both current and former gang members. In other words, current and former
members of more organized gangs reported higher levels of violent offending, gang sales
of different kinds of drugs, and violent victimization compared to members of less
organized gangs. Bouchard and Spindler (2010) examined whether levels of gang
organization influenced drug dealing, violent offending, and property offending among
523 self-reported delinquent youth in the Canadian province of Quebec. Using a nineitem organization index, the authors found that gangs were more organized than
delinquent groups. They also found that levels of organization were associated with
increases in drug dealing and violent offending, but not property offending.
Pyrooz and colleagues (2012) examined the relationship between gang
organization, patterns of delinquency, and victimization using a cross-national sample of
current juvenile gang members from three different data sources. These data sources
included the Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) project, the Trinidad and
Tobago Youth Survey (TTYS), and the Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring (ADAM). The
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authors found that gang organization had a significant, positive correlation with measures
of delinquency and victimization across the three samples. However, the individual items
used to create the organization scale were “checkered with weak, modest, moderate, and
strong coefficients, ranging from 0.05 to 0.58.... [and] the mean inter-item correlations
across the studies are not as large as one would expect to inspire confidence in the latent
construct of gang organizational structure” (p. 95-96).
Finally, Scott and Maxson (2016) examined if there was a link between levels of
gang organization and institutional violence in youth correctional facilities. Scott and
Maxson (2016) found that levels of perceived gang organization had no effect on
institutional violence at three time points. However, interviews with the incarcerated
youth suggested that the transgression of rules that govern respect for the group, and to a
lesser extent, violence regulated by leaders serve as a catalyst for institutional violence.
This suggests that some aspects of gang organization may play a role in explaining
violence between incarcerated youth.
As illustrated above, the majority of studies on gang organization have examined
the effects of organization on measures of criminal offending, delinquency, and to a
lesser extent, victimization. That said, a few studies have also explored the relationship
between gang organization and other deviant outcomes. For example, Mourle Jr. and
colleagues (2014) examined the degree to which gang organization influences the online
presence and behavior of gangs. Drawing from a sample of 418 current and former gang
members from five large cities across the United States, the authors found that gang
organization was positively and significantly related to a number of online behaviors,
including having a website, posting videos online, and recruiting online. More recently,
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Leverso and Matsueda (2019) examined the effects of perceived gang organization on the
length of time an individual spends in a gang. The authors found that perceived gang
organization was inversely related to leaving the gang. Put another way, individuals who
perceive their gang as more organized are more likely to stay in their respective gang
longer than those who perceive their gang as less organized.
In sum, prior research has illustrated two important points regarding the nature of
gang organization. First, there is a clear relationship between degrees of gang
organization and criminal offending. Members of more organized gangs report higher
levels of violence and criminal offending compared to members of less organized gangs.
Second, gang organization affects individual and group behaviors outside of criminal
offending such as the length of time an individual spends in a gang, victimization, and
online group behaviors. This suggests that gang organization influence a range of
criminological outcomes.
Structural indicators of gang organization
The previous section illustrated that levels of organization vary across gangs, and
members of gangs with higher levels of organization, typically report more engagement
in violence and criminal offending. What remains unknown is how gang organization is
measured across studies. For example, while developing a gang organization index,
Decker and colleagues (2008) included an item measuring whether gang members “give
money to the gang”, while Bouchard and Spindler (2010) did not. Likewise, Sheley and
colleagues (1995) argue that having an identifiable group name is an indicator of
organization, while Pyrooz and colleagues (2012) do not.
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To address this, Table 1 summarizes twenty studies that have examined, to some
degree, the structural indicators of gang organization. Table 1 was constructed using both
quantitative articles that have directly measured gang organization (e.g., Bouchard &
Spindler, 2010; Decker et al., 2008) as well as qualitative, ethnographic works that
unpacked indicators of gang organization (e.g., Thrasher, 1927; Sanchez-Jankowski,
1991). The articles were searched for using a keyword such as “gang organization”,
“gang typologies”, and “criminal gang structure” in Google Scholar and similar internetbased search engines (e.g., Lexis Nexis, JSTOR). This search was augmented by reviewer
the bibliographies of related articles. The primary inclusion criteria for Table 1 was that
the article was theoretically or methodologically related to gang organization and/or gang
structure. In other words, the article had to theorize the dimensions of gang organization
or discuss ways to measure it. I only counted articles by the same author(s) as one entry if
they used the same measures to assess gang organization across different articles. For
example, Bouchard and Spindler (2010) and Spindler and Bouchard (2011) use the same
items to measure gang organization so only one article was included on Table 1. This
helped reduce overweighting items published by a specific research team.
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Table 1. Summary of the Structural Indicators Based on Twenty Studies on Gang
Organization
Authors
Bjerregaard (2002)

•

Structural Features
Size, Group Name, Group Leader, Regular Meetings,
Designated Clothing, Claim Territory, Gun Stash
Group Name, Group Leader, Hierarchy, Meeting Location,
Distinctive Signs/Codes, Rules, Initiation, Protect Territory,
Defend Honor/Reputation
Levels of Membership, Leaders, Meetings, Rules, Discipline,
Post Gang Groups
Age-Graded Groups, Leaders, Meetings, Rules

Bouchard & Spindler (2010)

•

Decker (2001)

•

Decker & Curry (2000)

•

Decker & Van Winkle (1995)

•

Decker et al. (1998)

•

Decker et al. (2008)

•

Densley (2012)

•

Esbensen et al. (2001)
Fagan (1989)

•
•

Hagedorn (1994)

•

Leverso & Matsueda (2019)

•

Maxson & Klein (1995)

•

Moule et al. (2014)

•

Pyrooz et al. (2012)

•

Sanchez-Jankowski (1991)
Scott & Maxson (2016)

•
•

Sheley et al. (1995)

•

Thrasher (1927)

•

Yablonsky (1959)

•

Leadership Structure, Roles/Duties, Codes
Group Leader, Distinct Symbols/Styles, Entry Rituals, Claim
Area, Do Illegal Things Together, Illegal Drug Use
Group Name, Group Leader, Regular Meetings, Designated
Clothing, Protect Territory
Leaders, Meetings, Roles, Rules/Codes, Punishments,
Territory, Size
Hierarchy, Size, Roles

Valdez (2003)

•

Leadership Structure, Hierarchy, Rules

Roles in Selling Drugs, Leaders, Leader Duties, Leader
Influence
Levels of Membership, Leaders, Meetings, Rules, Pay Dues,
Political Activities, Legitimate Business, Consequences for
Leaving
Group Leader, Regular Meetings, Rules, Punishment for Rule
Breaking, Distinctive Signs/Codes, Responsibilities to the
Gang, Give Money to the Gang
Size, Hierarchy and Rules, Leadership, Incentives and
Organizational Mobility, Rules, Punishments
Initiation, Group Leader, Colors/Symbols
Join Before Age 13, Initiation, Leaders, Meetings,
Rules/Codes, Roles, Age-Graded Roles, Symbols/Colors,
Roles for Girls
Ethnicity, Division of Labor, Centralization, Relationship of
Drug Organization to Gang, Junior Groups, Adult
Involvement
Group Leader, Regular Meetings, Rules/Codes, Specific
Roles, Age-Graded Group, Roles for Females,
Colors/Symbols
Size, Age of Members, Duration of Existence, Subgroupings,
Territory, Crime Versatility
Group Leader, Shot Callers, Regular Meetings, Rules,
Punishment for Rule Breaking, Responsibilities to the Gang,
Give Money to the Gang, New Recruits, Claim Territory
Group Leader, Regular Meetings, Rules, Insignia
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Next, on Table 2, I categorized the indicators of gang organization found in prior
research under common organizational themes. For instance, reports of gangs having
different roles, age-graded groups, roles of girls, or responsibilities are suggestive of a
division of labor within the gang. Likewise, reports of females having levels of
membership, centralization, shot callers, or organizational mobility is indicative of a
hierarchy within the gang (see Moule Jr. et al., 2014 for a similar approach).
Furthermore, I only developed organizational themes in which an indicator was used in
more than one study. For example, Scott and Maxson (2016) assessed if incarcerated
youth “did illegal things together” as a marker of organization. Since this was the only
study to use this measure, and it did not fit in any other related theme, it was not included
on Table 2.
Table 2 also shows the number of times (and relative percentage) that a theme
was documented across the twenty articles. For example, Decker and Curry (2000)
examined age-graded groups, leaders, meetings, and rules as indicators of gang
organization. These characteristics were counted once under the following themes:
division of labor (age-graded groups), leadership (leaders), meetings (meetings), and
rules (rules). If an article noted multiple structural characteristics representing the same
theme – that theme only counted once. For example, Decker and Van Winkle (1995)
examined the presence of leaders as well as leadership influence (of those who sold
drugs). Both characteristics counted as one entry under the leadership theme since they
were drawn from the same study.
Table 2 shows that leadership (90 percent), rules (65 percent), and meetings (60
percent) were the only themes to exist in more than half of the twenty articles. These
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appear to be the most important structural themes when examining degrees of gang
organization. Next, insignia (46 percent), division of labor (45 percent), and hierarchy (40
percent) were themes that appeared in over one-third of the articles on gang organization.
Territory (30 percent) and punishment (30 percent) appeared in just under one-third of
articles, while size (25 percent) and resources or incentives were in a quarter of studies.
Finally, initiation (20 percent), group name (15 percent), subgroupings (15 percent), and
age of members (15 percent) were rarely used as indicators of gang organization across
the twenty articles.
Table 2. Structural Themes of Gang Organization
Theme
Example Structural Feature
Leadership
• Presence of Leaders; Leadership Structure;
Leader Influence
Rules
• Written Rules; Codes
Meetings
• Regular Meetings; Meeting Location
Insignia
• Distinct Signs or Codes; Designated
Clothing; Symbols or Colors
Division of Labor • Roles; Age-Graded Groups; Age-Graded
Roles; Roles for Girls; Duties; Leader
Duties; Responsibilities; Role in Drug
Selling
Hierarchy
• Levels of Membership; Centralization;
Shot Callers; Organizational Mobility
Territory
• Claim Territory; Protect Territory; Claim
Area
Punishments
• Discipline; Consequences for Leaving;
Punishments for Rule Breaking
Size
• Size
Resources and
• Give Money to the Gang; Pay Dues;
Incentives
Incentives; Gun Stash
Initiation
• Entry Rituals
Group Name
• Group Name
Subgroupings
• Junior Groups; Post Gang Groups
Age of Members
• Join Before 13; Adult Involvement

n

%

18

90%

13
12

65%
60%

9

45%

9

45%

8

40%

6

30%

6

30%

5

25%

5

25%

4
3
3
3

20%
15%
15%
15%
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Of the fifteen structural themes presented on Table 2, the top eight, including
leadership, rules, meetings, insignia, division of labor, hierarchy, territory, and
punishments were selected as the most important themes for measuring organization for
two primary reasons. First, the eight themes were represented in thirty percent or more of
studies, which highlights their relative importance in gang organization research. Second,
the eight structural themes overlap with seminal (Sanchez-Janlowski, 1991) and recent
(Moule Jr. et al., 2014) theoretical developments on gang organization.
In the previous section, I identified the most commonly used indicators to
measure gang organization and mapped them onto overarching organizational constructs.
In the next section, I draw on organizational theory to explore the underlying
organizational dimensions related to the gang organization themes.
Gang Organization Themes and Organizational Dimensions
Table 3 illustrates how the eight structural themes found in the previous section
underline four core organizational dimensions including centralization, formalization,
complexity, and interconnectedness. Building on theoretical insights from criminology
(e.g., Decker et al., 2008; Moule Jr. et al., 2014; Sanchez-Janlowski, 1991) and
organizational theory (e.g., Mintzberg, 1979; Pugh et al., 1968; Rogers, 2003), these
organizational dimensions help explain the linkage between organization and group
behavior.6

6

Moule Jr. and colleagues (2014) argued that five organizational dimensions underline gang organization
after reviewing theories of organizational behavior and innovation. The five dimensions included centrality,
formalization, complexity, interconnectedness, and organizational slack. Unlike Moule Jr and colleagues
(2014), I did not find that indicators of organizational slack, or the capability to commit resources back into
the organization, were frequently accounted for in prior gang organization research. As such, I did not
include it as a core organizational dimension.
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Organizational theory is particularly insightful given its focus on how
organizational features influence performance. For example, organizational theory
researchers have examined how organizational features affect the growth and decline of
organizations as well as their capacity to innovate (e.g., Rogers, 2003). In the sections
below, I highlight each organizational dimension.
Centralization
Centralization refers to the concentration of power and decision-making in the
organization (Fredrickson, 1986; O’Neill, Beauvais, & Scholl, 2016). In organizations,
centralization is ensured by designating one or more individuals with formal authority to
keep actions in line with goals and objectives. A highly centralized organization typically
has designated authority figures such as executives, managers, and supervisors who direct
the behavior of lower level members. When there are functionally different units in an
Table 3. Organizational Dimensions and Structural Themes in Gangs
Organizational
Dimensions
Centralization Formalization Interconnectedness
Complexity
Division of
Leadership
Insignia
Territory
Labor
Structural
Hierarchy
Rules
Meetings
Themes
Punishment
organization, centralizations safeguards coordination within and across units (Bolman &
Deal, 2008). Without the presence of a central figure, such coordination is unlikely. The
benefit of centralization, such as the presence of authority figures and a clear chain of
command, is that organizations are more efficient in their decision-making, resolving
internal conflicts, and distributing rewards and punishments.
In gang organization studies, structural indicators of centralization include the
presence of leaders, levels of membership, or a group hierarchy. Decker and colleagues
(1998) in particular, illustrated high levels of centralization in their analysis of the
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Gangster Disciplines and Latin Kings in Chicago. In an interview with one member of
the Gangster Disciplines, the subject identified eight levels of membership in the
hierarchy of the gang including foot soldiers, first coordinator, second coordinator,
literature coordinator, exercise coordinator, regents, governor, and board members (p.
403). Likewise, Densley (2012) observed internal hierarchical structures in London street
gangs consisting of approximately seven members who shared equal authority over all
other members. Similar to conventional organizations, centralization in gangs promotes
efficient decision-making, member accountability, and shared goals.
Formalization
Formalization refers to the rules, regulations, and procedures used to govern the
behaviors of members of the organization (Fredrickson, 1986; Palmer & Biggart, 2002).
High degrees of formalization in an organization limits individual discretion and ensures
predictable and consistent behaviors of group members. In other words, high degrees of
formalization specify standard ways of completing a task, handling internal problems,
and relating to key individuals outside the organization (Bolman & Deal, 2008). When
rules and policies are in place, it is less likely that members of the organizations make
decisions based on their own personal whims or pressures. This ensures that the actions
of group members are consistent with the organizational goals.
Indicators of gang formalization include the presence of gang insignia, rules, and
punishments. For example, Decker and colleagues (1998) illustrate how members of the
Gangster Disciples in Chicago are governed by values of secrecy and silence.
Furthermore, some Gangster Disciple members referred to the “sixteen laws” that each
member had to study and learn by heart (p. 407). Insignia, or distinctive colors or codes,
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are also indicators of formalization. Distinctive colors, hand signs, or tattoos help
overcome “asymmetries of information” between gang members and between gang
members and those outside the gang (Decker & Van Winkle, 1996). For instance, specific
displays of colors or symbols signal authority or status to other members in the same
gang. Specific displays of colors or symbols also signal gang membership to community
members and rival gangs (Leverso & Matsueda, 2019). In sum, formalization in gangs
helps regulate the behavior of members and reduce uncertainty through efficient and
predictable decision-making.
Interconnectedness
Interconnectedness refers to the degree to which units in a social system are
linked by interpersonal networks (Rodgers, 2003). In general, a high degree of network
interconnectedness is important for knowledge transfer in organizations. An
organizational unit’s capacity to contribute to the organization's performance depends on
its connectedness to other units. If one is not well-connected, their contributions to
knowledge transfer and the innovation process are limited (Granovetter, 1973; Hansen,
1999). Techniques to secure horizontal coordination and interconnectedness include
formal and informal meetings, task forces, coordinating roles, matrix structures, and
networks (Bolman & Deal, 2008).
Structural indicators of interconnectedness in gangs range from claiming and
protecting a specific territory to regular meetings between members. For instance, Decker
and colleagues (1998) showed members of both the Gangster Disciples and Latin Kings
in Chicago hold regular, mostly informal, meetings. For gangs, these meetings were used
to discuss internal disputes, collect dues, and discuss community concerns. Decker and
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Curry (2000) note that gang meetings are used to accomplish several gang functions,
including enhancing group cohesion, communicating responsibilities, and disseminating
information. Territoriality is often a defining characteristic of street gangs (Miller, 1975)
and an indicator of interconnectedness (Moule Jr. et al., 2014). In territories where gangs
claim ownership, there are typically set spaces where gang members congregate and
perform gang activities. In other words, a gang set space is defined as ‘‘the actual area
within the neighborhood where gang members come together as a gang’’ (Tita, Cohen, &
Engberg, 2005, p.280). These set spaces are vital resources for gangs attempting to
coordinate their efforts with little risk of interference (Taylor & Brower, 1985). In sum,
interconnectedness in gangs facilitates consistency in action and reduces redundancy of
effort, enhances the dissemination of knowledge, and allows for efficient planning and
resource management.
Complexity
Complexity is the organizational dimension linked to differentiation in
organizations. More specially, complexity refers to the background characteristics of
members and the specialization of roles within the organization (Yang & Ng, 2015). In
this definition, there are two forms of organizational complexity. First, organizational
complexity includes the expertise and specialization of individual members in the
organization. Second, organizational complexity includes the functional differentiation of
units within the organization. Both forms of complexity are interrelated since specialized
organizational units are often formed around the knowledge or skills of individuals
(Mintzberg, 1979). The benefit of organizational complexity in businesses is that it
ensures predictability, uniformity, and reliability (Bolman & Deal, 2008). Furthermore,
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organizations with high levels of expertise are better equipped to develop innovative
products (Mumford, Scott, Gaddis, & Strange, 2002).
In gangs, structural indicators of complexity include a task-based division of
labor, age-graded roles, and roles for females. For instance, prior studies have shown that
identified specific roles for females in gangs, such as infiltrating and spying on rival
gangs and carrying weapons or messages (Campbell, 1984; Thrasher, 1927). These roles
are strategic and help protect male gang members from arrest. Decker and Van Winkle
(1995) illustrated differential roles in drug sales played by members of the gang. For
instance, several gang members indicated that roles such as record keepers, salesmen, and
pistol packers existing in drug selling gangs. In sum, complexity in gangs facilitates the
development of expertise and reduces redundancy of effort through the specialization of
roles.
Summary
In sum, the most important indicators of gang organization focus on the presence
of leadership, rules, meetings, insignia, a division of labor, hierarchy, territory, and
punishment. These eight themes underline four organization dimensions including
centralization, formalization, interconnectedness, and complexity. In gangs, centralization
and formalization are beneficial in that they forge consensus, increase discipline, reduces
uncertainty, and ensures the gang’s reputation on the street (Decker & Van Winkle,
1996). Interconnectedness enhances horizontal coordination and is beneficial for gangs in
that it facilitates group cohesion and knowledge transfer (Decker & Curry, 2000). Finally,
complexity ensures differentiation and is beneficial in gangs by increasing the efficiency
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and success of gang activities, reducing uncertainty among members, and enhancing the
salience of one’s gang identity (Leverso & Matsueda, 2019).
In the next section, I examine how the organizational dimensions previously
discussed appear in terrorism studies.
Organization in Terrorist Groups
To date, several terrorism scholars have examined the structural features and
organizational dimensions of terrorist groups (e.g., Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001; Jackson,
2006; Kilberg, 2012; Ligon et al., 2013; Shapiro, 2005). Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001)
developed the “network, netwars” perspective to emphasize the how technology and the
information revolution influence networks (i.e., interconnectedness) during conflict. In
short, Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001) posit that terrorist networks come in three topologies:
the chain or line network, the hub, star, or wheel network, and the all-channel network.7
The authors argue that these flat, networked structures are better suited for technological
advancements and information dissemination compared to a hierarchical organizational
structure.
Building on Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001), Kilberg (2012) argues that there are
three structural characteristics of terrorist organizations including the presence of a clear
leader or leadership structure (centralization), functional differentiation (complexity), and
centralized command and control (centralization/interconnectedness). Based on those
features, there are four basic types of terrorist organizations including bureaucratic, huband-spoke, all-channel, and market. The bureaucratic structure is the most organized and
includes clear departmental boundaries, lines of authority, and formal decision-making
7

Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001) also note that possibility of hierarchical forms of organization, although the
authors doubt its utility in the context of asymmetric warfare.
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procedures (Kilberg, 2012). The market structure is the least organized with no
leadership, functional differentiation, nor command-and-control (Kilberg, 2012).
Mishal and Rosenthal (2005) argue that there are four key structural
characteristics of terrorist organizations including the communication structure within the
organization (interconnectedness), the level of specialization and division of labor
(complexity), the chain of command-and-control (centralization), and the organization’s
time definitions for implementing planned actions. Based on these features, terrorist
organizations come in one of five basic forms including hierarchical, network hub,
network chain, network multi-channel, and dune. Next, Shapiro (2005) suggests that
there are three dimensions of organizational design in covert organizations:
interconnectedness, hierarchy (centralization), and specialization (complexity). The
benefit of a hierarchical structure is that the leadership has influence over the
organization’s resources and operation; thus, all activities coordinated and in line with the
leadership’s strategy and vision. The drawback of a centralized structure is that these
organizations are easily infiltrated since they rely on a direct line of communication
(Shapiro, 2005). Furthermore, high degrees of interconnectedness ensure that there is a
direct link between leaders and foot soldiers so that all actions are in the interest of the
organization as a whole. The downside is that the organization is less secure from
infiltration, given the direct coordination between leaders and low level members.
Next, Jackson (2006) distinguishes between extremist groups, networks, and
movements by examining the nature of the authority exerted among group members. For
Jackson (2006), authority refers to the formal control relationships
(centralization/interconnectedness) and the informal influence exerted in the organization
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at the tactical, operational, and strategic level. By focusing on the functional
characteristics of the organization and the authority relations at each level, Jackson
(2006) describes three canonical classes including tightly coupled groups, coupled
networks, and loosely coupled movements. Zelinsky and Shubik (2009) developed a
framework of categorizing terrorist groups by comparing their operational characteristics
to business firms. Similar to Shapiro (2005), Zelinsky and Shubik (2009) focused on two
organizational dimensions: centralization of resources and centralization of operations.
By combining these two dimensions, there are four types of terrorist group structures,
including hierarchy, venture capital, franchise, and brand.
Ligon, Simi, Harms, and Harris (2013) drew from organizational theory to
differentiate terrorist organizations from other types of collectives (e.g., groups) as well
as describe the attributes of organizations. By definition, organizations refer to
collections of human systems of cooperation and coordination assembled within
identifiable boundaries to pursue shared performance goals or objectives (Hodge,
Anthony, & Gales, 2003). Based on this definition, Ligon and colleagues (2013) hold that
there are three characteristics that are unique to organizations compared to other
collectives, including 1) coordination between members (interconnectedness); 2)
identifiable boundaries (formalization); and 3) adherence to shared performance goals or
objectives (centralization). More importantly, Ligon and colleagues (2013) also hold that
organizations that meet those three criteria can be described in terms of two attributes:
structure and design. Structure refers to “the total amount of ways in which work and
people can be divided and organized to accomplish organizational goals” (p. 112). With
regard to structure, organization typically differ on degrees of hierarchy (centralization),
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the chain of command (centralization/interconnectedness), and reason for labor division
(complexity). Next, organizational design consists of two normative processes, including
formalization and communication (interconnectedness).
Finally, drawing from organizational theory, Volders (2016) argues that there are
four key parameters that differentiate terrorist groups: membership, operational time and
space, formalization, and centralization. Using these four design parameters, Volders
(2016) describes four ideal-types of organizational designs in relation to their ability to
complete strategically successful attacks and their operational security (see Figure 2).
Quadrant 1 groups characterize terrorist organizations with limited operational time and
space, few well-trained members, a decentralized structure, and little formal rules or
procedures that control member’s behaviors. Quadrant 1 terror groups are the least
organized. Quadrant 2 groups have rising centralization and formalization although
lacking specialized membership or operational time or space. With increasing
centralization and formalization from Quadrant 1 to Quadrant 2, groups have more
control over members’ behaviors and group goals; however, the risk of infiltration from
security threats also rises.
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Figure 2. Organizational Types Relative to Tactical Efficiency and
Operational Security (adopted from Volder, 2016)
Quadrant 3 characterizes groups with senior leadership positions held by welltrained individuals, formal rules or procedures, and control of physical territory to train
and coordinate their attacks. Quadrant 3 groups have increased functional specialization,
accountability, and institutional memory (Volders, 2016, p. 119). Quadrant 3 groups have
the highest levels of organization of the four types. Finally, Quadrant 4 characterizes the
“ideal” terrorist group. These groups have specialized members and the necessary
operational space to “carry out complex operations and/or prolonged terrorist campaigns
in line with the group’s strategic political goals and their organizational objectives”
(Volder, 2016, p. 119). However, these groups lack centralization and formalization to
minimize the risk of infiltration from security threats. The drawback of the Quadrant 4
design is that without structuring tools to guide members' behaviors (i.e., centralization
and formalization), organizational control is increasingly at risk. In other words, members
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have increased autonomy over their actions since there are fewer controls and
coordination mechanisms in place.
In sum, like gangs, no two terrorist groups are alike. For instance, terrorist groups
vary in several organizational dimensions commonly found in gang research such as their
interconnectedness (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001; Kilberg, 2012; Ligon et al., 2013; Mishal
& Rosenthal, 2005; Shapiro, 2005), centralization (Jackson, 2006; Kilberg, 2012;
Shapiro, 2005; Volder, 2016; Zelinsky & Shubik, 2009), complexity (Kilberg, 2012;
Mishal & Rosenthal, 2005), and formalization (Ligon et al., 2013; Volder 2016). The
primary limitation is that many of these studies are theoretical in nature (e.g., Arquilla &
Ronfeldt, 2001; Volder, 2016) or rely on case studies (Ligon et al., 2013; Shapiro, 2005)
to examine the organization dimensions of terrorist groups. Subsequently, few studies
have used a quantitative approach to examine how these organizational dimensions
manifest in terrorist group and their relationship with violence (for exception see;
Kilberg, 2012). This dissertation seeks to overcome this by using a data-driven approach
to classify the organization of terrorist groups and its relationship to violence.
Organizational Dimensions and Theoretical Mechanism
Recall that the second research question in this dissertation is: Do terrorist groups
that are more highly organized engage in more group level violence than less organized
terrorist groups? For this dissertation, two types of violence are examined: lethality and
hard target selection. Hard targets are of particular importance in this study since they
require a considerable amount of planning and coordination to successful attack (Asal et
al., 2015; Berman & Latin, 2008). Hard targets such as the military or police are wellguarded targets that are difficult to access, have a small window of opportunity to attack,
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and offer little chance of escape (Nilsson, 2018). When successful, attacks on hard targets
are strategically important for violent extremist organizations for projecting an image of
strength and “underscore[ing] its credentials as a meaningful force, establishing a
benchmark of power that it has then used to build morale among existing members and
attract new recruits” (Libicki, Chalk, & Sisson, 2007, p. 63).
In general, hard targets require expertise and coordination to successfully attack.
Given the novelty of measuring organization in terrorist groups, I do not offer formal
hypothesizes as to the relationship between the underlying organizational dimensions in
terrorist groups and violence. However, I do expect that terrorist groups with higher
degrees of organization are more violent and have the operational and tactical capacity to
successful attack hard targets for three reasons (See Figure 3). First, there is greater
levels of control and accountability in organized terrorist groups (Heger et al., 2012;
Shapiro, 2013). In particular, centralization and hierarchical authority roles limit the
amount of discretion afforded to individual members. Given the risk associated with
attacking hard targets, centralized terrorist groups are also able to hold members
accountable for their actions, which reducing the chances of negligent acts and rewards
successful attacks (Abrahms & Potter, 2015; Shapiro, 2015). Formalization also helps
regulate the behavior of members. More specifically, formalization mechanisms, such as
rules and punishments, allow for greater obedience and compliance from members
(Ligon et al., 2013; Shapiro, 2013; Volders, 2016). Members of highly formalized
organizations are more likely to use organizational resources toward organizational goals
as opposed to personal needs or for settling individual grievances (Ligon et al., 2013,
p.113). Formalization also limits the discretion of members by safeguarding efficient and
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predictable decision-making. When formalization mechanisms such as training in
organization rules and procedures are in place, lower level members know who has
decision-making authority in situations of uncertainty. From this view, formalization
serves as a “substitute” for day-to-day leadership decision-making (Keller, 2006). As
such, high levels of formalization connote member compliance through established
norms.
Second, there is a greater agenda setting capacity in well-organized terrorist
groups (Heger et al., 2012). Clear agenda setting ensures that there are few alternative
sources to distort or challenge the tactics of that specific attack or the larger operational
goals of the organization. Centralization improves the agenda setting capacity of terrorist
groups as leaders set the strategic agenda for the group and communication goals
unidirectional down the chain of command. Although the goals of leaders and foot
soldiers are not always perfectly aligned (Shapiro, 2013), research has shown that a lack
of leadership is especially detrimental. For example, Abrahms and Potter (2015) illustrate
that foot soldiers are incentivized to attack soft targets, which are not in line with the
higher-order goals of the group, during period of leadership deficiencies. During these
periods of instability, limited centralization reduces the ability of the group to regulate
members behavior and limits goal congruence among members. Interconnectedness
improves the agenda-setting capacity in terrorist groups. In highly interconnected
organizations, face-to-face meetings between members help establish the strategic and
operational goals of the organization. These meetings also help establish trust among
members, ensuring that there is a clear strategic agenda for the organization. While
agenda setting and decision-making in interconnected organizations are time-consuming,
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it facilitates consistency in action and reduces redundancy of effort (Ligon et al., 2013).
Finally, formalization improves the agenda setting capacity of groups through an
established institutional memory. In particular, training in ideological rules and
organization procedures develop explicit knowledge related to group goals and
acceptable means to achieve those goals.

Figure 3. Theoretical Linkages Between Organizational Theory Constructs and
Mechanisms for Violence
Third, there is greater expertise in well-organized terrorist groups. Complexity
ensures the development of group level expertise through a defined division of labor
allowing members to develop specialized task skills. For example, complex terrorist
groups provide members with specialized combat training. This training provides
members with greater tactical expertise in developing and deploying sophisticated
weapon systems to strike hard targets (Asal et al., 2015; Logan et al., 2019).
Formalization also enhances the development and management of expertise. For
example, training in organizational rules, policies, and procedures provides members
with superior knowledge of the operation of the group. Formalization also enhances the
institutional memory of groups allowing for more efficient information management and
transfer. Similarly, centralization and interconnected improve the means in which
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expertise is managed and allocated in the group. Centralization allows for betterequipped, highly executed attacks through the pooling and distribution of resources based
on collective as opposed to individual goals (Ligon et al., 2013). Thus, expertise is used
in the “right place at the right time.” In interconnected organizations, expertise and
knowledge are transferred – whether vertically in centralized organizations or
horizontally in decentralized groups – to other members thorough interactions.
Interconnected terrorist groups who hold territory also have the operational space to
develop expertise and coordinate activities. Without such space, terrorist groups are
scattered with no central organizing space to train and develop expertise without constant
threats from law enforcement or competing terrorist groups. In addition, territorial control
allows terrorist groups move at their own pace and utilize this space for planning
complex operations (Volders, 2016). In sum, the complexity dimension is linked to the
development of expertise, while the other three dimensions are related to coordinating
and managing expertise.
In the next chapter, I describe the methods used to assess the centralization,
formalization, interconnectedness, and complexity dimensions of organization in terrorist
groups. I also describe the ways I measured the two violent outcomes of interest: lethality
and hard target selection.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
Data for this dissertation come from two datasets. First, measures of organization
and group characteristics were derived from the Leadership for the Extreme and
Dangerous for Innovative Results (LEADIR) dataset. Second, measures of violence were
drawn from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). To examine the relationship between
the organization of terrorist groups and attack outcomes, I connected the LEADIR data
with attributed measures of violence collected for the GTD. In the sections below, I
describe both the datasets in more detail.
Global Terrorism Database
The GTD is an unclassified, open-source database on domestic and international
terrorist events from 1970 through 2018 maintained by the National Consortium for the
Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland
(START, 2020). Terror events are included in the GTD if they have a political, social,
religious, or economic motive, are intended to coerce, intimidate, or publicize the cause,
and/or if they violate international humanitarian law. The GTD excludes all acts of state
terrorism. While recognizing the complexities in defining terrorism, the GTD’s inclusion
criteria are generally agreed on by most scholars and experts (LaFree et al. 2014). Each
attack included in the GTD is coded for information including, but not limited to, the
number of fatalities, the number of causalities, weapons used, target type, and the
perpetrator group name. Given the scope and detail of the GTD, it is recognized as the
most comprehensive database on terrorist attacks and commonly used in terrorist studies
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(e.g., Carson et al., 2012; Hsu & McDowall, 2017; Mroszczyk, 2019; Santifort, Sandler,
& Brandt, 2013).
Leadership for the Extreme and Dangerous for Innovative Results
The LEADIR dataset contains organizational and leadership information on 280
terrorist groups active between 2008 and 2017.8 To reach the final sample of 280 terrorist
groups, LEADIR uses a three-stage process (see Figure 4). It is important to note that, to
develop the final sample of terrorist groups, the GTD was used as the starting point. In
the first stage, all attack cases in the GTD outside the years 2008 through 2017 were
removed.9 Attack cases in which (1) there was doubt in whether or not the incident
qualified as an act of terrorism and (2) there was uncertainty whether or not the
perpetrator group was involved were also removed. The remaining dataset included
73,013 terrorist attacks between 2008 and 2017. In the second stage, the terrorist attacks
were aggregated to the group level based on the “perpetrator group name” variable. Then
all perpetrator group name entries with less than five attacks attributed to them were
removed. In total, 640 perpetrator group name entries were removed at this stage.

8

The sample of terrorist groups is international, and groups were located in 50 different countries. This is
an important distinct since much of the gang organization literature focuses on US based gangs.
9
This timeframe was selected for three reasons. First, using a more current date range ensures that sufficient
and reliable information could be collected and coded for each terrorist group. Second, at the time of data
collection, the GTD included attack data up until 2017. Thus, 2008 to 2017 creates a practical 10-year date
range to examine. This 10-year time frame is consistent with other datasets on violent extremist organizations.
For example, the Big, Allied, and Dangerous Dataset (BADD) collected information on terrorist groups active
in an 8-year period from 1998 to 2005. Third, the most recent GTD collection period began in 2008. By using
2008 as our starting period, we do not have to account for different collection methods utilized by the GTD
(LaFree & Dugan, 2007; LaFree, Dugan, & Miller, 2014).
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Figure 4. Process for Determining LEADIR Sample
Five attacks were selected as the threshold for inclusion for two reasons. First,
committing five attacks during this ten-year period displayed a minimal commitment to
violence on the part of the perpetrator. A sustained commitment to violence is often a
principal in defining criminal organizations (Finckenauer, 2005). Second, five attacks are
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a mid-point of what other similar data collection efforts use. For example, the Big,
Allied, and Dangerous Dataset (BADD) collected information on 395 terrorist groups
with at least one act of terrorism between 1998 to 2005 (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008),
while Kilberg (2012) coded the organizational structure of 246 terrorist groups with ten
or more attacks between 1970 and 2007.
In the final stage, all perpetrator group name entries that did not have identifiable
group boundaries. The clearest example of group boundaries was the presence of a group
name or moniker. Thus, I removed all perpetrator group name entries coded as
“unknown” or those highlighting lone actors, social movements, or a generic reference
(e.g., “Maoists,” “Separatists,” and “White Extremists”). In total, 46 perpetrator group
name entries were removed (see Table 4). The remaining dataset included 25,627 terror
incidents nested with 280 terrorist groups.10 The LEADIR project consists of
organizational and leadership information collected for these 280 terrorist groups.
Table 4. Perpetrator Group Name Entries Removed
Perpetrator Type
Unknown
Maoists
Fulani extremists
Muslim extremists
Palestinian Extremists
Separatists
Jihadi-inspired extremists
Tribesmen
Gunmen
Pro Hartal Activists
Dissident Republicans
Anarchists
Anti-Muslim extremists
10

Number
of Attacks
43977
1206
405
360
237
198
90
87
84
79
71
65
61

Perpetrator Type
Anti-Government extremists
FARC dissidents
Neo-Nazi extremists
Loyalists
Anti-Semitic extremists
Chechen Rebels
Pro-Russia Militia
Gbagbo Loyalists
Buddhist Monks
Rohingya extremists
Ijaw extremists
Hindu extremists
Anti-Nuclear extremists

Number
of Attacks
15
14
13
13
13
11
10
9
9
8
7
7
7

There were 45,860 incidents in which the perpetrator group was coded as unknown. This was the cause
for the large drop in the number of cases between the second and third stage.
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Militants
Uighur Separatists
Israeli settlers
Murle Tribe
Israeli extremists
Algerian Islamic Extremists
Right-wing extremists
Muslim Separatists
White extremists
Mapuche activists

34
29
28
26
24
24
21
20
17
16

Anti-Immigrant extremists
Anti-Abortion extremists
Tuareg extremists
Qaddafi loyalists
Left-wing extremists
Corsican Nationalists
Bedouin tribesmen
Ukrainian nationalists
Anti-White extremists
Abbala extremists

7
7
6
6
6
6
6
5
5
5

Historiometric approach
LEADIR uses a historiometric approach to collect and code organizational
information. Historiometry is an organizational research method in which nomothetic
hypotheses about human behavior are tested by applying quantitative analyses to
historical information (Simonton, 1990; 1999). In other words, historiometric analysis
allows researchers to convert historical information into numeric data that are appropriate
for complex statistical analysis and modeling (Crayne & Hunter, 2018). Historiometry is
commonly used in personality studies and social psychology (Simonton, 2008) as well as
industrial and organizational (I/O) psychology to assess leaders (Ligon et al., 2012;
Mumford, 2006).11 Historiometric analysis is particularly advantageous for this study
given the rarity and inability to access and directly observe our population of interest
(i.e., terrorist groups). Similar research has applied historiometric analysis to examine
destructive leader behavior (O’Connor et al., 1995) and leader assassination (Yammarino
et al., 2013).

11

Criminologist terrorism scholars using comparable open-source information are also using data that is
representative of the larger universe they are interested in, according to Chermak, Freilich, Parkin, and
Lynch (2012).
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In accordance with best practice with historiometry, a psychometric content
coding scheme was developed for both organizational and leadership measures. This
psychometric content-coding scheme included the use of behaviorally anchored rating
scales (BARS) and objective indices related to measures of organizational centralization,
interconnectedness, and complexity. Constructs coded as BARS were measured on 5point Likert-type scales with benchmark exemplars for what would be considered low,
medium, and high on that particular construct in the sample at hand (see Figure 5). Other
organizational measures, such as the presence of territorial control, training, and uniform
were measured on dichotomous scales with descriptions of each construct.
Figure 5. Example Behaviorally Anchored Rating Scale for Organizational Centralization
1

2

3

4

5

There is no clear command
structure; the group is
anonymously cell-based.

Some command structure, but
still ambiguous in terms of
who is given
commands/leader.

The structure of an
organization is highly
centralized and hierarchical
with a clear chain of
command.

Pagan Sect of the Mountain
and other modern anarchist
groups operate in
autonomous cells

Caucasus Emirate has central
leadership, but it is difficult
to identify who has
operational control during
periods in the group’s history

ISIL has a hierarchical
command structure featuring a
central leader (Baghdadi) who
sets the strategic and
operational objectives for the
group

LEADIR data were collected and coded five raters who worked in an
interdisciplinary, collaborative research center located at a large Midwestern
University.12 Each rater was trained in theories underlying terrorist organizations as well
as best practices in utilizing open-source information to prevent common method bias

12

Each of the five raters were graduate students including one doctoral student in criminology and criminal
justice, three master’s students in criminology and criminal justice, and one master’s student in political
science.
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and ensure data were gathered from reputable sources. Each rater also individually coded
10 percent of the terrorist groups in LEADIR and met to discuss their evaluations to
ensure a shared cognitive framework and reach a better understanding of the group
characteristics. During this time, interrater reliability was calculated across coders for the
Likert-style organizational constructs. Cronbach’s alpha score for each measure was
greater than .80, suggesting adequate levels of interrater reliability (Shrout & Fleiss,
1979).
Data collection and source credibility
To account for source credibility, LEADIR utilized a three-tier source credibility
system to help direct raters to the more “trusted” source when conflicting information
was present (see Freilich, Chermak, & Belli, 2014 for similar credibility system). Tier 1
sources -- the most credible sources of information about terrorist groups -- included
academic publications and databases on terrorism (e.g., BAAD; Mapping Militant
Organization, South Asia Terrorism Portal) and government sources (e.g., Department of
Justice, United Nations). The next source credibility tier -- Tier 2 sources – included
media reports (e.g., Wall Street Journal, Al Jazeera, New York Times) and information
from watch-dog organizations (e.g., Council on Foreign Relations, Counter Extremist
Project). Finally, the lowest source credibility tier – Tier 3 sources – consisted of
information abstracted from blogs or extremist affiliated websites.
Table 5 shows the average number of sources per tier for each of the 280 terrorist
groups. On average, there were slightly over one Tier-1 and three Tier-2 sources per
terrorist group in the dataset. In addition, Tier-3 sources were used very little for the
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groups in LEADIR. This suggests that raters were able to find relatively credible
information.
Table 5. Source Credibility
Tier Source
Mean (SD)
Tier 1
1.49 (1.55)
Tier 2
3.66 (2.06)
Tier 3
0.69 (1.16)

Min
0
0
0

Max
11
14
7

n = 280

Missing data
Missing data is a frequent problem in research using open source information, and
researchers have employed a host of methods and statistical techniques to resolve such
issues (see LaFree et al., 2018; Safer-Lichtenstein, LaFree, & Loughran, 2017). For this
dissertation, I used listwise deletion for missing data on the measures of organization. In
total, 21 terrorist groups in the final sample had missing information on a core measure of
organization (see below) and were removed from the final analysis. The remainder of this
dissertation focuses on the 259 terrorist groups with sufficient organizational
information (see Appendix A for full sample).
Measures of Organization
All of the measures of organization were derived from the LEADIR dataset. Table
6 includes each measure of organization, their operational definitions, and their
relationship to the gang organization literature. In order to the address centralization
dimensions of organization three items were employed: leadership, centralization, and
uniforms. Leadership was a dichotomous measured assessing whether the terrorist group
were governed by a single leaders or ruling council as opposed to a decentralized
structure or fractured leadership. Centralization measured the degree to which each
terrorist group were centralized with a top-down chain of command and multiple levels
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of hierarchy as opposed to decentralized using a five-point Likert scale (1 = highly
decentralized; 2 = somewhat decentralized; 3 = balanced; 4 = somewhat centralized; 5 =
highly centralized). Finally, Uniforms was a dichotomous measure assessing whether
members of the terrorist group wore uniforms to denote status or tenure. Table 6 suggests
that the majority of terrorist groups in our sample had central leadership (78 percent) and
were relatively centralized (m = 3.25, SD = 1.20), while slightly more than half had
members wear uniforms to denote status or tenure (53 percent).
Three items also assessed the formalization dimension of organization including
organizational, ideological, and combat training. First, organization training was a
dichotomous measured assessing whether the terrorist group engaged in organizational
training (e.g., leadership succession planning; internal memos; financial reports).13
Second, ideological training was a dichotomous measured assessing whether the terrorist
group engaged in ideological training (e.g., religious camps; mandatory reading of
ideological texts). Third, combat training was a dichotomous measured assessing whether
the terrorist group engaged in combat training (e.g., weapons usage, physical tests).
Similar to written rules and punishments in gangs, these types of training socialize
members to the formal and informal codes of the organization. Table 6 illustrates that
slightly over half of the groups in LEADIR engaged in combat training (54 percent)
while less than one-third engaged in organizational (29 percent) or ideological (27
percent) training.

13

Although the indicators of organizational training such as internal memos and financial reports are not
direct evidence of organizational training, they suggest that the group adopted standardized procedures and
policies that would only be learned in the organization.
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Two items were used to examine the interconnectedness dimension of
organization including autonomy and territorial control. Connectedness measured the
degree to which each terrorist group and its subunits were interconnected as opposed to
autonomous using a five-point Likert scale (1 = fully autonomous; 2 = somewhat
autonomous; 3 = balanced; 4 = somewhat interconnected; 5 = highly interconnected).
Territorial Control was a dichotomous measured assessing whether the terrorist group
held a sizeable amount of territory for a substantive amount of time from 2008 through
2017. Table 6 indicates that, on average, the terrorist groups in LEADIR preferred
operational autonomy (m = 2.54, SD = .90) and roughly one-third had territorial control
(32 percent).
Finally, I used three items to assess the complexity dimension of organization
including departmentalization, deep-level diversity, and services. Departmentalization
measured the degree to which each terrorist group had multiple task-specific branches or
units in the organization using a five-point Likert scale (1 = no unit specialization; 2 =
some unit specialization; 3 = moderate unit specialization; 4 = high unit specialization; 5
= maximum unit specialization). Deep-Level Diversity measured the degree to which
each terrorist group had members with specialized skills such as medical professionals,
military officers, professors (1 = no member expertise; 2 = some member expertise; 3 =
moderate member expertise; 4 = high member expertise; 5 = maximum member
expertise). Finally, services was a dichotomous measure assessing whether the terrorist
group provided community services to their target community. Table 6 indicates that on
average, the terrorist groups in LEADIR were not highly specialized at either the
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organizational (m = 2.64, SD = 1.16) nor individual (m = 2.22, SD = 1.1) level.
Furthermore, few groups provided social services to the larger community (23 percent).
Table 6. Descriptive Statistics for Measures of Organization
Variable
Centralization

Operational Definition

Mean (SD)

Min

Max

Example Indictor of
Gang Organization

Leadership

“The terrorist group was governed by a
single leader or ruling council”

.78 (.41)

0

1

Presence of Leaders

Centralization

“The degree to which the terrorist group
was centralized”

3.25 (1.20)

1

5

Shot Callers

Uniforms

“There is evidence that members of the
terrorist group wore uniforms”

.54 (.50)

0

1

Levels of
Membership

“There is evidence that the terrorist group
engaged in organizational training”

.29 (.46)

0

1

Rules/Punishments

Ideological Training

“There is evidence that the terrorist group
engaged in ideological training”

.27 (.44)

0

1

Rules/Punishments

Combat Training

“There is evidence that the terrorist group
engaged in combat training”

.54 (.50)

0

1

Rules/ Punishments

2.54 (.90)

1

5

Regular Meetings

.32 (.47)

0

1

Claim or Protect
Territory

Formalization
Organizational
Training

Interconnectedness
Connectedness
Territorial Control

“The degree to which cells or units in the
terrorist group operate independently”
“There is evidence that the terrorist group
had control over territory”

Complexity
Departmentalization

“The degree to which the terrorist group
delineates tasks to specific cells or units”

2.64 (1.16)

1

5

Age-Graded Groups
or Roles

Deep-Level
Diversity

“The degree to which the terrorist group’s
membership is diverse on deep-level
characteristics such as educational
background, wealth, or specialized skills”

2.22 (1.10)

1

5

Specialized Roles

Services

“There is evidence that the terrorist group
provided community services”

.24 (.43)

0

1

Community
Responsibilities

Violent Outcomes
Each of the measures of violent comes from the GTD. There are five primary
outcomes for this dissertation including Lethality, Hard Target Lethality, Attacks on
Hard Targets, Successful Attacks on Hard Targets, and Highly Successful Attacks on
Hard Targets. As previously discussed, the five outcomes were designed around two
central measures of violence: lethality and hard target selection. Regarding lethality, I
included both a direct measure of group level lethality as well as a measure of lethality
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against hard targets. Concerning hard target selection, I included measure of both the
number of attacks on hard targets and measures of success when attacking hard targets.
First, Lethality measured the total number of victims killed by each terrorist group
between 2008 and 2017. The GTD provides the total number of fatalities as well as the
total number of perpetrator fatalities per attack. Thus, I subtracted the total number of
perpetrator fatalities from the total number of fatalities to capture the total number of
victim-only fatalities per attack. For example, if 15 individuals were killed in a suicide
bombing including 5 perpetrators and 10 civilians, the number of victims killed is 10.
The second outcome, the Hard Target Lethality, measured the total number of
hard targets killed by each terrorist group between 2008 and 2017. Hard targets include
four of the twenty-two different target types collected by the GTD including governmentgeneral, government-personnel, police, and military targets (Asal et al. 2015; Conrad &
Greene, 2015). Similar to the process of capturing victim-only fatalities, I subtracted the
total number of perpetrator fatalities from the total number of fatalities in attacks on hard
target to arrive at the number of hard targets killed. For example, if 10 individuals were
killed in an armed assault including 8 perpetrators and 2 police officers, the number of
hard targets killed is 2.
Next, the Attacks on Hard Targets measured the total number of attacks on hard
targets for each terrorist group between 2008 and 2017. The fourth outcome, Successful
Attacks on Hard Targets, measured the number of attacks in which the number of hard
targets killed was greater than the number of perpetrators. For example, if 12 members of
Boko Haram died during an attack that killed 15 police officers, this would qualify as a
successful attack. The number of hard targets killed (15) was greater than the number
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perpetrators killed (12). In the same example, if 12 members of Boko Haram were killed
during an attack that killed 11 police officers; this would not qualify as a successful
attack since the number of hard target deaths did not exceed the number of perpetrator
deaths.
Finally, Highly Successful Attacks on Hard Targets measured the number of
incidents in which the number of hard targets killed related to the number of perpetrators
killed was greater than 10. For example, if 5 members of al-Shabaab died during an
attack that killed 15 military members, this would qualify as a highly successful attack.
The number of hard targets killed (15) relative to the number perpetrators killed (5) was
greater than 10. In the same example, if 14 police officers and 5 perpetrators had died,
this would not qualify as a highly successful attack.
Table 7 includes the mean, standard deviation, minimum value, and maximum
value for each of the five outcome variables. After examining the descriptive statistics
and visual diagnostics for each outcome, there were clear outliers in the data. Thus, in
order to control for these outliers and create more meaningful variation in the distribution
of each outcome, I top-coded (also referred to as capped) the distribution of each
outcome at the upper 99th percentile.14 More specifically, Lethality was capped at 4,051,
Hard Target Lethality was capped at 1,408, Attacks on Hard Targets was capped at 344,
Successful Attacks on Hard Targets was capped at 253, and Highly Successful Attacks on
Hard Targets was capped at 37. Moving forward, the top-coded measures are the
variables of interest.15

14

In other words, 99 percent or more of the respective distributions fell below the value selected to represent the high end of the scale.
The results using the raw data illustrated that there were no substantive differences in the key variables of interest between the raw
and capped data.

15
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Table 7. Descriptive Statistics for Key Outcome Variables
Variable
Lethality (raw)
Lethality (99%)
Hard Target Lethality (raw)
Hard Target Lethality (99%)
Attacks on Hard Targets (raw)
Attacks on Hard Targets (99%)
Successful Attacks on Hard Targets (raw)
Successful Attacks on Hard Targets (99%)
Highly Successful Attacks on Hard Targets (raw)
Highly Successful Attacks on Hard Targets (raw)

Mean (SD)
285.22 (1634.60)
166.83 (576.27)
105.45 (612.57)
63.78 (215.32)
38.25 (218.89)
22.86 (60.65)
21.88 (139.44)
12.60 (38.97)
2.30 (12.65)
1.53 (5.66)

Min
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Max
20339
4051
7386
1408
3216
344
2072
253
139
37

Additional Group Level Variables
Although the focus on this dissertation is on indicators of organization, I
controlled for several important variables found to influence extremist organizations’
capacity for violence. This included ideology, goals, size, age, state sponsorship, alliance
funding, drug trafficking, and power. First, LEADIR collects information on three
ideological categories: religious, ethnonationalist, and left-wing. These categories were
not exclusive, and terrorist groups could fall into multiple ideological categories (see
Asal & Rethemyer, 2008 for similar schema). Religious was a dichotomous measure (1 =
religious) of whether the terrorist group was guided by some form of religious principles.
Ethnonationalist was a dichotomous measure (1 = ethnonationalist) of whether the
terrorist group advocates for the territorial autonomy or independence of a specific ethnic
group. Left-Wing was a dichotomous measure (1 = left-wing) of whether the terrorist
group promotes economic or social left-wing policies such as communism and its
variants (e.g., Marxist, Leninist, Maoists). Finally, Other was a dichotomous measure (1
= Other) of all other ideological motives, including right-wing, anarchists, supremacists,
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and environmentalists. As shown on Table 8, approximately 50 percent of the terrorist
groups had religious motivations, 49 percent had ethnonationalist motivations, 10 percent
had left-wing motivations, and 10 percent had other motives.
Next, I also controlled for the goals of each terrorist group. In LEADIR, group
goals are assessed using the six category-coding schema developed by Jones and Libicki
(2008). The six categories include policy change, status quo, territory change, regime
change, social revolution, and empire. Next, following Koehler-Derrick and Milton
(2019), I collapsed the six categories into a smaller set of three categories. First, AntiSystem Expansive is a dichotomous measure of groups that seek to establish an empire or
create a social revolution. These groups are anti-system in that they want to impose a new
governing order; however, they are also expansive because they wish for global as
opposed to local or regional change. Next, Anti-System Limited is a dichotomous measure
of groups whose goal is territorial control or regime change. These groups want to
impose a new governing order locally as opposed to globally. Finally, Within-System a
dichotomous measure of groups whose goal is to maintain the status quo or seek a shift in
policy. These groups seek to influence change inside a state but do not want to overthrow
the existing regime nor establish a new political order. Table 8 shows that the majority of
terrorist groups had anti-system limited goals (69 percent) followed by anti-system
expansive goals (23 percent) and within-system goals (8 percent).
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Table 8. Descriptive Statistics for Group Control Variables
Variable
Mean (SD)
Min
Max
Ideology
Religious
.50 (.50)
0
1
Ethnonationalist
.49 (.50)
0
1
Left-Wing
.10 (.32)
0
1
Other
.10 (.30)
0
1
Goals
Anti-System Expansive
.23 (.42)
0
1
Anti-System Limited
.69 (.47)
0
1
Within-System
.08 (.29)
0
1
Organizational Size
1.42 (1.27)
0
4
Organizational Age
15.93 (15.71)
1
59
State Sponsorship
.22 (.42)
0
1
Alliance Funding
.38 (.49)
0
1
Drug Trafficking
.14 (.35)
0
1
Power
7.22 (3.11)
1
10
Organizational Size was a 5-point ordinal measure of the estimated peak number
of members in the organization (0 = 0-99 or low confidence; 1 = 100-999; 2 = 1,0004,999; 3 = 5,000-9,999; 4 = 10,000 or more).16 This approach to examining organization
size is similar to that of Jones and Libicki (2008) and Asal and Rethemeyer (2008). Table
9 shows that the average organizational size for the terrorist groups in LEADIR was 1.42,
suggesting that most groups are relatively small with between 100 to 999 members.
Organizational Age was a continuous variable measuring the number of years each
terrorist group had been in existence. For terrorist groups that are still active, 2017 was
coded as their most recent year. For instance, the New People’s Army was founded in
1969 and is still active today, making their organizational age is 49 years. There were
four outliers including the Karen National Union and the militant wings of the Awami
League, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, and the Muslim Brotherhood. These historically

16

Low confidence suggests that there was limited evidence regarding the group’s size. When information
does not exist regarding the number of members in a group, they are typically small.
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political organizations were founded in the 1920s but have had individuals commit acts
of terrorism on their behalf in recent years. To account for these four groups, I top-coded
organizational age at the upper 99 percentile (59 years). Table 8 indicates that the average
age of the terrorist groups in LEADIR is approximately 16 years old.
Next, State Sponsorship was a dichotomous measure (1 = had state sponsorship)
of whether the terrorist group received funding by a state actor between 2008 and 2017.
Table 8 indicates that 22 percent of terrorist groups in LEADIR had a state sponsor.
Alliance Funding was a dichotomous measure (1 = had alliance funding) of whether the
terrorist group received funding from another terrorist group between 2008 and 2017. In
total, 38 percent of the terrorist groups in LEADIR received alliance funding. Drug
Trafficking was a dichotomous measure (1 = engaged in drug trafficking) of whether the
terrorist group engaged in drug trafficking as a source of fundraising. Only 14 percent of
the terrorist groups had evidence that they engaged in drug trafficking. Finally, I also
controlled for the length of time groups existed during the study period. In other words,
the variable, Power, measures the number of years each terrorist group existed between
2008 and 2017 (see Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008). Given the timeframe, each group could
have been exposed for one year to ten years. Table 8 indicates that the average exposure
for each group was around 7 years.
Analytical Techniques
There were three main analytical techniques used in this dissertation: exploratory
factor analysis, hierarchical regression modeling, and cluster analysis. In the sections
below, I describe each technique and how they related to the research questions and goals
of this dissertation (see Table 9).
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Table 9. Summary of Research Questions in Relation to Analytical Techniques
Research Question
Analytical Technique
RQ1: Which indicators of gang organization can 1a) Exploratory Factor Analysis
be applied to terrorist groups to develop a
classification schema of terrorist group structure? 1b) Cluster Analysis
RQ2: Do terrorist groups that are more highly 2) Hierarchical Poisson Modeling
organized engage in more group level violence
than less organized terrorist groups?
Exploratory factor analysis
In the first stage of my analysis, I used exploratory factor analysis (EFA) to
explore the underlying dimensions of organization using the observed measures of
centralization, formalization, interconnectedness, and complexity. EFA is an
unstructured, data-driven approach used to determine the appropriate number of factors,
and to examine which measured variables are reasonable indicators of those latent
dimensions (Brown, 2015, p. 11). The goal of EFA is to reduce the total number of
variables into a smaller number of factors composed of highly related variables (Baglin,
2014). EFA is the most appropriate technique since I do not have a priori hypotheses as
to the structure of the relationship between the dimensions of organization as they
manifest in terrorist groups.17
In order to examine the underlying structure of the data, I use the PC software
package FACTOR (Ferrando & Lorenzo-Seva, 2017; Lorenzo-Seva & Ferrando, 2006).
Given that the measures of organization used on this study are either ordinal or binary,
FACTOR is useful in that the EFA procedure can be based on polychoric correlations
(Timmerman & Lorenzo-Seva, 2011). Polychoric correlation is an extension of the

17

In contrast, Principle Components Analysis is not well suited for my analysis since it does not attempt to
explain the underlying factor structure of the data nor is Confirmatory Factor Analysis, which is typically
used to validate existing factor structures.
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tetrachoric correlation and estimates the correlation between two variables measured on
an ordinal scale (Baglin, 2014). Large datasets (> 200 cases) are typically necessary
when using polychoric correlations since it is calculated from the contingency table
between the scores of two items, and the more response categories, the greater the
number of cells that need to be filled (Ferrando & Lorenzo-Seva, 2014, p. 1171).
Standard software packages (e.g., SPSS) estimate these relationships using the Pearson
correlation matrix, which assumed that the variables are continuous and that a linear
relationship exists between the variables. Researchers have shown that Pearson
correlations underestimate the strength of the relationship between two ordinal variables
and leads to biased factor loadings (Bernstein & Teng, 1989; Olsson, 1979).
In order to perform the EFA, the minimum rank factor analysis (MRFA)
procedure was employed. The MRFA is beneficial in that it estimates the percentage of
common variance and unique variance explained by the EFA model (Shapiro & ten
Berge, 2002; ten Berge & Kiers, 1991). MRFA minimized the common variance that is
ignored when only some factors are maintained (Lorenzo-Seva & Ferrando, 2006, p.89).
In order to simplify the factor structure, an oblique rotation (i.e., direct oblimin) was
performed. Following Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), an oblique rotation is preferred
when the underlying factors produced by the EFA are correlated. More specifically, if the
underlying factors are correlated at .32 or above, this means that there is 10 percent or
more overlap in the variance among factors and oblique rotation (Tabachnick & Fidell,
2007). Results from the unrotated EFA indicated that the factors were correlated above
.32, suggesting that the use of an oblique rotation procedure was appropriate.
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Cluster analysis
Cluster analysis was used to classify units of analysis (i.e., terrorist groups) based
in their similarity with respect to a set of variables (i.e., measures of organization). The
goal of cluster analysis is to assess similarity based on a set of theoretically relevant
variables.18 The benefit of cluster analysis is that it develops classification schemas and
typologies that offer a unique form of theory building by organizing complex webs of
cause-effect relationships into coherent accounts (Doty & Glick, 1994; Fiss, 2011). In
order to develop the clusters, a two-stage clustering strategy was used (see Govender &
Sivkumar, 2020 for review). First, I used Hierarchical cluster analysis using Ward’s
clustering method to search for latent behavioral clusters among the terrorist groups.
Hierarchical cluster analysis is an agglomerative clustering approach where each data
point starts in its own cluster before merging with similar pairs of clusters resulting in a
hierarchy. In other words, hierarchical cluster analysis is a bottom-up approach to
clustering. The Ward’s minimum variance method is one of the mostly frequently used
method for hierarchal clustering and is defined as the smallest increase in the withincluster sum of squares after merging of two clusters (Jolliffe & Philipp, 2010; Ward,
1963). The primary benefit of the hierarchical cluster analysis is that it produced a
dendrogram and an agglomeration schedule that can be used to define the optimal
number of clusters (Govender & Sivkumar, 2020; Yim & Ramdeen, 2015). More
specifically, dendrogram is two-dimensional tree-like structure depicting the sequence of
nested clusters (Dubes & Jain, 1976). The distance between each division in the

18

The general goal of cluster analysis is to group (i.e., cluster) a set of objects based in share similarities
whereas the goal of factor analysis is for data reduction purposes. In other words, factor analysis is concerned
with grouping variables as opposed to objects. Thus, while factor analysis and cluster analysis are similar in
some respects, clustering is the preferred method to classify terrorist groups.
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dendrogram can be examined to determine the optimal number of clusters. In addition,
the agglomeration schedule identifies which point two clusters being combined are too
dissimilar to form a homogeneous group. This is evident by the first large increase in the
coefficient values and suggests the ideal stop point in the clustering process (Yim &
Ramdeen, 2015).
In the second phase of the two-stage clustering strategy, k-means clustering is
used to determine cluster assignments. K-means clustering is a partitional clustering
method used to determine the initial cluster center based on the nearest centroid sorting
method. After the centers are determined, the k-means procedure assigned cases (i.e.,
terrorist groups) to each cluster based on an estimation of the closest distance between
that case and the center of the cluster’s centroid (Norusis, 1990). A cluster’s centroid is a
compilation of a combined mean score across all variables clustered (for review and
application in criminal justice research, see Terrill, Paoline III, & Manning, 2003). For
this dissertation, each terrorist group’s combined scores on the measures of organization
are compared with every other group, and those terrorist groups who are most similar are
sorted into the same grouping or cluster. Terrorist groups do not have to be identical to
one another in each cluster, but they are more like the organizations in their cluster
compared to other clusters.
As illustrated by Govender and Sivkumar (2020), a two-stage clustering strategy
is preferred since it utilizes the strengths of both clustering methods. First, hierarchical
cluster analysis was used to determine the approprirate number of clusters. Second, kmeans clustering produces a flat clustering structure that is simple and efficient (Jain,
2010). It is important to note that, although the factor analysis precedes the cluster
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analysis in this study, I used individual items as opposed to factor scores when
performing the cluster analysis. Previous research has shown that individual items
outperforms factor scores when using cluster analysis (Fiedler & McDonald, 1993).
Before the two-stage cluster approach, each measure of organization was transformed
into standardized z-scores to control for the unequal scaling of variables. Prior research
has shown that the use of z-score is more effective and efficient compared to other
methods when using k-mean cluster analysis (Mohamad & Usman, 2013).
As a supplemental analysis, I also examined the relationship between each cluster
typology and the other group characteristics using Spearman Rank-Order Correlation.
Spearman Rank-Order Correlation has been shown to improve power and limit error
when using nonnormal data (Bishara & Hittmer, 2012; Zimmerman & Zumbo, 1993).
Hierarchical Poisson regression
Finally, in order to examine the relationship between the dimensions of
organization produced from the EFA and violence, I used Hierarchical Poisson models in
the HLM 7.03 (Raudenbush, Bryk, Cheong, Congdon, & du Toit, 2011). Hierarchical
Linear Modeling (HLM) is a complex form of multiple regression used to analyze
variance in an outcome variable with predictors existing at different levels of analysis
(Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). HLM is beneficial since it accounts for the shared variance
in level-1 predictors (i.e., terrorist groups) across higher-order contexts. The higher-order
contexts for this dissertation is the country in which each terrorist group operates. There
is a large body of literature suggesting the country level effects influence violence (e.g,
Fahey & LaFree, 2015; Gurr, 1970; Piazza, 2008; Sandler, 2014). In total, the 259
terrorist groups operated across 50 different countries. Statistical procedures that do not
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account for the nested nature of data also risk inflating statistical power by failing to
adjust the degrees of freedom to the appropriate sample size. HLM corrects standard
errors by accounting for the nested nature of the data – producing a unique effect for each
group (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). HLM also corrects standard errors by accounting for
the clustered nature of these data and adjusting significance tests to reflect appropriate
degrees of freedom.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
The results of this dissertation are divided in three main sections. First, I
examined the underlying dimensions of organization using the observed measures of
centralization, formalization, interconnectedness, and complexity using exploratory factor
analysis. Second, I employ cluster analysis to classify terrorist groups based on the
dimensions of organization found from the EFA. Finally, I utilized Hierarchical Poisson
models to examine the relationship between the dimensions of organization and violence.
EFA Findings
EFA is an unstructured, data-driven approach used to reduce the total number of
variables into a smaller number of latent factors composed of highly correlated variables
(Baglin, 2014). In relation to this study, EFA is appropriate to examine how the
dimensions of organization manifest in terrorist groups since I do not have a priori
hypotheses as to the structure of the relationship between variables. The results presented
below were analyzed in PC software package FACTOR (see Ferrando & Lorenzo-Seva,
2017; Lorenzo-Seva & Ferrando, 2006) and the use of polychoric correlations to estimate
the correlation between two variables.
Table 10 includes the results of the EFA including the factor loading for each
dimension of organization, eigenvalues for each retained factor, and the percent of
variation explained by each factor identified. Prior to analysis, significant results on a
Bartlett’s test (p <.001) and a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin score of .70 suggest that the data are
suitable for factor analysis. Table 9 indicates that nine of the eleven measures of
organization loaded onto two factors (eigenvalue > 1). Two measures,
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departmentalization and services, cross-loaded on both factors and were removed from
the analysis for factor parsimony and simplicity. The two-factor solution explained
approximately 70 percent of the variation in the level of organization in terrorist groups.
Both factors had Generalized H-Latent Index and Generalized H-Observed Index at or
greater than .80, suggesting that the items represent a well-defined latent variable that is
likely to be stable across studies (Ferrando & Lorenzo-Seva, 2018).
Table 10. Results from Exploratory Factor Analysis
Structuring of
Concentration
Variable
Activities
of Authority
Deep-Level Diversity
.59
.15
Organizational Training
.90
.11
Combat Training
.92
.01
Ideological Training
.94
-.11
Territorial Control
.14
.55
Leadership
-.11
.94
Centralization
.01
.94
Connectedness
.25
.69
Uniforms
.08
.48
Eigenvalue
4.83
1.47
% Variation Explained
53.6%
16.3%
The first factor shown on Table 10 was comprised of four items including deeplevel diversity (i.e., membership expertise), organizational training, combat training, and
ideological training and explained 53.6 percent of the variation in organization. Based on
the items retained, this factor was labeled: Structuring of Activities. Structuring of
activities refers to the degree to which an organization has specialized sections (e.g.,
training) and formal procedures, and encompassed two organizational dimensions,
formalization and complexity (Pugh, Hickson, Hinings, & Turner, 1968; Pugh &
Hickson, 2007). The second factor illustrated on Table 10 was comprised of five items
including territorial control, leadership, centralization, interconnectedness, and uniforms
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and explained 16.3 percent of the variation in organization. Based on the items retained,
this factor was labeled: Concentration of Authority. Concentration of authority refers to
the degree to which an organization has a hierarchical decision-making structure with
limited unit autonomy, and encompassed two organizational dimensions, centralization
and interconnectedness (Pugh et al., 1968; Pugh & Hickson, 2007).
Next, Table 11 shows the descriptive statistics for both structuring of activities
and concentration of authority dimension of organization. The values on Table 11 are
based on the factor scores assigned to each terrorist group based on the results on the
EFA. Each terrorist group’s factor score indicates their relative standing on that latent
factor. For example, a factor score of 1.83 on the Structuring of Activities indicates a
high level of structuring relative to other terrorist groups, while a score of -.20 would
indicate a less than average level of structuring relative to other terrorist groups. An
important finding is Structuring of Activities is significantly correlated with
Concentration of Authority (r = .35, p < .001). This relationship indicates that terrorist
groups with high degrees of training and member expertise (i.e., structuring of activities)
are significantly more likely to have centralized top-down command-and-control,
leadership, and interconnectivity (i.e., concentration of authority).
Table 11. Descriptive Statistics for Structuring and Authority
Variable
Mean (SD)
Min
Max
r
Structuring of
.00 (.89)
-1.13
1.83
--Activities
Concentration of
.01 (.98)
-2.06
1.97
.35***
Authority
*** p < .001
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There are two primary reasons why the structuring of activities and concentration
of authority are positively correlated. First, both the structuring of activities and
concentration of authority dimensions are “structuring” characteristics of organizations as
opposed to “structural” characteristics (Campbell, Bownas, Peterson, & Dunnette, 1974;
Dalton, Todor, Spendolini, et al., 1980). In other words, both dimensions are related to
the “policies and activities occurring within the organization that prescribe or restrict the
behavior of organizational members” (Dalton et al., 1980, p. 51). Second, although there
is debate on the relationship between structuring of activities and concentration of
authority in organizational science (Child, 1972; Greenwood & Hinings, 1976; Pugh et
al., 1968), both dimensions are necessary for survival in a malevolent context. Terrorist
organizations with concentrated authority are typically more visible and subject to
increased law enforcement actions. Subsequently, these organizations are more likely to
have formalized training and rules to secure the loyalty and secrecy from its members
(Shapiro, 2013; also see Best & Luckenbill, 1980 for application in criminal
organizations).
Structuring, authority, and group characteristics
To provide a more nuanced understanding of structuring of activities and
concentration of authority dimensions, Table 12 illustrates the zero-order correlation
between both dimensions and other group characteristics. Beginning with the structuring
of activities dimension, Table 11 suggests that terrorist groups with high degrees of
structuring were significantly more likely to be religious (ρ = .26, p <.001), large in size
(ρ = .46, p <.001), older (ρ = .30, p <.001), have a state sponsor (ρ = .14, p <.05), receive
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funding from a non-state ally (ρ = .16, p <.01), and engage in drug trafficking (ρ = .14, p
<.05).
Table 12. Zero-Order Correlations Between Organizational
Dimensions and Additional Group Level Characteristics
Structuring of
Concentration of
Variable
Activities
Authority
Organizational Size
.46***
.41***
Organizational Age
.30***
.25***
***
Religious
.26
.05
Ethnonationalist
-.07
.10
Left-Wing
.01
.02
***
Other
-.17
-.23***
Anti-System
-.02
-.10
Expansive
Anti-System Limited
.03
.16***
Within-System
-.02
-.11
*
State Sponsorship
.14
.29***
**
Alliance Funding
.16
.20***
Drug Trafficking
.14*
.14*
*** p < .001; ** p <.01; * p <.05

Next, terrorist groups high in concentration of authority were significantly more
likely to have anti-system limited goals (ρ = .16, p <.001), be large in size (ρ = .41, p
<.001), be older (ρ = .25, p <.001), have a state sponsor (ρ = .29, p <.001), receive funding
from a non-state ally (ρ = .20, p <.001), and engage in drug trafficking (ρ = .14, p <.05);
however, they were less likely to adhere to other ideologies (ρ = -.23, p <.001). Finally,
terrorist groups high in structuring were also significantly less likely to adhere to other
ideologies including but not limited to anti-globalization, right-wing extremism,
anarchism, and animal liberation (ρ = -.17, p <.001).
Summary of findings: Structuring of activities and concertation of authority
There are two underlying dimensions of organization in terrorist groups:
structuring of activities and concertation of authority. These dimensions have theoretical
implications for organizational theory and the terrorism literature. Importantly, overlap
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exists between the dimensions of organization in terrorist groups as found in this study
and research on conventional organizations. More specifically, using scales representing
the centralization, formalization, standardization, specialization, and configuration
dimensions of organizational structure, seminal researchers from the Aston Group
research program found that two core dimensions of organizational structure were the
structuring of activities and concentration of authority (Hinings, Pugh, Hickson, &
Turner, 1967; Pugh et al., 1968; Pugh, Hickson, Hinings, & Turner, 1969; Pugh &
Hickson, 2007). The structuring of activities consisted of variables related to
standardization, specialization, and formalization whereas concentration of authority
consisted of variables related centralization and autonomy (Pugh et al. 1968). Findings
from this analysis indicate that similar underlying organizational behaviors -- structuring
of activities and concentration of authority – also manifest in terrorist groups. Thus,
despite the desire for secrecy, terrorist groups share common processes and
characteristics in common with conventional organizations (Ligon et al., 2013; Shapiro,
2013; Shapiro & Siegel, 2012; Volders, 2016). This commonality underscores the
applicability of theories from organizational behavior (Jung & Lee, 2015) and industrial
and organizational psychology (Hunter et al., 2017) are well suited to study terrorism.
Although not explicitly discussed, there is evidence of these dimensions in existing
terrorism studies. For example, Shapiro (2005) suggests that terrorist groups can be
differentiated based on their centralization and interconnectedness – the two structural
dimensions of concentration of authority. Likewise, Ligon and colleagues (2013) discuss
how centralization and communication patterns (i.e., interconnectedness) vary together in
terrorist organizations. Mechanistic terrorist organizations feature high levels of
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centralization and a highly connected communication structure based on hierarchy,
whereas organic terrorist organizations have low levels of centralization and
unpredictable communication patterns based on the task.
The organizational components underlying the structuring of activities
dimension, formalization and complexity, have also been discussed in the literature
(Ligon et al., 2013; Volders, 2016). However, few scholars have examined them together
nor elaborated on why they would underlie a single dimension. One reason why
formalization and complexity vary together is that, as complexity increased, the need for
improved communication through mechanisms of formalization such as policies and rules
in needed (Basol & Dogerlioglu, 2014). As organizational complexity increased, the risk
that some individuals or units became the sole proprietors of knowledge also increased.
In turn, formalization is needed to improve organizational cooperation and collaboration,
facilitate explicit and codified knowledge, and reduce ambiguity (Cohendet, Creplet,
Diani, Dupouët, Schenk, 2004; Cordón-Pozo, García-Morales, Aragón-Correa, 2006;
Pertusa-Ortega, Zaragoza-Sáez, Claver-Cortés, 2010). As such, the structuring of
activities dimension reflects the need for formalization as organizational complexity
increases.
Next, results from the bivariate correlations analysis suggest that terrorist groups
high in both structuring of activities and concentration of authority are more likely to be
older, large in size, receive state sponsorship, receive funding from a non-state ally, and
engage in drug trafficking. Similar to the life cycle of conventional organizations,
terrorist groups become increasingly complex as they age and grow in size. In turn, there
is a greater need for formal training, rules, and procedures as well as bureaucratic control
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mechanisms as both size and age increase (Lester, Parnell, Carraher, 2003; Quinn &
Cameron, 1983). Both state sponsorship (e.g., Byman, 2005; Carter, 2012; Hoffman,
2006) as well as alliances with other non-state actors (e.g., Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008;
Asal, Ackerman, & Rethemeyer, 2012; Horowitz & Potter, 2014) offer terrorist groups
access to additional tangible (e.g., weaponry) and intangible (e.g., knowledge) resources.
Thus, the need for structuring of activities increases as terrorist groups acquire
specialization and as the labor pool available to the group grows. Concentration of
authority is also necessary to efficiently and effectively redistribute resources such as
weapons or funds within the group (Shapiro, 2013). Last, drug trafficking is a complex
operation requiring multiple actors within the supply chain (Benson & Decker, 2010;
Morselli, 2001; Zaitch, 2002). In turn, concentration of authority is higher as the need for
coordination and collaboration is greater for terrorist groups involved in drug trafficking.
The structuring of activities is also greater in terrorist groups who engage in drug
trafficking since a task-based division of labor is necessary to move drugs across the
supply chain.
One key difference at the bivariate level was that terrorist groups high in
structuring were significantly more likely to adhere to religious motivations, whereas
there was no significant relationship between concentration of authority and having a
religious ideology. This likely reflects the processes by which many modern religious
terrorist groups construct expertise (Bloom, 2017). For instance, some modern religious
groups (e.g., al-Qaeda) have a large pool of recruits to draw from and develop expertise
through on the job training, while others (e.g., the Islamic State) engage in “talent
spotting” and recruit specific types of expertise (Bloom, 2017; Hunter et al., 2017;
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Windisch et al., 2018). Additionally, religious terrorist groups tend to have a built-in
theological hierarchy and a global as opposed to geographically centered focus, which
helps explains why religious groups are not significantly related to the concentration of
authority dimensions (Kilberg, 2012).
In addition, the bivariate results indicate that terrorist groups high in concentration
of authority were significantly more likely to have anti-system limited goals, while there
was no significant link between the structuring of activities and such goals. Terrorist
groups with anti-system limited goals (i.e., regime change, territorial control) need public
support to survive and achieve their goals (Berman, 2003; Siqueira & Sandler, 2006). To
maintain public support and not alienate potential supporters, terrorist groups must show
self-restraint and limit acts of indiscriminate violence (Sànchez-Cuenca, 2007). To do so,
high levels of concentration of authority are necessary to ensure accountability and a
shared vision among group members (Heger et al., 2012). Without a concentration of
authority, units or individuals within the group are incentivized to act in their own
interests as opposed to the collective goals (Abrahms & Potter, 2015; Shapiro, 2013;
Shapiro & Siegel, 2007).
While the previous results revealed the dimensions of organization that vary in
terrorist groups, it did not tell us how such dimensions can be used to classify terrorist
groups. Thus, the next section examines how the concentration of authority and structuring
of activities dimensions of organization are related to unique terrorist structure typologies.
Cluster Analysis Findings
A second goal of this dissertation was to develop structural typologies of terrorist
groups using the indicators of organization. To do so, a two-stage cluster approach was
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employed. In the first stage, the individual items underlying the structuring of activities
and concentration of authority factors were standardized into z-score and a hierarchical
cluster analysis was used to determine the approach number of clusters. Recall that I used
the individual items underlying both dimensions as opposed to the factor scores
themselves since this approach is more effective at differentiating clusters (Fiedler &
McDonald, 1993). The results of the dendrogram and agglomeration schedule were used
to determine how many clusters should be used in the k-mean cluster analysis. The results
from both the dendrogram and agglomeration schedule indicated that a five-cluster
solution was appropriate (see Appendix B). Next, the number of clusters set at five and a
k-means cluster analysis was performed. K-means clustering is a partitional clustering
method and was used to assigned cases (i.e., terrorist groups) to specific clusters based on
their structural similarities.
In the sections below, I describe the characteristics of each of the five terrorist
group typologies (Tables 13-15). More specifically, Table 13 presents the results of the kmeans cluster analysis including the average cluster score for each measure of
organization. Table 13 also shows specific differences between clusters on measures of
organization based on post-hoc results from an analysis of variance. Table 14 shows
descriptive statistics for the additional group characteristics (e.g., size, age, ideology)
across the five clusters. Finally, Table 15 shows the zero-order relationships between the
group characteristics and terrorist group clusters.
Cluster 1: Informal-diffused
The first cluster shown on Table 13 was labeled: informal-diffused. In total, 59
terrorist groups (23 percent) fell into the informal-diffused cluster including the Animal

81
Liberation Front, the Baloch Liberation Army, the Conspiracy Cells of Fire, the Earth
Liberation Front, the Indian Mujahedeen, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger
Delta, and the Sindu Liberation Army.19 Terrorist groups in the informal diffused typology
were the least organized – particularly in terms of their concentration of authority.
Informal-diffused groups were the least likely of the five clusters to hold territory, have
leadership, follow a top-down command and control structure, maintain connections
between members, seek expertise, or engage in organizational or combat training. In other
word, informal-diffused groups are highly decentralized and cell-based.
Informal-diffused groups were significantly more likely to be small in size,
younger, have “other” ideological motivations such as earth and animal liberation, farright, or anti-globalization, and have within-system goals (i.e., policy change, status quo).
On average, informal-diffused groups had less than 100 members and were
approximately 12 years old. Of the 59 informal-diffused groups, 29 percent had “other”
ideological motivations, while 15 percent had within-system goals. Informal-diffused
groups were also significantly less likely to have religious ideological motives, receive
state sponsorship, or receive funding from another non-state ally. For instance, only 29
percent of informal-diffused groups were religiously motived, 5 percent received state
sponsorship, and 14 received alliance funding.

19

In addition, several of the Mai Mai milita groups also fit into the informal-diffused typology. We suspect
that this is because many of these militia groups are village-specific and do not coordinate across locations.
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Table 13. Results from K-Means Cluster Analysis
InformalDiffused
(1)

Simple
Structure (2)

Divisional
Structure
(3)

FormalProfessional
(4)

InstrumentalRational
(5)

Deep-Level Diversity

-.64

-.37

.49

.45

.95

Organizational Training

-.64

-.64

.25

1.14

1.23

Combat Training

-.72

-.53

.70

.85

.91

1:3; 1:4; 1:5; 2:3;
2:4; 2:5

Ideological Training

-.56

-.58

.74

1.09

.55

1:3; 1:4; 1:5; 2:3;
2:4; 2:5

Territorial Control

-.61

.04

-.56

-.21

1.47

1:2; 1:5; 2:3; 2:5;
3:5; 4:5

Leadership

-1.28

.52

.46

-.23

.47

1:2; 1:3; 1:4; 1:5;
2:4; 3:4; 4:5

Centralization

-1.35

.32

.24

.16

.91

1:2; 1:3; 1:4; 1:5;
2:5; 3:5; 4:5

Connectedness

-1.11

-.02

.68

.00

1.03

1:2; 1:3; 1:4; 1:5;
2:3; 2:5; 3:4; 4:5

Uniforms

-.74

.30

-.76

.80

.48

1:2; 1:4; 1:5; 2:3;
2:4; 3:4; 3:5

-.65 (.22)

-.66 (.24)

.56 (.65)

1.10 (.53)

1.03 (.63)

1:3; 1:4; 1:5; 2:3;
2:4; 2:5; 3:4; 3:5

Variables

Structuring
of Activities

Concertation
-1.37 (.60)
.33 (.54)
.24 (.59)
.10 (.66)
of Authority
n
59
90
37
32
The mean for all z-scored items is 0 and the standard deviation is 1.
Note: Games-Howell Post-Hoc Test used to examine specific differences between clusters.

1.03 (.50)
41

Stat. Sig (p <.05)
Mean Diff
(ANOVA)
1:3; 1:4; 1:5; 2:3;
2:4; 2:5
1:3; 1:4; 1:5; 2:3;
2:4; 2:5; 3:4; 3:5

1:2; 1:3; 1:4; 1:5;
2:5; 3:5; 4:5
259

Cluster 2: Simple structure
The second cluster shown on Table 13 was labeled: simple structure. In total, 90
terrorist groups (35 percent) fell into the simple structure cluster including the Al-Qaida
in the Islamic Maghreb, the Anti-Balaka Milita, Ansar al-Dine (Mali), the Caucasus
Emirate, Jahba East Africa, M23, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the
New Irish Republican Army, Seleka, and the Sinai Province of the Islamic State.
Compared to the informal-diffused cluster, terrorist groups in the simple structure cluster
had relatively similar levels of organizational capital but significantly higher levels of
cohesion. For example, terrorist groups with the simple structure cluster had significantly
higher degrees of territorial control, leadership, centralization, interconnectedness, and
uniforms compared to the informal-diffused cluster.
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When examining the group characteristics on Tables 14-15, the results suggest
that terrorist groups in the simple structure cluster were significantly more likely to be
smaller and younger. On average, simple structure terrorist groups had approximately
100 to 500 members and were around 12 years old. Regarding ideology, simple structure
terrorist groups were significantly less likely to have neither religious motives nor
motives captured in the “other” ideological category. Of the 90 groups in the simple
structure cluster, only 46 percent were religiously motivated while 4 percent had other
ideological motives. It is important to note that a large proportion of groups in the simple
structure cluster had ethnonationalist motives (52 percent) and anti-system limited goals
(73 percent).
Cluster 3: Divisional structure
The third cluster shown on Table 13 was labeled: divisional structure. Of the 259
terrorist groups, 37 (14 percent) fell into the divisional structure cluster including the
Abdullah Azzam Brigades, the Baloch Republican Army, the Haqqani Network, Lashkare-Taiba, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Afghan Taliban. Compared to the informaldiffused cluster, divisional structure terrorist groups had significantly higher levels of
structuring of activities and concentration of authority. Compared to the simple structure
cluster, groups in the divisional structure had significantly greater levels of structuring
but relative similar degrees of authority. For example, divisional structure terrorist groups
had significantly higher degrees of deep-level diversity, organizational training, combat
training, and ideological training compared to those in the simple structure cluster. In
addition, divisional structure terrorist groups had higher levels in interconnectedness, but
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significantly lower levels of territorial control and uniform usage compared to those in
the simple structure cluster.
Tables 15 indicates that divisional structure terrorist groups are significantly more
likely to be older and religiously motivated. The average age of divisional structure
groups was approximately 21 years old while 65 percent of the groups in this cluster were
religious. None of the other group characteristics were significantly correlated with the
divisional structure at the bi-variate level.
Table 14. Descriptive Statistics for Group Characteristics by Cluster Type
InformalDiffused

Simple
Structure

Divisional
Structure

FormalProfessional

InstrumentalRational

M(SD)

M(SD)

M(SD)

M(SD)

M(SD)

Organizational Size

.66 (.90)

1.17 (1.17)

1.59 (1.32)

1.87 (1.13)

2.68 (.88)

Organizational Age

11.83 (15.01)

12.22 (13.27)

20.57 (15.31)

21.75 (16.54)

21.27 (17.89)

Religious

.29 (.46)

.46 (.50)

.65 (.48)

.72 (.46)

.54 (.51)

Ethnonationalist

.41 (.50)

.52 (.50)

.32 (.48)

.44 (.50)

.41 (.50)

Left-Wing

.08 (.28)

.13 (.34)

.14 (.35)

.09 (.30)

.12 (.33)

Other

.29 (.46)

.04 (.21)

.03 (.16)

.03 (.18)

.05 (.22)

Anti-System Expansive

.31 (.46)

.21 (.41)

.22 (.41)

.22 (.42)

.17 (.38)

Anti-System Limited

.54 (.50)

.73 (.45)

.68 (.48)

.66 (.48)

.78 (.42)

Within-System

.15 (.36)

.06 (.23)

.11 (.32)

.13 (.34)

.05 (.22)

State Sponsorship

.05 (.22)

.27 (.45)

.16 (.37)

.22 (.42)

.41 (.50)

Alliance Funding

.14 (.35)

.40 (.49)

.41 (.50)

.53 (.51)

.54 (.51)

Drug Trafficking

.12 (.33)

.11 (.32)

.11 (.32)

.19 (.40)

.24 (.44)

Variables

Cluster 4: Formal-professional
The fourth cluster shown on Table 13 was labeled: formal-professional. A total of
32 terrorist groups (12 percent) fell into the formal-professional cluster including the
Allied Democratic Forces, Boko Haram, Kata’ib Hezbollah, the Lord’s Resistance Army,
the New People’s Army, the Real Irish Republican Army, Tehrik e-Taliban Pakistan, and
the Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Opposition. Terrorist groups in the formal-
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professional cluster had significantly higher rates of organizational capital relative to
those in the informal-diffused, simple structure, and divisional structure cluster. For
instance, those in the formal professional cluster had significantly higher use of
organizational training compared to the other three clusters. Formal-professional terrorist
groups also had significantly higher levels of deep-level diversity, combat training, and
ideological training compared to informal-diffused or simple structure groups. However,
there were no significant difference in deep-level diversity, combat training, and
ideological training for formal-professional groups relative to those in the divisional
structure cluster. Thus, the key difference between the formal-professional and divisional
structure clusters regarding organizational capital was the degree of organizational
training.
Formal-professional terrorist groups were significantly more cohesive than groups
in the informal-diffused cluster. However, there was no significant differences in
cohesion levels between groups in the formal-professional cluster relative to the simple
structure or divisional structure clusters. In fact, formal-profession terrorist groups were
significantly less likely to have central leadership compared to the simple structure or
divisional structure groups. Formal-profession terrorist groups were significantly more
likely to use uniforms relative to the simple structure or divisional structure clusters.
When examining the zero-order correlations, the results suggest that formal-professional
terrorist groups were significant more likely to be large, older, and religious. Groups in
the formal-professional clusters had, on average, 100 to 500 members with estimates
closer to the upper end. Terrorist groups in this cluster were also an average on 22 years
old. Finally, of the 32 formal-professional terrorist groups, 72 percent were religiously
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motivated. None of the other group characteristics were significantly correlated with the
formal-professional typology at the bi-variate level.
Table 15. Zero-Order Correlations Between Cluster Types and Group Characteristics
InformalSimple
Divisional
FormalInstrumentalVariables
Diffused
Structure
Structure Professional
Rational
Organizational Size

-.35***

-.16**

.05

.14*

.43***

Organizational Age

-.20***

-.16**

.15*

.17***

.15*

Religious

-.22***

-.05

.13*

.17***

.04

Ethnonationalist

-.04

.12

-.10

-.01

-.02

Left-Wing

-.05

.04

.03

-.03

.01

.35***

-.13*

-.01

-.03

-.07

.10

-.03

-.01

-.01

-.06

-.16

.08

-.03

.04

.09

.11+

Other
Anti-System
Expansive
Anti-System Limited
Within-System

-.09

.02

.04

-.07

State Sponsorship

-.22

***

.08

-.06

-.01

.20***

Alliance Funding

-.27***

.03

.02

.12

.14*

Drug Trafficking

-.04

-.07

-.04

.05

.13*

*** p < .001; ** p <.01; * p <.05; + p <.10
Note: Results of Spearman’s Rho Order Correlation

Cluster 5: Instrumental-rational
The final cluster shown on Table 13 was labeled: instrumental-rational. Of the
259 terrorist groups, 41 (16 percent) fit into the instrumental-rational cluster such as AlQaida in the Arabian Peninsula. Al-Nusrah Front, Al-Shabbab, the Badr Brigades, the
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, Hezbollah, the Houthis, the Kurdistan Workers'
Party, and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. Terrorist groups in the instrumentalrational cluster were the most organized of the five clusters. Instrumental-rational
terrorist groups had significantly higher levels of cohesion than each other cluster type
and significantly higher degrees of organizational capital relative to all but the formalprofessional cluster. In terms of cohesion, instrumental-rational terrorist groups were
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significantly more likely to hold territory and follow a centralized command structure
compared to all other cluster types. Instrumental-rational terrorist groups were also more
likely to have central leadership relative to the informal-diffused and formal-professional
clusters, more likely to be interconnected than informal-diffused, simple structure, and
formal-professional clusters, and more likely to use uniforms relative to the informaldiffused and divisional structure clusters.
Regarding organizational capital, instrumental-rational terrorist groups were
relatively similar to groups in the formal-professional cluster. In other words, there were
no significant differences between the instrumental-rational groups and formalprofessional groups on deep-level diversity, organizational training, combat training, and
ideological training. Instrumental-rational terrorist groups were also relatively similar to
divisional structure groups on indicators of organizational capital with the exception of
organizational training. Instrumental-rational terrorist groups had significantly higher
levels of organizational training relative to divisional structure groups. However, terrorist
groups in the instrumental-rational cluster had significantly higher rates of deep-level
diversity, organizational training, combat training, and ideological training relative to
informal-diffused or simple structure groups.
Tables 15 indicates that instrumental-rational groups were significantly more
likely to be large, older, have a state sponsor, receive alliance funding, and engage in
drug trafficking. On average, terrorist groups in the instrumental-rational cluster were
approximately 21 years old and included roughly 1,000 members. Of the 41 groups in the
instrumental-rational cluster, 41 percent received state sponsorship, 54 percent receive
funding from a non-state ally, and 24 percent engaged on drug trafficking.
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Summary of findings: Structural types of terrorist groups
There are two main findings regarding the structural types of terrorist groups.
First, results from the two-stage cluster analysis indicated that there are five basic
structural types of terrorist groups: informal-diffused, simple structure, divisional
structure, formal-professional, and instrumental-rational. When organization is
conceptualized on a continuum, the informal-diffused structure is the least organized and
represent one end of the continuum. Terrorist groups in the informal-diffused typology
are decentralized, lack leadership, and have very little functional differentiation nor
formalization. In turn, these groups sacrifice operational efficiency in order to maximize
security. The informal-diffused typology is similar to the brand (Zelinsky & Shubik,
2009), or market (Kilberg, 2012) structure found in prior terrorism research. Next on the
organization continuum is the simple structure typology. Terrorist groups in the simple
structure typology have are hierarchically structured with centralized leadership but lack
functional differentiation and formalization. The presence of leaders to articulate a group
vision, ensure accountability, and secure and distribute resources are a notable
characteristics of simple structure groups. The simple structure typology has
commonalities with the all-channel (Kilberg, 2012), tightly coupled groups (Jackson,
2006), and simple organization structure (Ligon et al., 2013) described in the existing
terrorist literature.
In the middle of the organization continuum are divisional structure groups.
Groups in the divisional structure typology are moderately centralized, highly connected,
and invest in some types of training. Based on these characteristics, divisional structure
groups are similar to the hub-and-spoke structure described by Arquilla and Ronfeldt

89
(2001) and Kilberg (2012). In divisional structured groups, actors communicate and
coordinate via a central node. These groups have a leader and functional differentiation
between members but lack a hierarchical command-and-control structure. In the next
position on the organization continuum is the formal-professional typology. Formalprofessional terrorist groups lack direct leadership and centralization but account for this
through high levels of training and formalization. These groups share similar
characteristics of organic organizations described by Ligon and colleagues (2013).
Formal-professional groups are characterized by their mutual accountability and
decision-making, knowledge and skills-based specialization, low degrees of
centralization, and expertise-based patterns of communication. The key strengths for
organic organizations are their diverse pool of resources and ability to develop creative
and innovative strategies that come with having highly skilled members with few
organizational restrictions.
Finally, the instrumental-rational typology is the most organized and represents
on the end of the organization continuum. Instrumental-rational terrorist groups have high
levels of concertation of authority and structuring of activities. These groups share
similar characteristics of mechanistic organizations (Ligon et al., 2013), hierarchical
organizations (Mishal & Rosenthal, 2005; Zelinsky & Shubik, 2009), and the
bureaucratic structure (Kilberg, 2012). Instrumental-rational groups are characterized by
their top-down decision-making structure, function-based specialization, high degrees of
formalization and centralization, and hierarchy-based patterns of communication. The
key strengths of these groups are their expertise and human capital, efficient decisionmaking, and resource allocation strategies.
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While the previous results revealed the dimensions of organization that vary in
terrorist groups and such dimensions can be used to classify distinct typologies, it did not
tell us how such dimensions nor typologies are related to violence. Thus, the next section
examines the relationship between the dimensions of organization, the structural
typologies, and violence.
Terrorist Group Organization and Violent Outcomes
Tables 16-21 presents the results of Hierarchal Poisson models (with the
correction for overdispersion available in the HLM 7.03 software) (Raudenbush et al.,
2011). The Poisson-based regression model with the HLM overdispersion parameter is
the “HLM equivalent to negative binomial regression” (LaFree & Bersani, 2014, p. 466),
and models with the overdispersion parameter produce more accurate significance tests
compared to standard models (Osgood, 2000). It should be noted that, although the multilevel data set was created to adjust for problem resulting from the hierarchical data
structure, the models presented in this dissertation are technically single level models
since they only include measures at the group-level of analysis. I considered examining
country level effects but results of the unconditional models discussed below in
conjunction with my theoretical focus on group level effect did not warrant such an
analysis (see Steiner & Wooldredge, 2014 for a similar approach).
The analysis proceeded in several stages. First, I estimated unconditional models
to reveal if there was significant variance (p < .10) in each outcome at level- 1 (within
countries) and level-2 (between countries). These models revealed non-significant
between-country variance in the number of attacks on hard targets and the number of
successful attacks on successful hard targets. In contrast, there was significant between-
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country variance for the number of victims killed, the number of hard targets killed, and
the number of highly successful attacks on hard targets (see Table 16). It could be argued
that the use of HLM is not warranted for the two outcomes with non-significant betweencountry variance and another approach for analyzing clustered data (e.g., fixed effects for
clusters, cluster-corrected robust standard errors) could be employed. However, Johnson
(2012) argues that HLM is still the preferred method for examined clustered data since it
clearly differentiated level 1 and level 2 effects, properly adjusts standard errors and level
2 significant tests, and disaggregates the total variance in outcomes among levels of
analysis (p 171-172).20
Table 16. HLM Estimates of Variance within and between Countries
Variable
Lethality
Groups overdispersion
Country means
Reliability (.35)
Hard Target Lethality
Groups overdispersion
Country means
Reliability (.35)
Attacks on Hard Targets
Groups overdispersion
Country means
Reliability (.26)
Successful Attacks on Hard
Targets
Groups overdispersion
Country means
Reliability (.29)
Highly Successful Attacks on
Hard Targets
Groups overdispersion
Country means
Reliability (.30)

Variance
Component

X2

df

p-value

712.05
.84

97.09

49

<.001

343.79
.74

72.29

49

.02

104.10
.41

54.73

49

.27

57.52
.54

60.41

49

.13

9.36
.94

77.62

49

< .001

It should be noted that, in hierarchical linear models, the unconditional model also produces estimates of
the relative amount of variation occurring at level 1 compared to level 2. However, the Poisson HLM model
does not incorporate a level 1 variance component in the usual sense, so it is not possible to divide the total
variance between level 1 and level 2 units (Osgood & Anderson, 2004, p. 535).

20
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Each model was estimated using fixed effects for the group level measures. 21 I
explored random coefficient models, but none of the level 1 slopes for key variables of
interest significantly varied between countries in the full model for each outcome.22 This
is likely due to the relatively small sample of terrorist groups (n = 259) resulting in the
average cluster size of roughly 5 terrorist groups per country. Although past research has
shown that the number of level 2 units is a more important factor in determining
statistical power than the number of observations per cluster (Johnson, 2012; Raudenbush
& Liu, 2000; Snijders, 2005), the small average cluster sizes limit the estimation of
random slope variance. However, the relatively large number of level 2 units in this study
(n = 50) limits the negative consequences for testing regression coefficients (i.e., fixed
effects; Snijders, 2005). Furthermore, level 1 intercepts were kept as random to parse out
the error variance in the outcomes that was attributable to between-country differences.
Future research with a larger average cluster size samples are needed to better investigate
the extent to which the characteristics of terrorist groups vary across country contexts.
Each measure was group mean-centered before being introduced into the model.
Group-mean centering removes between-country variation in the measures of
organization and group characteristics that might have corresponded with differences in
levels of violence across countries. The benefit of group-mean centering is that it
provides a more conservative test of level 1 effects (i.e., group level) by limiting the
chance of finding spurious level 1 effects due to unmeasured level 2 effects that might be
related to compositional differences in group characteristics across countries. The results

21

Models are also referred to as “random intercept models” when all level 1 variables are “fixed” in the
model.
22
In addition, the magnitude of the coefficient for variables that did have significantly varying effects were
similar to the magnitude of the fixed effects coefficients.
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reported are based on population-average models using robust standard errors.
Coefficients based on population average models are averaged across the entire sample
with estimated predicted probabilities for the whole population. Population average
models are advantageous since they are based on fewer assumptions compared to unitspecific models (Raudenbush et al., 2011). Finally, the use of robust standard errors
limits misspecification of variance components by accounting for potential violations of
model assumptions (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002).
Findings from Hierarchical Poisson Models
Table 17 presents the hierarchical Poisson regression analysis predicting the
number of victims killed for each terrorist group between 2008 and 2017. Results of the
fixed effects model suggests that terrorist groups with higher levels of structuring of
activities were more lethal relative to those with lower levels. The concentration of
authority dimension in a terrorist group did not have a significant effect on the number
victims killed. Terrorist groups who were large, had expansive anti-system goals, or
engaged in drug trafficking were significantly more likely to kill a higher number of
victims. In contrast, older terrorist groups as well as those with within-system goals,
ethnonationalist motivations, or state sponsorship were significantly less lethal from 2008
through 2017. The effect of having a religious or left-wing ideology and alliance funding
were not significant in the model. Taken together, the full model explained a considerable
amount of the within-country variation for lethality (pseudo R2 = .79).
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Table 17. Fixed Effects Models Predicting Lethality
Variable
Structuring of Activities
Concentration of Authority
Organizational Size
Organizational Age
Anti-System Expansive
Within-System
Religious
Ethnonationalist
Left-Wing
State Sponsorship
Alliance Funding
Drug Trafficking
Power
Intercept
Reliability
Proportion variation
within countries explained

b
.47***
.04
.40***
-.04***
.55*
-1.11***
-.32
-1.20***
.21
-.98***
-.02
.82***
.26***
4.35***
.57

se
.12
.13
.10
.01
.28
.31
.18
.24
.18
.34
.25
.30
.05
.19

ERR
1.60
1.04
1.48
.96
1.73
.33
.76
.30
1.23
.38
.97
2.27
1.30
77.23

.79

*** p < .001; ** p <.01; * p <.05
ERR = Event Rate Ratio
Note: Maximum likelihood coefficients (and robust standard errors) reported from hierarchical
Poisson regression models

Table 18 presents the hierarchical Poisson regression analysis examining the
number of hard targets killed. Results of the fixed effects model suggests that terrorist
groups with higher levels of structuring of activities killed more hard targets between
2008 and 2017 compared to those with lower levels. The concentration of authority
dimension did not have a significant effect on the number of hard targets killed. Terrorist
groups who were large, had expansive anti-system goals, left-wing ideological motives,
or engaged in drug trafficking killed a significantly higher number of hard targets.
Terrorist groups who were older, had within-system goals, had ethnonationalist motives,
or those with state sponsorship were significantly less likely to kill hard targets during the
ten-year period from 2008 through 2017. Religious ideological motives and alliance
funding were non-significant in the model. Finally, the full model explained a
considerable amount of the within-country variation for lethality against hard targets
(pseudo R2 = .82).
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Table 18. Fixed Effects Models Predicting Hard Targets Lethality
Variable
Structuring of Activities
Concentration of
Authority
Organizational Size
Organizational Age
Anti-System Expansive
Within-System
Religious
Ethnonationalist
Left-Wing
State Sponsorship
Alliance Funding
Drug Trafficking
Power
Intercept
Reliability
Proportion variation
within countries explained

b
.51***

se
.18

ERR
1.67

.10

.11

1.11

.12
.01
.21
.30
.22
.30
.24
.34
.23
.28
.06
.19

1.38
.96
1.71
.20
.65
.28
2.13
.30
1.02
2.49
1.36
25.61

**

.32
-.04***
.54**
-1.62***
-.43
-1.28**
.75***
-1.18***
.03
.91***
.31***
3.24***
.55
.82

*** p < .001; ** p <.01; * p <.05
ERR = Event Rate Ratio
Note: Maximum likelihood coefficients (and robust standard errors) reported from hierarchical Poisson
regression models

Table 19 presents the hierarchical Poisson regression analysis examining the
number of attacks on hard targets. Results of the fixed effects model suggests that higher
scores on the concentration of authority dimension were significantly linked to greater
frequency of attacks on hard targets. The structuring of activities dimension had no
significant influence the number of times terrorist groups attacked hard targets. Terrorist
groups who were large, had left-wing ideological motives, received alliance funding, or
engaged in drug trafficking had a significantly higher number of attacks on hard targets.
Terrorist groups who were older or those with within-system goals were had a significantly
lower number of attacks on hard targets. The effect of expansive anti-system goals,
religious or ethnonationalist motives, or state sponsorship were non-significant in the
model. The collection of covariates in the full model explained a considerable amount of
the within-country variation for the number of attacks on hard targets (pseudo R2 = .79).
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Table 19. Fixed Effects Models Predicting Attacks on Hard Targets
Variable
Structuring of Activities
Concentration of Authority
Organizational Size
Organizational Age
Anti-System Expansive
Within-System
Religious
Ethnonationalist
Left-Wing
State Sponsorship
Alliance Funding
Drug Trafficking
Power
Intercept
Reliability
Proportion variation within
countries explained

b
.05
.26*
.40***
-.04***
.52
-1.73***
-.23
-.45
1.50***
-.43
.42***
.72***
.19***
2.59***
.55

se
.11
.12
.08
.01
.29
.40
.15
.32
.40
.32
.14
.31
.05
.14

ERR
1.05
1.29
1.49
.96
1.69
.18
.79
.63
4.48
0.65
1.52
2.04
1.21
13.36

.79

*** p < .001; ** p <.01; * p <.05
ERR = Event Rate Ratio
Note: Maximum likelihood coefficients (and robust standard errors) reported from hierarchical Poisson
regression models

Table 20 presents the hierarchical Poisson regression analysis examining the
number of successful attacks on hard targets. Results of the fixed effects model suggests
that higher degrees of concentration of authority were significantly related to a higher
number of successful attacks on hard targets. The structuring of activities dimension was
not significantly related to the number of successful attacks on hard targets. Terrorist
groups who were large, had expansive anti-system goals, had left-wing ideological
motives, received alliance funding, or engaged in drug trafficking had a significantly
higher number of successful attacks on hard targets. Terrorist groups who were older, had
within-system goals, or received state sponsorship had a significantly lower number of
successful attacks on hard targets. The effect of religious or ethnonationalist motives
were not significant in the model. The collection of covariates in the full model explained
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a considerable amount of the within-country variation for the number of successful
attacks on hard targets (pseudo R2 = .82).
Table 20. Fixed Effects Models Predicting Successful Attacks on
Hard Targets
Variable
Structuring of Activities
Concentration of Authority
Organizational Size
Organizational Age
Anti-System Expansive
Within-System
Religious
Ethnonationalist
Left-Wing
State Sponsorship
Alliance Funding
Drug Trafficking
Power
Intercept
Reliability
Proportion variation within
countries explained

b
.20
.24*
.39***
-.04***
.61**
-1.56***
-.14
-.57
1.98***
-.61*
.41***
.71***
.22***
1.77***
.59

se
.11
.12
.07
.01
.24
.34
.17
.27
.27
.31
.16
.26
.04
.15

ERR
1.22
1.27
1.47
.96
1.88
.22
.87
.56
7.27
.55
1.51
2.04
1.24
5.88

.81

*** p < .001; ** p <.01; * p <.05
ERR = Event Rate Ratio
Note: Maximum likelihood coefficients (and robust standard errors) reported from hierarchical Poisson
regression models

Table 21 presents the hierarchical Poisson regression analysis examining the
number of highly successful attacks on hard targets. Results of the fixed effects model
suggests that terrorist groups with higher levels of structuring of activities had a greater
number of highly successful attacks on hard targets relative to those with less levels. The
concentration of authority dimension had no significant effect on the number of highly
successful attacks on hard targets. Terrorist groups who were large, had expansive antisystem goals, or engaged in drug trafficking had a significantly higher number of highly
successful attacks on hard targets. Older terrorist groups as well as those with withinsystem goals, religious or ethnonationalist motives, or state sponsorship had a
significantly lower number of highly successful attacks on hard targets. The effect of
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having left-wing ideological motives or alliance funding was not significant in the model.
Taken together, the full model explained approximately 81 percent of the within-country
variation for the number of highly successful attacks on hard targets.
Table 21. Fixed Effects Models Predicting Highly Successful
Attacks on Hard Target
Variable
Structuring of Activities
Concentration of Authority
Organizational Size
Organizational Age
Anti-System Expansive
Within-System
Religious
Ethnonationalist
Left-Wing
State Sponsorship
Alliance Funding
Drug Trafficking
Power
Intercept
Reliability
Proportion variation within
countries explained

b
.57***
.07
.38**
-.06***
.79***
-1.42***
-.67***
-.98***
.31
-1.22***
.01
.97***
.39***
-.63***
.52

se
.18
.11
.13
.01
.24
.35
.23
.22
.27
.28
.22
.28
.07
.21

ERR
1.76
1.07
1.46
.94
2.20
.24
.50
.37
1.34
.30
1.02
2.63
1.48
.53

.81

*** p < .001; ** p <.01; * p <.05
ERR = Event Rate Ratio
Note: Maximum likelihood coefficients (and robust standard errors) reported from hierarchical
Poisson regression models

Summary of findings: Terrorist group organization and violent outcomes
The primary goal of this section was to examine the relationship between the
underlying dimensions of organization and violence in terrorist groups. Terrorist groups
with more structuring of activities were more lethal in general, more lethal when
attacking hard targets, and had a higher number of highly successful attacks on hard
targets. However, the degree to which a terrorist group structured its activities had no
effect on the number of attacks on hard targets nor the number of successful attacks on
hard targets. Based on these findings, I suspect that the relationship between structuring
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of activities dimension and violence is explained by enhanced expertise and human
capital. Human capital at the group level is related to the training, experience, judgement,
intelligence, relationship, and insights of individuals within the organization (Barney,
1991). Researchers have long understood that human capital such as education and
training plays in organizational success (Andrews, 1965; Becker, 1983; Hambrick &
Mason, 1984; Mincer, 1974). For instance, research has linked human capital to higher
organizational commitment (Iles et al., 1990), innovative capacity (Selvarajan et al.,
2007), and overall performance (Dooley, 2000) in conventional organizations.
In terrorist groups, human capital influences both the capacity to engage in complex
actions and the efficiency of violence (Asal et al., 2015; Jackson, 2001, 2009). For
example, terrorist groups with higher degree of human capital may have people with the
technical skills to construct sophisticated explosives (Jackson, 2009). In turn, these
terrorist groups are generally more lethal since they have the capacity to develop
weapons that are highly destructive. There is also evidence that human capital influences
the effectiveness of violence against hard targets (Asal et al., 2015). From this
perspective, human capital has little influence of the frequency of attacks on hard targets.
However, terrorist groups with high levels of human capital have a greater destructive
capacity when attacking hard targets compared to those with limited capital.
The accumulation of organization-specific knowledge that is typically codified and
generated within the organization also increases intra-group cooperation and
collaboration (Atkeson & Kehoe, 2005; Carmona-Lavado, Cuevas-Rodriguez & CabelloMedina, 2010; Tushman & Rosenkopf, 1992; Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005). This type
of knowledge, often referred to as organizational capital, is the knowledge that remains
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when people go home at night (Youndt et al., 2004). In terrorist groups, training through
indoctrination processes and relationship building exercises maximize group cohesion,
solidarity, and loyalty (Hegghammer, 2006; Jung & Lee, 2015). In turn, group-specific
training improves accountability and the agenda setting capacity of the group.
Next, terrorist groups with greater concentration of authority had a higher number
of attacks on hard targets and a higher number of success on hard targets. However,
concentration of authority had no significant effect on the number of victims killed, the
number of hard targets killed, nor the number of highly successful attacks on hard targets.
Based on these findings, I suspect that there are two mechanisms that explain the
relationship between structuring of activities dimension and violence. First, terrorist
groups with more concentrated authority have increased membership accountability
(Heger et al., 2012). In other words, hierarchical terrorist groups have a system of
rewards and punishments in place to minimize neglectful member behaviors. This is
closely tied to Shapiro’s (2013) work on the necessity of bureaucratic control
mechanisms in terrorist organization. Drawing on internal documents collected from Al
Qaeda in Iraq, Shapiro shows that bureaucracy is necessary in terrorist groups to reduce
the agency afforded to lower level members. Accountability is especially important for
terrorist groups seeking to attack hard targets since there is a greater risk of direct
confrontation and operational failure (Asal et al., 2015; Koehler-Derrick & Milton,
2019). Without the rewards and punishments associated with hierarchically structured
groups, members are likely to act in their own interests when faced with adversity and
lessen the degree of operational success (Abrahms & Potter, 2015; Shapiro, 2013).
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Second, terrorist groups with strong concentration of authority have a strong
agenda-setting capacity. In other words, “there is a clear point at which the flow of
information and the agenda originate, with few (or no) legitimate alternative sources to
distort or challenge the right to articulate the operational goals of the organization”
(Heger et al., 2012, p. 747). Clear and unidirectional agenda-setting creates tighter, more
cohesive relationships between the leadership and followers within a group. This is
especially important given the internal agency issues faced by many terrorist groups
(Abrahms & Potter, 2015; Shapiro, 2013). Members of terrorist groups vary in both
levels of commitment and goals. Without such a strong agenda-setting capacity, low level
members are incentivized to act in their own interests as opposed to the collective group
goals (Abrahms & Potter, 2015; Shapiro, 2013). Leader’s ability to set the group’s
agenda and articulate a strategic vision provides members with a distinctive and clearly
defined identity with behavioral prescriptions in times of uncertainty (Hogg 2014) as well
as a shared understanding of the ideal end state relative to the current problem (Mumford,
2006, Mumford & Connelly, 1991). Reducing uncertainty and motivating followers to
sacrifice personally for the strategic goals of the organization are especially important
considering the elevated risk of failure when attacking hard targets.
Summary of findings: Additional group characteristics and violent outcomes
While the dimensions of organization were the focus of my analysis, findings from
the group level control variables also offer implications for terrorism research. Below, I
discuss six central findings. First, organizational size and drug trafficking were
significantly related to violence across all five models. In relation to organizational size,
large terrorist groups are more violent for two reasons. First, large terrorist groups have
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the human capital (i.e., knowledge, skills, experience, and training possessed both
individually and collectively by group members) to sustain violent campaigns and the
necessary expertise to successfully attack hard targets compared to smaller groups (Asal
& Rethmeyer, 2008; Pearson et al., 2017). Second, large terrorist groups are less risk
averse given their sheer manpower and ability to absorb the losses of engaging in large
scale attacks especially on harden targets. For example, Koehler-Derrick and Milton
(2019) found that, the larger the terrorist group, the more likely they are to use firearms
as opposed to explosives in their attack portfolio. To be effective, firearms require a close
proximity between the perpetuator and the intended victim increasing the risk of direct
confrontation between both actors. Large terrorist groups have a higher tolerance for the
risk associated with attacks using firearms since they can replace fallen members at a
lower cost (Koehler-Derrick & Milton, 2019, p. 914).
Concerning drug trafficking, terrorist groups who traffic drugs are more violence
across all five outcomes. There are both direct and indirect effects that involvement in
illicit drug markets have on terrorist groups (for review see Omelicheva & Markowitz,
2019; Piazza, 2012). For example, drug trafficking generates enormous revenue for
terrorist groups. Recent estimates by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
(2017) indicates that armed groups raised roughly $150 million in 2016 from the Afghan
illicit opiate trade. This revenue is then available for terrorist groups to purchase weapons
and pay for training, ultimately increasing their tactical sophistication and destructive
capacity. Another direct effect occurs when terrorist groups use violence to protect their
illicit drug markets against uncooperative government officals. Drug trafficking is a
lucrative business and terrorist groups are more likely to dedicate resources and
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manpower to protect their drug markets. In terms of indirect effects, the presence of illicit
drug markets weakens the state and their ability to conduct counterterrorism operations.
Drug trafficking enables other illicit markets (e.g., weapons, money laundering, human
trafficking) and places additional burden on state security and law enforcement. Since
terrorism often occurs in socially disadvantaged states with weak domestic security
(Piazza, 2008), drug trafficking increases the scope of criminal activities and limits the
resources that could be used to combat terrorism (Omelicheva & Markowitz, 2019;
Piazza, 2012).
The second key finding is that organizational age was significant and negative
across each of the five violent outcome models. Past research on the effects of
organizational age and violence have largely been mixed. While some scholars argue that
older organizations are more violent because they learn from past experiences and
acquire knowledge that increases chances of successful violent performances (Asal et al.,
2012; Chermak, Freilich, & Suttmoeller, 2013; Ranger-Moore, 1997), other researchers
have found that organizational age does not have an effect or has an inverse effect on
violence (Asal & Rethemeyer 2008). I suspect older terrorist organizations are less
violent in general and less violent against hard targets for two reasons. First, older
terrorist groups and their leadership do not want to face the “strategic fallout” from
highly lethal attacks (Abrahms & Potter, 2015, p. 316). Second, older terrorist groups are
more likely to conserve and not utilize the resources they have developed across their life
course. In other words, as organizations age, they become more risk-averse and do not
want to risk the resources and human capital necessary to sustain violence.
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Next, the third finding is that terrorist groups who receive state sponsorship are
less lethal when attacking hard targets. This finding is consistent with prior research
showing that state sponsored terrorist groups are generally less violent (Asal &
Rethemeyer, 2008; Simon & Benjamin, 2001). Although state sponsorship provides
terrorist groups with increased firepower, funding, and training, state sponsorship also
creates a “state restraint” effect for terrorist groups. Through this lens, state sponsors
restrict the activity of terrorist groups to avoid retaliation (Simon & Benjamin, 2001).
The state restraint effect is likely even greater for terrorist groups attacking hard targets
since targets such as police or military are a direct representation of the state (Gibbs,
2013). Violence against hard targets might exacerbate direct interstate conflict compared
to other target types.
Fourth, terrorist group goals had a profound influence on violence. This is
consistent with Crenshaw’s (1981) argument that terrorist groups serve a variety of goals,
which are often linked to the group’s strategy. More specifically, I found that terrorist
group’s that had within-system goals were negatively related to each of the five violence
indicators, while groups with expansive anti-system goals were generally more lethal,
more lethal when attacking hard targets, and more successful at attacking hard targets.
The relationship between within-system goals and violence is straightforward. For
example, several terrorist groups with goals of policy change did not endorse
interpersonal violence (e.g., Animal Liberation Front, Earth Liberation Front). Similarly,
others such as the Niger Delta Avengers and Movement for the Emancipation of the
Niger Delta preferred economic damage compared to interpersonal violence. In addition,
terrorist groups with goals of protecting the status quo had an established relationship
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with the existing government such as Ranvir Sena, the Right Sector (Ukraine), and
Vishwa Hindu Parishad. For these groups, there is little reason to attack targets affiliated
with the state (e.g., police, military) since they support the same interests, and
indiscriminate violence would be counterproductive as it would bring increased pressure
on the government in which they support.
In contrast, violence in general and against hard targets were greater for terrorist
groups with expansive anti-system goals. Similar to Piazza (2009a) labeling of
“universal/abstract groups,” terrorist groups in this category sought to establish an empire
such as the Islamic State, Al Qaeda, and their affiliates as well as groups seeking a social
revolution such as the Conspiracy Cells of Fire, Informal Anarchist Federation, and
Pagan Sect of the Mountain. On a surface level, terrorist groups with empire and social
revolutionary goals are very different. The key commonality is both goal structures are
highly abstract and complex posing few limits on the types of violence groups can engage
in against a variety of targets. Violence committed by terrorist groups with expansive
anti-system goals is often communicative as opposed to instrumental and viewed as a
form of signaling (Hoffman & McCormick, 2004; Loadenthal, 2017; Piazza, 2009a). In
turn, highly lethal attacks are an important tool for terrorist groups with expansive antisystem goals to grab media attention and communicate their message to a large audience.
Attacks on hard targets are also important for terrorist groups with expansive goals. For
example, hard targets represent apostate regimes and foreign occupants of Muslim lands
for terrorist groups with expansive goals of establishing a Caliphate (Piazza, 2009a).
Hard targets also reflect the oppression caused by dominant social institutions and their
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interests (e.g., capitalism, globalization) for terrorist groups with expansive goals of
creating a social revolution (Loadenthal, 2017).
Fifth, ideology had little effect on violence in ways that are typically theorized.
More specifically, we did not find that religious or ethnonationist terrorist groups were
more lethal in general nor against hard targets (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008;
Juergensmeyer, 2003; Tilly, 2003). I suspect this finding is due to the influence of goal
structure as opposed to ideology on lethality. For example, Piazza (2009a) found that
Islamic terrorist groups were no more likely than non-Islamic groups to commit high
casualty attacks after controlling for groups’ affiliation with al-Qaeda (p. 72). In addition,
Piazza (2009a) found that the inclusion of a measure of universal/abstract goals reduced
the effect size of Islamic terrorist group on high casualty attacks. Both the affiliation with
al-Qaeda measure and the universal/abstract goals measure are similar to the anti-system
expansive goals variables presented here, offering a potential explanation of why I did
not find a significant effect for religiously motivated groups.
One caveat of the relationship between ideology and violence is the finding that
left-wing groups killed more hard targets, attacked hard targets at a higher rate, and did
so successfully. There are two reasons that explain this relationship. First, the underlying
ideology of far-left groups (e.g., Marxist-Leninist, Maoist) is framed around a utopian or
egalitarian future with the current regime being the primary obstacle to reaching such
goals (Forrest, 2019, p.162). In turn, violence committed by left-wing groups is often
directed at hard targets such as police and other actors in the criminal justice system,
military personnel and installations, and politicians. By attacking hard targets, the goal is
to provoke the state into using indiscriminate violence that would further highlight their
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cause and mobilize the population. Second, many of the most effect and long-standing
far-left terrorist groups such as the New People’s Army, the Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Columbia, and the Communist Party of India-Maoist provide services to underserved
communities often located in stateless areas (Piazza, 2009b). In turn, these groups can
establish a territorial network to launch attacks on police and military patrols in these
stateless communities.
Finally, terrorist groups who received funding from a non-state ally were
significantly more likely to attack hard targets and do so successfully. Terrorist groups
who receive support from a non-state ally have improved resources and operational
capabilities compared to those who do not receive support (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008;
Horowitz & Potter, 2014). In other words, terrorist groups who receive alliance funding
have access to better tactical information and weaponry. Collaborations between groups
also provides the opportunity to develop new skills and transmit knowledge and expertise
(see Horowitz & Potter, 2014 for review across conventional and malevolent
organizations). Access to enhanced resources would not only allow terrorist groups to
attack hard targets more often but also do so more effectively. Admittedly, the binary
measure of alliance funding used in this study is not as direct nor elaborate of a measure
of terrorist group alliances as used in other studies (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008; Horowitz
& Potter, 2014). Perhaps this is why I did not find a significant relationship between
alliance funding and the lethality of terrorist groups. Based on the results of this study,
future research should examine the relationship between terrorist group alliances and
violence against hard targets using different measures of alliances.
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Terrorist Group Types and Violent Outcomes
Finally, Table 22 presents the hierarchical Poisson regression analysis examined
each of the five violent outcomes with the cluster types as the main predictor variables.
The focus of this section is on the cluster type and their relationship to violence. The only
difference between these models and the hierarchical Poisson regression models
presented in previous section is that the key predictor variables are the cluster types as
opposed to the dimension of organization. Given these marginal differences, I combined
the models into a single table and my discussion focuses on the influence of each cluster
type on violence. In other words, I do not discuss the group level controls since their
relationship to the violence outcomes do not substantively change relative to the results
previously discussed. Beginning with Model 1, the results suggest that simple structure,
formal-professional, and instrumental-rational terrorist groups were significantly more
lethal than informal-diffused groups. There were no significant differences in lethality
between divisional structure groups and informal-diffused groups.
Model 2 indicates that formal-professional and instrumental-rational terrorist
groups significantly killed a greater number of hard targets compared to informaldiffused groups. Simple structure and divisional structure groups had no significant effect
on the number of hard targets killed relative to informal-diffused groups. The results from
Model 3 suggest that simple structure, formal-professional, and instrumental-rational
terrorist groups had a significantly higher number of attacks on hard targets compared to
informal-diffused groups. The relationship between divisional structure groups and the
number of attacks on hard targets was non-significant.
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Table 22. Fixed Effects Models Predicting Violent Outcomes by Cluster Type
Model 1
DV:
Lethality
b (se)

Model 2
DV:
HT Lethality
b (se)

Model 3
DV:
Attacks on HT
b (se)

Model 4
DV: Successful
Attacks on HT
b (se)

Model 5
DV: Highly Successful
Attacks on HT
b (se)

.67 (.27)**

.13 (.24)

.58 (.19)***

.46 (.21)*

.06 (.26)

Divisional Structure
Formal-Professional
Instrumental-Rational
Organizational Size
Organizational Age
Anti-System Expansive
Within-System
Religious

.59 (.31)
.94 (.26) ***
1.61 (.30)***
.40 (.10)***
-.03 (.01)***
.58 (.30)
-.88 (.25)***
-.12 (.17)

.12 (.39)
.64 (.28)*
1.20 (.37)***
.35 (.09)***
-.03 (.01)***
.64 (.22)*
-1.36 (.29)***
-.29 (.22)

.15 (.28)
.62 (.24)***
1.02 (.26)***
.38 (.07)***
-.03 (.01)***
.62 (.23) ***
-1.64 (.38)***
-.27 (.16)

.09 (.26)
.57 (.20)***
1.18 (.19)***
.37 (.07)***
-.04 (.01)***
.71 (.18)***
-1.34 (.31)***
-.06 (.16)

.13 (.41)
.68 (.30)*
1.26 (.37)***
.41 (.12)***
-.05 (.01)***
.89 (.32)***
-1.11 (.33)***
-.60 (.24)**

Ethnonationalist

-1.25 (.25) ***

-1.38 (.30)***

-.49 (.32)

-.64 (.28)*

-1.14 (.25)***

Variables
Simple Structure1

Left-Wing

.17 (.22)

.73(.26)

***

1.41 (.43)

***

1.88 (.29)

***

.36 (.28)

State Sponsorship
Alliance Funding

-.97 (.32)***
-.19 (.30)

-1.17 (.35)***
-.10 (.33)

-.35 (.31)
.36 (.19)

-.53 (.31)
.34 (.20)

-1.25 (.27)***
-.11 (.32)

Drug Trafficking

.92 (.28)***

.99 (.30)***

.79 (.35)*

.85 (.21)***

1.02 (.29)***

***

***

Power

.23 (.05)

Intercept

4.32 (.19)

Reliability

.56

***

.28 (.05)

3.26 (.20)

***

.52

.19 (.04)

***

2.45 (.14)
.56

***

.21 (.04)

***

1.77 (.16)

***

.37 (.07)***
-62 (.22)***

.57

.50

Proportion variation
.79
.81
.79
.80
.81
within countries explained
*** p < .001; ** p <.01; * p <.05
1: Informal-Diffused is the reference category.
Note: Maximum likelihood coefficients (and robust standard errors) reported from hierarchical Poisson regression models

Next, Model 4 indicates that simple structure, formal-professional, and
instrumental-rational terrorist groups had a significantly higher number of successful
attacks on hard targets compared to informal-diffused groups. The relationship between
divisional structure groups and the number of successful attacks on hard targets was nonsignificant. Finally, Model 5 suggests that formal-professional and instrumental-rational
terrorist groups had a significantly higher number of highly successful attacks on hard
targets compared to informal-diffused groups. Simple structure and divisional structure
groups had no significant effect on the number of highly successful attacks on hard
targets relative to informal-diffused groups.
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Summary of findings: Terrorist group types and violent outcomes
The main finding from this section is that terrorist groups with higher degrees of
organization (e.g., instrumental-rational, formal-professional) were more violent relative
to those with lower levels of organization (e.g., informal diffused). As terrorist groups
increase in structuring of activities and concentration of authority, their capacity for
violence increases. This finding also supports previous research on gang organization and
criminal offending (Bouchard & Spindler, 2011; Decker et al., 2008; Sheley et al. 1995).
More organized terrorist groups have a greater capacity for lethal violence in general and
against hard targets because they have the knowledge and skills to perpetrate highly
sophisticated attacks relative to less organized groups. In addition, more organized
terrorist groups have the control mechanisms in place (e.g., training in organization rules)
to ensure accountability and commitment to tactical
objectives (Shapiro, 2013).
There are two caveats in the relationships between terrorist group structure and
violence. First, there was no significant difference in the number of hard targets killed nor
the number of highly successful attacks between simple structure and informal-diffused
groups. I suspect this result highlights the importance of the structuring of activities
dimension as opposed to the concentration of authority in the capacity to effectiveness
attack hard targets. Recall that simple structure groups have high degrees of
concentration of authority but low degrees of structuring of activities. Thus, while the
concentration of authority provides a shared vision and accountability to ensure that
lower levels members follow through with their objectives, the lack of training and
expertise in simple structure groups limits complexity of their attacks. This explains why
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simple structure groups are more likely to perpetrate attacks on hard targets but are no
more likely to kill a high number of hard targets nor have a greater number of high
successful attacks relative to informal diffused groups.
The second caveat is that divisional structure terrorist groups were not
significantly related to any of the violence measures. This is unexpected, especially
given that the Afghan Taliban -- one of the most violent terrorist group in the past two
decades – fit this typology. One explanation is that divisional structure groups do not
have the necessary training and expertise to make up for their general lack of
concentration of authority. For example, formal--professional groups lack a concentration
of authority as well but account for this through high levels of formalization and
specialization. Despite the relatively high degrees of interconnectedness, divisional
structure terrorist groups do not have additional control mechanisms in place to regulate
the actions lower level members. Thus, members and units in the group focus on their
own goals as opposed to the collective goals of the group. A second potential explanation
is that divisional structure groups generally lack territorial control, limiting the degree to
which they can plan and coordinate sophisticated acts of violence. For example, Volders
(2016) emphasizes the importance of operational time and space in providing terrorist
groups with the physical space to coordinate activities with relative security. Since many
groups in the divisional structure typology lack territorial control, they are limited in the
degree to which they can plan and coordinate highly destructive attacks.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCULSIONS
This dissertation sought to address two overarching research questions. First,
Which indicators of gang organization can be applied to terrorist groups to develop a
classification schema of terrorist group structure? Based on my review of the literature, I
argued that the indicators of gang organization (e.g., presence of leadership, rules,
division of labor) were linked to four core organizational dimensions including
centralization, formalization, interconnectedness, and complexity. I used EFA to examine
the underlying relationships between measures related to these four organizational
dimensions in the context of terrorism. The results suggest that there are two higher-order
organizational dimensions in terrorist groups. The first dimension, structuring of
activities, encompassed indicators of both formalization (e.g., organizational training,
ideological training) and complexity (e.g., background diversity of members). The second
dimension, concentration of authority, encompassed indicators of both centralization
(e.g., presence of leadership, uniforms) and interconnectedness (e.g., territorial control).
These organizational dimensions are consistent with seminal research on conventional
businesses (Pugh et al., 1968) suggesting these dimensions underlie both conventional
organizations and criminal groups. This is important for two reasons. First, this finding
supports the applicability of organizational theory to study terrorist groups. Second, it
indicates the mechanisms that drive performance in conventional organizations also
facilities violence in terrorist groups.
In relation to the first research question, I also used measures underlying the
structuring of activities and concentration of authority dimensions to develop structural
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typologies of terrorist groups. Results from a two-stage cluster analysis indicated the
presence of five basic structural typologies including informal-diffused, simple structure,
divisional structure, formal-professional, and instrumental-rational. These findings
support the idea that like gangs (Thrasher, 1927) and conventional organizations (Pugh et
al., 1968; Mintzberg, 1979), no two terrorist groups are alike. As discussed in Chapter 4,
considerable overlap existed in the structural typologies found here and those in existing
terrorism research. For instance, the instrumental-rational typology is similar to the
bureaucratic (Kilberg, 2012) or mechanistic (Ligon et al., 2013) structure whereas the
informal-diffused typology shares characteristics with the market (Kilberg, 2012) or
brand (Zelinsky & Shubik, 2009) structure. This overlap provides some degree of
external validity as to the typologies developed in this study.
The second research question was: Do terrorist groups that are more highly
organized engage in more group level violence than less organized terrorist groups?
Results from Hierarchal Poisson models suggests that both the structuring of activities
and concentration of authority dimensions were related to greater degrees of violence in
different ways. Terrorist groups with greater degrees of structuring of activities were
more lethal in general, more lethal when attack hard targets, and had a higher number of
highly successful attacks on hard targets. Based on these results, I argue that the
structuring of activities dimension is linked to human capital. Human capital, or the
training, experience, judgement, intelligence, relationship, and insights of individuals
within the organization, is developed through both training as well as recruitment of
specialized individuals. Members of terrorist groups with high levels of human capital
have increased tactical knowledge and adaptive expertise whereas the group has a greater
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innovation capacity. Both types of capital are byproducts of the structuring of activities
dimension, and they provide terrorist groups with the skills, knowledge, and abilities to
successfully and efficiently carry out large scale acts of violence. In addition, members of
terrorist groups with high levels training in internal organizational policies and rules have
increased explicit knowledge, while the group has an enhanced organizational memory,
cohesiveness, and intra-group cooperation.
A second finding was that terrorist groups with greater concentration of authority
had a higher number of attacks on hard targets and a higher number of success on hard
targets. Based on these findings, I argued that the concentration of authority dimension is
related to the regulation of members’ behaviors through accountability and agenda setting
(Heger et al., 2012). Building on recent insights on principle-agent theory (Abrahms &
Potter, 2015; Shapiro, 2013), high degrees of concentration of authority are necessary in
terrorist groups to control and regulate member behaviors. Members of terrorist groups
vary in both levels of commitment and goals. The bureaucratic mechanisms inherent to
hierarchical groups, such as the presence of a command structure and organizational
incentives and punishments, minimizes the agency afforded to members. In turn, these
mechanisms also ensure that members are accountable for their actions. The presence of
one or more central leaders with a strong agenda setting capacity is also an important
function within the concentration of authority dimension. A strong agenda-setting
capacity ensures tighter cohesiveness between the leadership and followers within a
group, and it reduces uncertainty among members. Taken together, the presence of
bureaucratic mechanisms that ensure accountability coupled with a strong agenda-setting
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capacity increase the likelihood that the behaviors of group members are in the interest of
the collective as opposed to the individual.
In relation to the second research question, I also examined the relationship
between the typologies of terrorist groups and violence outcomes. The results provide
support for the notion that more organized terrorist groups are also more violent in
general and better equipped to attack hard targets. For instance, the two most organized
typologies, the formal-professional and instrumental-rational structures, had significantly
greater levels of violence across each outcome relative to the least organized typology,
the informal-diffused structure. Even after controlling for group characteristics such as
size, age, and ideology, these findings provide further evidence that group structure is an
important correlate of violent outcomes.
Structuring of Activities and Concentration of Authority in Gangs
One of the main goals of this study was to use the gang organization research to
inform how to measure organization in terrorist groups. However, what remains unknown
is the degree to which the findings of this study relate back to the original gang
organization literature. For instance, what evidence is there that the structuring of
activities and concentration of authority dimensions exist in gangs? Relatedly, how can
these dimensions be measured? Before moving forward, there are three key differences
between this study and the research on gang organization to discuss including the
dimensionality of organization, levels of measurement, and methods of data collection.
First, there is debate as to whether organization is a unidimensional or
multidimensional concept. The vast majority of gang researchers have utilized an index
to assess gang organization (Bouchard & Spindler, 2011; Decker et al., 2008). In doing
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so, the assumption is that each item of gang organization is related to one another and
measures a single construct. Pyrooz and colleagues (2012) is of the first to question this
assumption and find evidence that organization is not a unidimensional concept. More
specifically, Pyrooz and colleagues (2012) found that items commonly used to examine
gang organization were weakly related to one another and to measures of delinquency
and victimization across different datasets. For instance, the mean inter-item correlation
coefficient between four measures of organization including the presence of a leader,
regular meetings, rules, and insignia was .32, .35., and .40 across three datasets.
Furthermore, the direction of each measure of organization was not positive in
multivariate models predicting delinquency, suggestive that some characteristics of
organization are not related to offending. In contrast, Leverso and Matsueda (2019)
argue that gang organization is a unidimensional concept. Using confirmatory factory
analysis, the authors found that eight binary measures of gang organization loaded on a
one-factor model with standardized loading scores ranging from .44 to .92. My
dissertation supports the idea that organization is a multidimension concept similar to
findings from Pyrooz and colleagues (2012) and research on conventional organizations
(Pugh et al., 1968), more research is needed to unpack the underlying structure of
organization in gangs and terrorist groups.
Second, the level of measurement of the items used in this study were mixed (i.e.,
ordinal and dichotomous) while the gang organization literature relies solely on
dichotomous measures. This is primarily a limitation of the existing gang organization
research. As Pyrooz and colleagues (2012, p. 100) note “A limitation of this line of
research more generally is that is relies on several dichotomous variables for information
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on gang organizational structure. This constrains the variability in the construct of gang
organizational structure, reducing the likelihood of identifying statistically significant
findings or identifying a latent construct of gang organizational structure. We recommend
that future survey development introduce ordinal variables to measure gang
organizational structure.” Thus, the multidimensionality of terrorist group organization
may be a function of increased variability in the measures of organization used in this
study. Future studies on both gangs and terrorist groups should consider adopting ordinal
level measures of organization.
Third, this study relied on secondary data sources coded by trained raters to
examine the level of organization of terrorist groups. In contrast, research on gang
organization typically relies on survey data collected from either former and active gang
members (Decker et al., 2008) or law enforcement (Klein, 1971; Maxson & Klein, 1995).
While data collected from active or former extremists would be optimal to examine the
organization of terrorist groups, gaining access to extremists is an inherently difficult task
(LaFree & Dugan, 2007). Furthermore, researchers have relied on survey data collected
from law enforcement to examine the threat of domestic terrorist groups (e.g., Freilich,
Chermak, & Simon Jr., 2009), however, this would be difficult in relation to the current
study given that the majority of groups in LEADIR are international. The use of
secondary sources comes with limitations that are important to consider. However, this
approach is consistent with many of the existing data collection efforts seeking to sample
from the total population of terrorist groups (see for example, Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008;
Kilberg, 2012).
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Structuring of activities in gangs
The structuring of activities dimension focuses on the extent to which terrorist
groups have formal roles and procedures (i.e., formalization) and specialized sections
(i.e., complexity). Unlike the concentration of authority dimension described below, the
scalability of the items underlying the structuring of activities dimension in terrorist
groups are limited in the context of gangs (see Table 23). For instance, there is limited
evidence that gangs engage in combat training or have highly skilled members with
specialized backgrounds. That said, there are both existing and new measures that could
be employed to examine the structuring of activities dimension in gangs. For example,
the presence of rules, norms, or codes with punishments for violators are important
measures of formalization in gangs (Moule Jr. et al., 2014). Gang rules announce
important organizational values and provide a means of forging consensus in gangs while
a system of punishments increases discipline in the gang (Decker & Curry, 2000; Decker
& Van Winkle, 1996; Thrasher, 1927). Gang rules and punishments are functionally
similar to organizational and ideological training in terrorist groups.
In the future, a measure of whether gang members received combat or weapons
training would be comparable to combat training in terrorist groups. Smith (2015)
suggests there has been an increase in the number of military-trained gang members in
the United States. The presence of military-trained members and the extent to which they
share their expertise in military tactics or weaponry would be useful indicators of gang
complexity. Finally, the presence of a division of labor or specialization of tasks in gangs
serves as indicator of complexity within the structuring of activities dimension. For
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example, specific roles in the gang related to handling finances, doling out punishment,
or serving as a lookout would indicate a division of labor (Leverso & Matsueda, 2019).
Table 23. Potential Measures for both Dimension of Organization in Terrorist Groups and
Gangs
Structuring of Activities
Concentration of Authority
Terrorist Groups
Gangs
Terrorist Groups
Gangs
Organizational
Training in Group
Leadership
Presence of Leader
Training
Roles
Training in Rules
Levels of
Ideological Training
Centralization
and Codes
Membership
Combat Training
Weapons Training Interconnectedness
Regular Meetings
Deep-Level Diversity

Division of Labor

Territorial Control

Territorial Control

Uniforms

Insignia

Concentration of authority in gangs
The concentration of authority dimension emphasizes the degree to which terrorist
groups have a hierarchical decision-making structuring (i.e., centralization) with limited
unit or member autonomy (i.e., interconnectedness). Since much of the gang organization
literature focuses on the degree of hierarchy in gangs, there are several available
measures used in this study that also account for the concentration of authority dimension
in gangs. For example, the presence of leadership or shot callers, the level of
centralization, and territorial control are indicators of centralization commonly found in
gang organization research (Bouchard and Spindler, 2011; Decker, 2001; Decker et al.,
1998, Decker et al., 2008; Densley, 2012; Maxon & Klein, 1995; Pyrooz et al., 2012).
Furthermore, the presence of regular meetings could be used to assess the
interconnectedness of gangs (Moule Jr. et al., 2014) while the presence of insignia,
designated clothing, or distinctive colors in gangs (Bjerregaard, 2002; Pyrooz et al., 2012;
Sheley et al., 1995) is functionally similar to the use of uniforms in terrorist groups.
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Theoretical Implications
Findings from this dissertation offer three theoretical implications for the
intersection of criminology and terrorism studies. The first implication is that this study
highlights the importance of control mechanisms to regulate members behaviors
corresponding with well-organized groups. Drawing on Weber’s (1946) theory of
bureaucratic control, both the concentration of authority and structuring of activities
dimension represent distinct yet interrelated organizational control mechanisms. Broadly
speaking, Weber theorized that rational collective activities face two inherent problems:
1) to ensure that individuals officially designated to exercise control actually direct an
organization’s activities and 2) to ensure that decisions are made on the basis of the best
possible information (Miller, 1970). To overcome these constraints, formal organizations
become more bureaucratized and rely on administrative mechanisms for maintaining the
organization and coordinating activities (Blau & Scott, 1962). Some of the prominent
characteristics of bureaucracies are a hierarchy of positions and authority, a fixed division
of labor, adherence to rules, expert training, administration based on written documents,
and a full-time commitment to organizational activities (Weber, 1946; for review see).
Based on these characteristics, control in the concentration of authority dimension
is ensured through the hierarchical structures of positions and authority. Hierarchical
structures of positions increased control and coordination by restricting free flowing
communication with structural competent of the organization (Blau & Scott, 1962).
Bureaucracies also formalize systems of control through a hierarchical distribution of
authority. Individuals in positions of authority are able to exercise control especially
when they are viewed as legitimate. When a person occupying an authority position
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issues a command, individuals under their influence are more likely to obey them since
they have the “right” to exercise control (Miller, 1970). Taken together, the concentration
of authority dimension enhances control through a strong agenda-setting capacity as well
as accountability and obedience to an established executive order. This supports Heger
and colleagues’ (2012) theorizing on why hierarchically structured terrorist groups are
more violent as opposed to decentralized groups.
Next, control within the structuring of activities dimension is increased through a
fixed division of labor, expert training, adherence to rules, and administration based on
written documents. First, a division of labor within an organization is a marker of
specialization (Pugh et al., 1968). As noted by Blau (1970), specialization improves
control and coordination in an organization by limiting the scope of activities and
broadening responsibilities of experts. Similarly, expert training ensures control as
individuals gain superior knowledge about the organization or acquire specific skills,
which limits the scope of activities in the organization. Finally, as organizations become
increasingly specialized and differentiated, they are more likely to develop standardized
rules, regulations, and procedures. These impersonal control mechanisms are often
formalized (e.g., written and filed) and become substitutes for direct executive control
(Blau, 1968).
The importance of these bureaucratic control mechanisms is closely in line with
recent developments on principal-agent theory and terrorist organizations (Abrahms &
Potter, 2015; Shapiro, 2013). More specifically, principal-agent theory examines the
difficulties (e.g., information asymmetry, differing goals) associated with situations
where a principal (i.e., leader) hires an agent (i.e., member) to accomplish a task. In
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terrorist groups, principal-agent difficulties are problematic for three reasons. First,
terrorist leaders and foot soldiers often have different preferences over targets reflecting
different goals or different means to similar goals. Second, terrorist leaders and foot
soldiers have access to different information regarding the political value of targets.
Furthermore, communicating that information within the group is costly and a security
risk for senior leaders. Finally, when either the first or second problems emerge, the
conflict of interest over targets between principals and agents makes it difficult to
credibly communication which targets should be hit (Shapiro, 2008).
To mitigate these issues, terrorist groups employ bureaucratic control mechanisms
to reduce the discretion afforded to lower level members. For example, Shapiro and
Siegel (2012) show how Al Qaeda in Iraq used standardized forms for tracking weapons,
group funds, and affiliate groups, demanded regular reports from lower level members,
and sent regular memos and meeting agendas. Abrahms and Potter (2015) also show the
importance of leadership as a control mechanism. More specifically, when terrorist
groups experience a “leadership deficiency”, members are incentivized to commit
violence in their own interests as opposed to the larger group goals Thus, despite the
increased security risk, terrorist groups rely on bureaucratic practices to reduce agency
problems and protect their strategic goals.
Taken together, the results of this study support and build on Shapiro’s (2013)
work in two ways. First, my findings suggest that the concentration of authority and
structuring of activities dimensions reflect to interrelated but distinct bureaucratic control
mechanism. At one level, control in the concentration of authority dimension is based on
direct executive control where formal lines of reporting promote accountability and

123
strong agenda-setting. For example, leaders of the Sinjar organization frequently sent
memos laying down administrative rules on how operative spent money (Shapiro &
Siegel, 2012). Without such administrative controls in place, lower level operatives are
incentivized to use group resources and perpetrate violence in their own interest as
opposed to the collective interests of the group (Abrahms & Potter, 2015). At another
level, control in the structuring of activities dimension is based on impersonal control
where expertise and written rules, policies, and procedures guide members activities. For
example, the Sinjar organization kept technical training manuals and ideological screeds
to condition members to take favorable actions. There is also evidence that the
organization required an application from members and kept track of foreign fighters to
manage expertise and mitigate the actions of actors with an underlying preference for
violence (Shapiro & Siegel, 2012).
In addition, this study builds on the principal-agent framework by suggesting that
bureaucratic control mechanism, not only regulates members behaviors, but also provides
coordinating systems for members to engage in sophisticated violence. The crux of
Shapiro’s (2013) argument is that bureaucratic control mechanisms limit the discretion
afforded to lower levels members and subsequently limits actions that are counter to the
group’s goals. Another side of this perspective is that, when these mechanisms are in
place, members are conditioned to take favorable actions and have the resources to
successful to do so.
The second broad theoretical implication of this study is that it highlights the
importance of human capital in terrorist groups. For example, the structuring of activities
dimension is closely related to how terrorist groups acquire and maintain human capital
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while the concentration of authority dimension relates to how terrorist groups manage
human capital. In criminology, the concept of capital is not new as several researchers
have advanced the concept of criminal capital (Loughran et al., 2013; McCarthy &
Hagan, 1995, 2001). Drawing on ideas on human capital and social capital, criminal
capital refers to the knowledge and skills that can facilitate successful criminal activity
(McCarthy & Hagan, 2001). Researchers have generally found a positive, significant
relationship between measures of criminal capital such as criminal experience,
specialization, and tutelage and illicit earnings (Loughran et al., 2013; McCarthy &
Hagan, 2001; Morselli et al., 2006; Uggen & Thompson, 2003). For example, Morselli
and colleagues (2006) found that individuals who received tutelage from a criminal
mentor had higher illicit earning and lower chances of being incarcerated compared to
those who did not receive tutelage. Uggen and Thompson (2003) found that criminal
experience, measured by the total number of times an offender was arrested in a 36month period, had a curvilinear relationship with total monthly illegal earnings, while
Loughran and colleagues (2013) found that investment in criminal capital yielded greater
illicit returns in a sample of serious offending adolescents.
Relatedly, research on criminal expertise has also shown that there are important
cognitive benefits for offending when individuals invest in their criminality (Bennett &
Wright, 1984; Nee & Meenaghan, 2006; Nee et al., 2019; Topalli, 2005; Topalli et al.,
2015; Wright & Decker, 1994; Wright, Logie, & Decker, 1995). Experienced criminals
are better at recognizing opportunities, responding to risk, and diagnosing environmental
features that are conductive (or unfavorable) to crime compared to novices (see Nee &
Ward, 2015 for review). For example, Wright, Logie, and Decker (1995) demonstrate
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that, after viewing photos of residential buildings, active burglars were more likely to
recall situational details about a building and its surroundings compared to a control
group. Using standardized videos of short dyadic social interactions, Topalli (2005)
illustrated that active street offenders focused on different perceptual cues related to
victimization or target vulnerability compared to a control group. Nee and colleagues
(2019) demonstrate that experienced burglars relied on “script-like knowledge” to locate
high-value items relative to nonoffenders in a virtual environment. In sum, research on
criminal capital and criminal expertise suggests that offenders acquire specific perceptual
and procedural skills, which facilitate successful criminal activity when they invest in
criminal training.
In the context of this study, the criminal capital and expertise frameworks are
useful in explaining why some terrorist groups have the capacity to successful attack hard
target and other do not. For example, successfully attacking hard targets requires both
perceptual skills to identify vulnerabilities as well as procedural skills to exploit those
vulnerabilities (Berman & Latin, 2008). The problem is that, like ideas on human capital
(Becker, 1962; Mincer, 1974; Schultz, 1981) the overwhelming majority of research on
criminal capital operates at the individual level. Thus, little attention has been given to
criminal capital as a group level concept. Recognizing this limitation, recent theoretical
advancements in strategic management and human resources have argued that human
capital also operates at the group - or organizational level (Fagan & Ployhart, 2015;
Ployhart & Moliterno, 2011; Ployhart, Nyberg, Reilly, & Maltarich, 2014; Ployhart, Van
Iddekinge, & MacKenzie Jr., 2011). More specifically, Ployhart and colleagues (2014)
put forth the concept of human capital resources to describe “individual or unit level
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capacities based on individual knowledge, skills, abilities, and other characteristics that
are accessible for unit-relevant purposes” (p. 374). In other words, human capital
resources focus on the accessibility of human capital for unit-relevant purposes and the
capacities for producing outcomes whereas human capital focuses on the resources
themselves. Consistent with the resource-based view, organizations rely on human capital
resources to achieve a competitive advantage in a particular product market (Barney,
1991) or competitive parity relative to other competitors (Barney & Wright, 1998).
Based on these insights, there is reason to believe that criminal capital also exists
at the group level. Building on the criminal capital literature in conjunction with ideas on
human capital resources, I put forth the concept of criminal capital resources to refer to
unit level capacities based on individual knowledge, skills, abilities, and other
characteristics that facilitate successful criminal activities. There are two key differences
between criminal capital resources and human capital resources. First, criminal capital
resources are conceptualized as a collective construct while human capital resources
operate at multiple levels of analysis. Second, criminal capital resources focus on
criminal outcomes where human capital resources emphasize conventional markers of
performance or productivity such as customer ratings of a unit’s hospitality, order,
accuracy, product quality, and speed (Ployhart et al., 2011). In criminology and terrorism
research, there are several unit level criminal outcomes worth examining, including but
not limited to, lethal violence, target specialization or diversification, illicit earnings, and
weapons usage. The point is that criminal capital resources are resources and capabilities
that facilitate criminal outcomes.
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Perhaps the best illustration of how to measure criminal capital resources and
their influence on violence come from Asal and colleagues (2015). More specifically, the
authors examined brigade level human capital in the Provisional Irish Republican Party
using two proxies: the mean age of the subunits’ members and the proportion of subunit
members who possessed professional training relative to bomb making. Findings suggest
that the percentage of members with professional training increased the likely that a
bridge killed a nonzero number of people with an IED especially in attacks on high value
targets, while the age of subunit members had no meaningful effects. Put another way,
professional training provides brigades with the expertise to selectively kill “those people
they wish to kill” as opposed to indiscriminate violence (Asal et al., 2015, p. 20). Taken
together with the results of this study, training appears to be an indicator of criminal
capital resources.
Last, the third theoretical implication is that this study provides insights into the
ways in which criminal capital resources are developed or acquired. Drawing on Lepak
and Snell’s (1999) human resource framework, there are two internalization strategies
used to build human capital in business firms. First, businesses develop human capital
through internal development. Internal development strategies focus on “making” human
capital and building employee skills though training and development initiatives. The
benefit of internal development is that firm-specific skills are nontransferable and internal
development is less likely to result in capital loss (Barney, 1991; Becker, 1976). Second,
businesses also develop human capital through acquisition. Acquisition strategies focus
on “buying” human capital that does not require further investment. The benefit of
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acquiring human capital is that firms do not have to further invest in development
initiatives and have instant access to skilled employees.
Based on the items retained in the structuring of activities dimension, terrorist
groups acquire criminal capital resources through both a combination of internal
development and acquisition. For example, measures of organization, ideological, and
combat training are internal development strategies in terrorist groups. As noted by Jung
and Lee (2015, p. 68), training of terrorist groups not only increased knowledge and skills
but also facilitated indoctrination of their political or religious ideology and creeds.”
Following Hegghammer (2006), it is likely that training in terrorist groups focus on four
factors: violence acculturation, indoctrination, training on tactical and operational attack
skills, and relationship-building with other members. Criminal capital resources are
greater in terrorist groups who invest in training. Terrorist groups also building human
capital through acquisition. For instance, the measure of deep-level diversity (i.e.,
background diversity of membership) is related to acquisition. Terrorist groups high in
deep-level diversity have a heterogenous membership with individuals varying in
characteristics such as educational attainment or specialized skills such as weapons or
religious training (Windisch et al., 2019). While some of these skills can be internally
developed, others cannot, suggesting that individuals developed these skills prior to
joining the group. Although the deep-level diversity measure does not tease out whether
these specialized individuals were acquired through traditional “top-down” recruitment as
opposed to self-selection, there is evidence that terrorist groups engage in periods of
targeted recruitment and talent spotting (Bloom, 2017; Hunter et al., 2017; Windisch et
al., 2018). During these recruitment cycles, terrorist groups construct expertise through
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pragmatic assessments of their workforce and selective recruitment (Bloom, 2017). In
other words, these groups seek to acquire specific criminal capital resources that cannot
be addressed via internal development strategies.
In sum, findings from this dissertation emphasize the importance of centralized
control and criminal capital resources on performance among terrorist groups. In the next
section, I discuss how findings from this study have practical implications for
practitioners and those in the field.
Practical Implications
Findings from this study can be used to guide practitioners including law
enforcement, the intelligence community, and policymakers as to which terrorist groups
pose the larger threat based on their organizational sophistication and violent capabilities.
For example, results from this dissertation suggest that certain group characteristics
factors are linked to terrorist groups’ capacity to engage in complex violence. Using
classified and unclassified sources, law enforcement and counter terrorism analysts could
periodically assess these characteristics as evidence of a group’s increase (or
diminishing) capabilities. For example, if a terrorist group establishes a network of
training camps and begins a focused recruitment campaign, it is likely that they have an
increased capacity to engage in highly destructive attacks on hard targets. If a terrorist
group loses territory they once held and experiences a leadership decapitation event, it is
likely that they have a reduced capacity to attack hard targets in favor of soft targets
(Abrahms & Potter, 2015). Intel analysts could examine these group characteristics on a
weekly or monthly bases, depending on the availability of the information, to provide a
real-time, actionable insights into terrorist groups’ capabilities.
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From this perspective, characteristics of terrorist groups can be viewed as group
level risk factors related to their capacity for violence. Risk factors involve different types
of adverse conditions that increase the likelihood of delinquency and criminal behavior
(Hawkins et al., 1998; Loeber et al., 1998; Moffitt, 1990; Simi et al., 2016). Consistent
with the general theme of this dissertation, much of the growth of the risk factor
paradigm has come from street gang research (Hawkins et al., 1992; Klein & Maxson,
2006; Thornberry et al. 2003). For example, the backgrounds of many gang members are
characterized by adverse family conditions such as domestic violence, sexual abuse, and
neglect. In relation to this study, risk factors are those indicators of organization that
increase the capacity of terrorist groups to engage in highly destructive, complex acts of
violence. Although this study does not examine why ideological groups turn to violence,
there is evidence that certain group characteristics predict the onset of violence (Asal,
Chermak, Fitzgerald, & Freilich, 2020). This research coupled with the results of this
study could be integrated into the risk factor paradigm to provide a comprehensive
understanding of the adoption and capacity of violence among terrorist groups. That said,
research on group characteristics and violent outcomes is still relatively novel and much
more research is needed to translate findings into policy.
Limitations and Directions for Future Research
There are five primary limitations of this dissertation to bear in mind. First, the
LEADIR dataset relies on open source, secondary information for collecting and coding
organization data. Although an increasing number of terrorism dataset based on open
source data such as the BAAD dataset (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008), the Global Terrorism
Database (LaFree, 2010; LaFree & Dugan, 2007), the United States Extremist Crime
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Database (Freilich et al., 2014), the Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United
States dataset (Freilich, Chermak, Belli, Gruenewald, & Parkin, 2014), and the Salafi
Jihadist Inspired Profiles and Radicalization Clusters dataset (Ligon, Windisch, Braun,
Logan, Derrick, & Armstrong, 2019), there is the potential of reporting inaccurate,
biased, or false information when using secondary data. Furthermore, given the
polarization of terrorism, there is also the potential that government-censored information
may influence results. To mitigate these issues, the LEADIR dataset only included
terrorist groups with more than five attacks ensuring that there is an ample amount of
information for each group to collect and code. Nevertheless, results of this study should
be interpreted with limitations related to open source data in mind.
Second, the LEADIR dataset includes terrorist groups with more than five attacks
between 2008 and 2017. While this includes the majority of highly active terrorist
groups, it does not include all terrorist groups. The removal of terrorist groups with less
than five attacks likely leads to the removal of less durable – and potentially less
organized groups. Perhaps the results of this dissertation and the influence of the
structuring of activities and concentration of authority dimensions would be more robust
with a more robust sample. The difficulty is that including terrorist with few attacks
would make it increasingly difficult to examine markers of organization since the amount
of open source information tied to a group is often linked to how often they perpetrate
violence. Recall that LEADIR also does not include terror attacks perpetrated by lone
actors or collectives without identifiable group boundaries. As a result, the
generalizability of my findings is applicable to highly active terrorist groups with patterns
of sustained violence as opposed to lone actors or collectives with limited sporadic acts of
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violence. Third, since the LEADIR data are limited to a specific time period, I could not
examine how terrorist group organization changes overtime nor how organizational
changes influence violence overtime. Rather findings from this study highlight general
patterns between the degree of organization among terrorist groups and violence during a
10-year time period.
Fourth, it was difficult to capture when a terrorist group started and ended. This
limitation is not unique to this study and several terrorism scholars have emphasized the
difficulty in capturing this information (e.g., Miller, 2016; Young & Dugan, 2014). In the
LEADIR dataset, terrorist groups were treated as a different group if they rebranded,
changed their name, or broke away from a larger group. For example, the Al Qaeda in
Iraq (AQI) and the Islamic State and the Levant (ISIL) are treated as two different
terrorist groups. As such, ISIL was ‘founded’ in 2013 when they broke away from Al
Qaeda. The drawback to this approach is that ISIL was well established in 2013 – in
terms of resources and structure – given their relationship with Al Qaeda. However,
ISIL’s organizational age would only account for the time in which they self-identified as
ISIL and not the years in which they operated under a different name. Finally, LEADIR
relied on fixed-value imputation to replace missing information on variables for which
substantive knowledge or subject expertise suggested a most likely or highly probable
value. For instance, missing data for variables that generally leave an evidence trail, such
as drug trafficking or state sponsorship were replaced with null values when they were
not mentioned in open sources. Recently, LaFree and colleagues (2018) demonstrated
that there were no substantive differences in the results using the fixed-value approach
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compared to other strategies for handling missing data. Nevertheless, the results of this
dissertation should be interpreted with this in mind.
While the present effort suggests that the dimensions of terrorist group
organization are important to consider when examining lethality and hard target selection,
it should also serve as a springboard for future research. For instance, future research
could examine the relationship between the dimensions of terrorist group organization
and other types of violence such as attacks on soft targets or infrastructure attacks.
Furthermore, future studies could examine other non-violent outcomes. For example,
both structuring of activities and concentration of authority were correlated with drug
trafficking at the bivariate level. However, these relationships could be examined through
multivariate analyses to assess the relative effect of the dimensions of organization on
drug trafficking after accounting for other group characteristics. Additional non-violent
outcomes such as state sponsorship or alliance funding could also be examined.
Future studies should incorporate contextual effects when examining the
relationship between terrorist group organization and violence. Given the exploratory
nature of this study, I used HLM to account for contextual influences despite not
including any higher-level variables. That said, future studies could include contextual
influence such as measure of social disorganization and relative deprivation and examine
their cross-level interaction with the dimensions of organization. Finally, it is important
that future research continue to examine and replicate findings at the group level of
analysis using different data sources. For example, the relationship between organization
size and violence found in this study overlaps with findings from previous research (Asal
& Rethemeyer, 2008). Given the general scarcity of quantitative research on terrorism

134
(Schuurman, 2018), research should continue to collect and examine data on group level
characteristics and violence to build an empirical body of knowledge about terrorist
groups.
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Appendix A
Group Name
Abdullah Azzam Brigades
Abu Obaida bin Jarrah Brigade
Abu Sayyaf Group
Achik National Volunteer Council-B
Adan-Abyan Province of the Islamic State
Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat
Ahlu-sunah Wal-jamea
Ahrar al-Sham
Ajnad Misr
Akhil Terai Mukti Morcha
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade
Al-Ashtar Brigades
Al-Islah Party
Al-Mua'qi'oon Biddam Brigade
Al-Naqshabandiya Army
Al-Nasir Army
Al-Nusrah Front
Al-Qaida in Iraq
Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula
Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent
Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb
Al-Shabaab
Al-Sham Legion
Aleppo Fatah Operations Room
Algeria Province of the Islamic State
Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo
Allied Democratic Forces
Ambazonia Defense Forces
Animal Liberation Front
Ansar al-Din Front
Ansar al-Dine (Mali)
Ansar al-Islam
Ansar al-Islam (Burkina Faso)
Ansar al-Sharia (Libya)
Ansar al-Sharia (Pakistan)
Ansar al-Sharia (Tunisia)
Ansar al-Sharia Operations Room
Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis
Ansaru
Ansarullah Bangla Team
Anti-Balaka Militia
Arab Movement of Azawad
Arakan Army

Size
0
1
1
1
1
2
3
4
1
1
1
0
0
0
2
2
3
3
2
1
0
3
4
3
0
2
2
1
0
1
2
1
1
2
0
2
3
2
2
0
0
1
2

Ideology
R
R
R, EN
EN
R
R, EN
R
R
R
LW,EN
R
R
R
R
EN
0
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
EN
R
EN
0
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R, EN
R
EN

Goals
E
TC
E
TC
E
RC
TC
E
RC
TC
TC
RC
RC
TC
SQ
RC
E
E
E
E
E
E
RC
RC
E
TC
RC
TC
PC
RC
TC
RC
RC
TC
E
E
E
TC
E
E
RC
TC
TC
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Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army
Asa'ib Ahl al-Haqq
Awami League
Azawad National Liberation Movement
Badr Brigades
Baloch Liberation Army
Baloch Liberation Front
Baloch Republican Army
Baloch Republican Guards
Bangladesh Nationalist Party
Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement
Barisan Revolusi Nasional
Barqa Province of the Islamic State
Base Movement
Basque Fatherland and Freedom
Benghazi Defense Brigades
Bodu Bala Sena
Boko Haram
Caucasus Emirate
Caucasus Province of the Islamic State
Comite d'Action Viticole
Communist Party of India - Maoist
Communist Party of Nepal - Maoist
Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist
Conspiracy Cells of Fire
Coordination Committee
Coordination of Azawad Movements
Corsican National Liberation Front
Deccan Mujahideen
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Rwanda
Democratic Front of the Central African People
Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Cephesi
Donetsk People's Republic
Earth Liberation Front
Economic Freedom Fighters
February 17th Martyrs Brigade
Fetullah Terrorist Organization
Free Papua Movement
Free Syrian Army
Garo National Liberation Army
Gorkha Janmukti Morcha
Gorkha Liberation Army
Group of Popular Fighters
Hadramawt Province of the Islamic State

2
2
2
3
4
2
0
2
0
4
1
2
0
0
1
2
1
3
2
2
0
4
3
1
0
2
0
1
0
0
2
0
0
4
0
0
2
4
2
2
0
0
0
0
1

R, EN
R, EN
LW
EN
R,EN
EN
EN
EN
EN
EN
R, EN
LW,EN,
R
R
R
EN
R
R, EN
R
R
R
LW
LW
LW
LW
0
EN
EN
EN
R
LW,EN
EN
EN
LW
EN
0
LW,EN
R
R
EN
0
EN
EN
EN
0
R

TC
TC
PC
TC
TC
TC
TC
TC
TC
RC
TC
TC
E
RC
TC
RC
RC
E
E
E
PC
TC
RC
TC
SR
TC
TC
TC
TC
TC
RC
RC
SR
TC
PC
SR
RC
RC
TC
RC
TC
TC
TC
SR
E
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Haftar Militia
Halqa-e-Mehsud
Hamas
Haqqani Network
Hasam Movement
Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham
Hezbollah
Hizb-I-Islami
Hizbul al Islam
Hizbul Mujahideen
Hmar People's Convention-Democracy
Houthi extremists
Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council
Illuminating Paths of Solidarity
Indian Mujahideen
Informal Anarchist Federation
International Revolutionary Front
Islamic Courts Union
Islamic Front
Islamic State in Bangladesh
Islamic State in Egypt
Islamic State in the Greater Sahara
Islamic State of Iraq
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
Jahba East Africa
Jaish al-Fatah
Jaish-e-Islam
Jaish-e-Mohammad
Jama’at Mujahideen Bangladesh
Jamaah Ansharut Daulah
Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin
Jamaat-E-Islami
Jamat al-Tawhid wal-Qisas
Jamiat ul-Mujahedin
Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha - Goit
Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha
Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha- Jwala Singh
Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha- Rajan Mukti
Janjaweed
Jaysh al-Islam
Jharkhand Janmukti Parishad
Jund al-Aqsa
Jund al-Khilafah
Jundallah
Justice and Equality Movement
Kachin Independence Army

4
2
3
3
1
4
4
3
1
2
0
4
0
0
0
1
0
2
4
0
0
2
3
4
0
4
1
1
2
0
2
3
0
1
2
0
1
2
4
4
0
2
0
1
2
3

0
R
R, EN
R
R
R
R, EN
R, EN
R
R, EN
EN
R
EN
0
R
0
0
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R, EN
R, EN
R
R
R
R
R
R, EN
EN
EN
EN
EN
EN
R
EN
R
R
R, EN
R, EN
EN

RC
RC
TC
E
RC
E
TC
TC
RC
TC
TC
RC
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SR
E
SR
SR
TC
TC
E
E
E
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E
E
TC
TC
TC
E
E
E
RC
E
RC
TC
TC
TC
TC
TC
E
RC
TC
E
PC
RC
TC
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Kamtapur Liberation Organization
Kamwina Nsapu Militia
Kangleipak Communist Party
Karbi People's Liberation Tigers
Karen National Union
Kata’ib Hezbollah
Khalistan Liberation Force
Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State
Kuki National Front
Kurdistan Free Life Party
Kurdistan Workers' Party
Lashkar-e-Islam
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
Lashkar-e-Taiba
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
Libya Revolutionaries Operations Room
Libya Shield Force
Lord's Resistance Army
Luhansk People's Republic
M23
Macina Liberation Front
Madhesh Rastra Janatantrik Revolutionary
Madhesi Mukti Tigers
Mahaz Fedai Tahrik Islami Afghanistan
Mai Mai Bakata Katanga Militia
Mai Mai Mazembe Militia
Mai Mai Simba Militia
Maute Group
Mayi Mayi
Misrata Brigades
Moro Islamic Liberation Front
Moro National Liberation Front
Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance
Movement of Niger People for Justice
Mozambique National Resistance Movement
Mujahedeen Shura Council in the Environs of
Jerusalem
Mujahideen Ansar
Mujahidin Indonesia Timur
Muslim Brotherhood
Najd Province of the Islamic State
National Democratic Alliance Army
National Democratic Front of Bodoland
National Liberation Army of Colombia

0
1
1
0
2
4
1
2
1
2
3
3
1
4
2
2
2
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
3
2
3
2
2
1
1
2
2

EN
EN
EN
EN
EN
R, EN
EN
R
EN
EN
LW,EN
R
R, EN
R, EN
EN
R
0
R, EN
EN
EN
R, EN
EN
LW, EN
R
EN
EN
EN
R, EN
EN
R
R, EN
R, EN
R
EN
0
EN
R

TC
TC
TC
TC
RC
TC
TC
E
TC
RC
TC
TC
TC
E
TC
RC
TC
RC
TC
RC
TC
RC
TC
RC
TC
TC
TC
TC
TC
RC
TC
TC
TC
PC
TC
PC
SQ

1

R, EN

TC

1
0
4
2
2
2
2

R
R
R
R
LW,EN
EN
LW

TC
TC
E
E
TC
TC
RC
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National Liberation Front of Tripura
National Socialist Council of Nagaland-IsakMuivah
National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang
Nduma Defense of Congo
New People's Army
Niger Delta Avengers
Niger Delta Greenland Justice Mandate
Nur-al-Din al-Zinki Movement
Nyatura Militia
Oglaigh na hEireann
Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade
Organization for Revolutionary Self-Defense
Pagan Sect of the Mountain
Palestinian Islamic Jihad
Patriotic Ginbot 7 Movement for Unity and
Democracy
Patriotic Resistance Front in Ituri
Peace at Home Council
People's Committee against Police Atrocities
People's Liberation Army (India)
People's Liberation Front of India
People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak
People's Revolutionary Party of KangleipakProgressive
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
Popular Front for the Renaissance of the Central
African Republic
Popular Liberation Army
Popular Resistance Brigade
Popular Resistance Committees
Popular Resistance Movement
Raia Mutomboki Militia
Ranbir/Ranvir Sena
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
Real Irish Republican Army
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
Revolutionary Punishment Movement
Revolutionary Struggle
Right Sector
Rubicon (Rouvikonas)
Runda Kumpulan Kecil
Samyukta Jatiya Mukti Morcha
Sanaa Province of the Islamic State
Seleka
Shamiya Front
Shining Path

1

2
1
2
1
0
2
1
0
0
0
0
2

EN
LW,EN,
R
EN
EN
LW
EN
EN
R
EN
EN
R
0
0
R, EN

TC
TC
RC
PC
PC
TC
TC
TC
TC
SR
SR
TC

0

EN

TC

1
0
1
2
0
1

EN
0
LW
EN
LW
EN

RC
RC
TC
TC
RC
TC

1

EN

TC

1

LW, EN

TC

0

EN

TC

1
0
1
1
2
1
4
1
3
0
0
2
1
1
0
1
3
2
1

LW
R
R, EN
EN
EN
0
R, EN
R, EN
LW
R
0
0
0
R, EN
EN
R
R, EN
R
LW

RC
RC
TC
RC
SQ
SQ
RC
TC
RC
E
SR
SQ
SR
RC
PC
E
RC
RC
RC

2

TC
TC
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Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries
Shura Council of Mujahideen in Derna
Shutdown G20: Take Hamburg Offline!
Sinai Province of the Islamic State
Sindhudesh Liberation Army
Southern Front
Southern Mobility Movement
Students Islamic Movement of India
Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minawi
Sudan Liberation Movement
Sudan People's Liberation Movement - North
Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Opposition
Taliban
Tehrik al-Mojahedin
Tehrik e-Taliban Pakistan
Tehrik-e-Khilafat
Terai Army
The Defense Command of the French People and
the Motherland
The Joint Revolutionary Council
The New Irish Republican Army
Tripoli Province of the Islamic State
Tripoli Revolutionaries Battalion
Tritiya Prastuti Committee
Turkestan Islamic Party
Ulster Volunteer Force
United Baloch Army
United Democratic Liberation Army
United Democratic Madhesi Front
United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship
United Liberation Front of Assam
United National Liberation Front
United Revolutionary Front (India)
United Self Defense Units of Colombia
Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP)
Weichan Auka Mapu
Wild Individualities
Zeliangrong United Front

3
1
0
2
0
4
3
0
0
0
0
2
4
1
4
0
0

R
R
0
R
EN
0
R
R
EN
EN
EN
EN
R
R, EN
R
R, EN
EN

E
TC
PC
E
TC
RC
TC
E
RC
TC
TC
TC
RC
RC
RC
E
TC

0

0

SQ

0
1
3
2
1
3
1
0
0
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
0
0
1

EN
EN
R
EN
LW
R, EN
EN
EN
EN
EN
LW
LW, EN
LW, EN
0
0
R
LW
0
EN

RC
TC
E
RC
RC
RC
SQ
TC
RC
TC
RC
TC
TC
PC
SQ
SQ
SR
SR
TC

Size: (0: 0-99; 1: 100-999; 2: 1,000-4,999; 3: 5,000-9,999; 4: 10,000+)
Ideology: (R: Religious; EN: Ethnonationalist; LW: Left-Wing; O: Other)
Goals: (E: Empire; SR: Social Revolution: TC: Territorial Control; RC: Regime Change; SQ: Status Quo; PC: Policy
Change)
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